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>Virus2 News

Current world news with Covid-19 environment

- Covid-19 is causing various changes in around Aug. 2020 -

Cat: ECO
Pub: 2020/8

Souces: Forbes, Brookings, The Guardian, et al.


Current world news with Covid-19


  1. Introduction:
  2. Japanese Prime Minister Abe resigns:
  3. Japan's GDP plunges 27.8%:
  4. Abenomics:
  5. L-Shaped Recovery:
  6. Uncertainty of US-China investment flow:
  7. First development of vaccine:
  8. Serious brain disorders with mild sympotoms:
  9. Post-Covid-19 Economic Nationalism:
  10. Pandemic reinforcing authoritalism:
  11. China's economic reopening:
  12. The fastest route to ending this crisis:
  13. Britain's reopening:
  14. Germany's reopening:
  15. France's reopening
  16. England further restrictions from 14 Sept, 2020;
  17. Japanese Dr. Tatsuhiko Kodama's view:
  18. Covid-19 mutated. Can vaccines keep up?:
  19. Covid vaccine update: When will one be ready?:
  20. The COVAX Facility:
  21. What is the R number?:
  1. 序文:
  2. 安倍首相退陣表明:
  3. 日本のGDP27.8%下落:
  4. アベノミクス:
  5. L字型回復:
  6. 米中投資の不安定要素:
  7. ワクチン開発の第一段階:
  8. 軽症でも深刻な脳障害の可能性
  9. コロナ後の経済ナショナリズム:
  10. 権威主義を高める伝染病:
  11. 中国の経済再開:
  12. ウイルス危機の早期解決:
  13. 英国の再開:
  14. ドイツの再開:
  15. フランスの再開:
  16. イングランド 9/14から再度規制強化'
  17. 日本の児玉龍彦医師の見解:
  18. コロナウイルスは変異した。ワクチンは対応可能か:
  19. コロナワクチン最新動向、いつ実用化なるか:
  20. コロナワクチン国際共同購入機関 COVAX Facility
  21. R数とは何か:

; Audacity; Brain disorder; China join COVAX; COVANX: Frugal Four; GFCC; How depression happen; Japan's trap; L-Shaped recovery; Middle power; Performance legitimacy; Punting forward decades; ;Reflation; Return-to-work rate; Vaccine effectiveness;

  • Covid-19 Pandemic Update (as of Sep.6, 2020) affecting 213 countries and territories; over 1M people died on Sept 29, 2020.
    • Cf: Spanish flu pandemic (1918-Apr. 1920): mutated from Avian flu (bird flu)
      (H1N1 influenza A virus; infected 500M people, 25-30% of world population (around 1.7-2B) in four successive waves;
      the death toll is about 17-50M, mostly due to Cytokine storm typically among younger people)
    • Japan: infected 23.8M out of total population 55M (43%), and died about 390K people.
  • Coronavirus Update site: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/
# Country
Total cases (1000) Total deaths
/1M pop
/1M pop
Total tests /1M pop Population
Jan.8 Sept 6 Jan.8 Sept 6 Jan.8 Sept 6 Jan.8 Sept 6 Jan.8 Sept 6 2020
  World 88,459 27,117 1,905 885 11,348 3,479 244 114     7,812
1 USA 22,112 6,434 374 193 66,599 19,418 1,126 582 799,491 261,945 331
2 India 10,414 4,132 151 71 7,508 2,989 109 80 128,619 35,322 1,383
3 Brazil 7,962 4,123 200 126 36,253 19,372 940 593 134,055 67,696 213
4 Russia 3,332 1,026 60 18 22,175 7,027 414 122 627,541 263,111 146
5 UK 2,889 344 79 42 39,002 5,065 1,153 611 806,445 259,302 68
6 France 2,727 318 69 31 40,640 4,865 995 471 552,820 130,168 65
8 Italy 2,220 276 77 36 35,677 4,572 1,247 588 445,679 151,251 60
9 Spain


517 52 29 41,415 11,060 1,087 629 577,711 196,979 47
10 Germany 1,869 251 39 9.4 21,257 2,995 418 112 414,696 147,710 84
18 Peru 1,027 684 38 30 30,915 20,684 1,146 898 169,134


42 Japan 258 71 3.8 1.3 2,046 561 30 11 41,222 21,612 126
82 China 87 85 4.6 4.6 61 59 3 3 111,163 111,163 1,439
86 S.Korea 67 21 1.0 0.3 1,300 20 19 7 89,094 39,899 51

>Top 0. Introduction:

  • The world is changing irrevocably by Covid-19: Has the summer in 2020 become like a kind of divide of no-return (Anāgāmi).

0. 序文

  • 世界はコロナウイルスによって不可逆的な変化を遂げつつある。2020年8月はこのような戻ることのない不還 (阿那含) になってしまったのか。

>Top 1. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe resigns due to poor health, markets slump:
by Ralph Jennings, Aug. 28, 2020

  • Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said he would resign Friday due to health problems after a record-length term in office, leaving a legacy marked by a unique economic stimulus program.
    Markets reacted negatively to the late afternoon announcement with a drop of as much as 2.6% in the benchmark Nikkei 225 index, before paring losses to close down 1.4%. The yen rose as much as 1% against the dollar to 105.50, according to a Bloomberg report.
    Abe announced his resignation a year before the end of his term. He has battled ulcerative colitis, an incurable intestinal disease, since at least 2007 when he resigned during his first term after about a year.
    "I made a judgment that I should not continue my job as prime minister,” Abe told NHK, as cited by text media reports in Tokyo. “I need to fight against the disease and need to be treated."
    The prime minister took the top job again in 2012, promising to revive Japan’s economic growth with Abenomics. GDP had stagnated in the 1990s. His plan called for more spending, a larger money supply and reforms to make the economy more competitive.
    Abe sought to build strong ties with the U.S., becoming the first leader of a major nation to meet with Donald Trump following his election as U.S. president in 2016.

  • Stronger relations with China, despite chronic acrimony over World War II issues and modern territorial disputes, will also further define the “conservative nationalist” PM’s legacy, says Stephen Nagy, a senior associate professor of politics and international studies at International Christian University in Tokyo.
    However, Japanese citizens grew critical of Abe this year over perceptions that he let the country’s Covid-19 caseload grow too high, Nagy says. Japan has reported nearly 65,000 cases and more than 1,200 deaths over two waves, one in April and the other this month. “You have a domestic level and an international level, so it’s hard to say he’s all good or all bad,” Nagy says, sizing up Abe’s reputation.

  • Staying in office would confront Abe with the specter of cancelling the summer Olympics a second time due to Covid-19, Nagy says. The Games were delayed a year from July-August 2020 because of the outbreak.
  • Japan’s relations with the United States face “potential changes” after the U.S. presidential election in November, Nagy adds. Abe and U.S. President Donald Trump are especially close. They have jointly resisted North Korea and shared ideas on other problems in Asia, the think tank Center for Strategic & International Studies says.
    Abe said he would stay on board until his Liberal Democratic Party picked a new prime minister, Tokyo-based Kyodo News reported.

1. 安倍首相、健康などを理由に退任表明 (2020/8/28)

  • acrimony: bitterness or ill feeling
  • 日本の安倍首相は、長期政権の記録を打ち立てた後、 2020/8/28金曜に辞任を表明した。Bloombergによれば、日経平均225社株価はこれに反応して2.6%下落し、為替は1%円高の¥105.50となった。安倍首相の任期はまで1年残しての退陣となる。彼は、2007年以来、不治の潰瘍性大腸炎を患っていた。今回も、"病気の治療が必要とのことなので、これ以上政権を続けるべきではないと判断した"とNHKに語った。2012年に政権について以来、アベノミクスによって経済復活に取り組んできた。GDPは1990年代以来に低迷したきたが、この計画によって、消費の喚起、より大型の資金供給、また経済の競争力強化を目指してきた。さらに主要国の中でDonald Trumpを最初に面談した首脳となるなど日米関係の強化を推進してきた。

  • 先の大戦中の歴史認識や最近の領土問題はあるが、日中関係改善に取り組みつつも、中国との関係改善に努めてきた。国際基督教大学のStephen Nagyによれば、この"保守的ナショナリスト"は首相のレガシーとなろうという。しかし、日本国民は、コロナウイルス対策では、4月と8月の二波によって、6.5万人近くの感染者と1200人以上の死者を出すなどの批判が高まってきた。Nagy曰く、"感染状況では、国内のレベルと海外のレベルの違いがあり、安倍首相の対策が良かったか悪かったを決めつけるのは難しい。"

  • Nagy(国際関係戦略研究センター)によれば、これ以上政権を続けると、すでに1年間延期されたオリンピックの開催が中止に追い込まれるリスクが出てくるという。11月の米国大統領選挙の結果次第では、日米関係は"変化する可能性"はある。安倍首相はトランプ大統領と特に親しいからだ。両者は、北朝鮮問題その他のアジアの問題で意見を共有してきた、という。なお、安倍首相は、次期首相が決まるまでその職に留まるとのことである。

>Top 2. Japan's GDP Plunges 27.8%:, begging question who should be responsible?:
by William Pesek, senior contributor, Aug 17, 2020:

  • If there’s any Tokyo job lost in translation these days, it’s Yasutoshi Nishimura’s. He is Japan’s minister of “economic revitalization,” a contraction in terms as growth craters an annualized 27.8%. 
    One unfortunate cabinet secretary in the wrong gig at the wrong time—amid Covid-19—doesn’t deserve all the blame. It fell to Nishimura to face the cameras on Monday and admit the economy suffered a “severe outcome” in the April-June period. The economy is suffering from a coronavirus shock that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s team assured us Japan would avoid.
    It’s time, though, that Japan’s 126 million people asked an obvious question: Who should be responsible as Asia’s second-biggest economy veers so sharply into the red?
    Many economies are stumbling as lockdowns cause the human version of a credit crunch. Yet Japan under Abe, Nishimura’s boss, saw GDP tank an annualized 7.3% between October and December, long before #coronavirus began trending on Twitter or Tokyo confirmed its first case. And this Group of Seven economy continues to suffer for it.

  • >Top The hit to fourth-quarter growth was the result of an ill-conceived sales tax hike to 10% last October. A quick Google search of “Herbert Hoover” could’ve explained why tightening fiscal policy during a global trade war is a terrible idea. And yet Abe, Nishimura and Finance Minister Taro Aso raised sales levies anyway, arguing it was necessary to pay down national debt.
    If only they’d Googled “how depressions happen” on September 30, the day before Herbert Hoovering the economy. It could’ve enabled Japan to spend less than the $\$$2.2 trillion it’s now pumping into a flatlining business environment. Odds are, Japan would’ve required Covid-19 stimulus regardless—just like the U.S. and Europe. But now Japan finds itself spending 40% of GDP to get growth back to the mediocre pace of 2019.
    To recap, a tax hike meant to reduce Tokyo’s debt burden now has it pushing borrowings to a record high to ease the fallout. The same thing happened in 2014, when Team Abe boosted sales taxes to 8% from 5%. In quick succession, Japan slid into recession and debt sales increased to ease the GDP hit. By the way, a similar chain of events befell Japan in 1997.
    Economists talk so much about lessons from Japan’s deflation and lost decades. More discussion should be devoted to Tokyo’s failure to learn from its own mistakes. At the very minimum, Team Abe should announce an immediate suspension of the last two consumption tax hikes, putting the rate down to 5%.

  • >Top Tokyo’s political establishment also needs to demand some new blood in economic leadership circles. The only bull market Aso, who turns 80 in September, knows how to generate is insensitive gaffes that require days to clean up.
    Until now, Abe could’ve argued he needed the support of his deputy prime minister to triangulate Tokyo’s factional politics. Aso was, after all, prime minister for 12 months between 2008 and 2009. As finance minister, though, Aso is as hapless as they come. The failure to implement a single one of the seemingly bold reforms Team Abe promised back in 2012 leaves Aso with a rather dismal economic legacy.
    If Nishimura has any gravitas, or juice, to get anything notable, it’s past time he spoke up. Or, that Abe did a serious cabinet reshuffling. Tokyo really does need a kind of war-time cabinet of sorts to confront head-on the challenges it’s been punting forward for a couple of decades now. The war Tokyo needs to declare is against economic complacency.

  • Nineteen years ago, then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi arrived on the scene pledging a structural reform big bang. He pledged to cut red tape, incentivize a startup boom and get the government’s hands off the free market. Between 2001 and 2006, Koizumi managed to privatize the sprawling Japan Post system, which included the globe’s biggest savings bank. 
    Then Koizumi passed the baton to Abe, who served as prime minister from 2006 to 2007. Abe famously shelved economic upgrades in favor of nationalist pet projects. After him came a revolving door of leaders—including Aso—who let the Bank of Japan run the economy. Abe 2.0 has, for the most part, continued this leave-it-to-the-BOJ pattern.
    This complacency, leader after leader, is why Japanese growth is nosediving at a nearly 28% rate. Sure, Covid-19 is doing the pushing here. But If any of the nine governments that ran Japan these last 20 years did their duty to modernize a rigid and aging system, the economy might not be cavitating so spectacularly.
    Tokyo officialdom can stick with the same B-team whose fingerprints are all over the deep recession Japan could’ve avoided. But resigning Japan to yet another lost decade is in no one’s interest. The time to bring in a new team with vision and bravado was, frankly, yesterday.

2. 日本のGDPは27.8%も下落:
by William Pesek, (2020/8/17):

  • recapitulate: recap, state again
  • befall: happen to
  • gaffe: unintentional remark causing embarrassment
  • hapless: unfortune
  • complacency: feeling of uncritical satisfaction with oneself
  • nosedive: steep downward plunge
  • cavitate: 空洞
  • officialdom: officials in an organization
  • bravado: bold manner
  • tank: 急落する
  • hapless: 不運、数奇、unlucky
  • dismal: 陰気な、憂鬱な、お粗末な
  • gravitas: 実直さ
  • juice: 活力、意気込み
  • head-on: 正面から
  • take a punt: 一か八か賭けてみる
  • complacence: 自己満足
  • sprawl: 大の字に倒す、
  • nosedive: 急落、急降下
  • cavitate: 空洞を作る
  • bravado: 虚勢、からいばり
  • 日本の成長率は、4-5月のGDP年換算27.8%下落の予測を受けて、西村経済再生大臣は記者会見に臨んだ。コロナのせいでこのような結果となったことの責任はないが、西村大臣の会見での表情は、4-6月の期間での経済の"厳しい結果"を反映していた。安倍内閣としてコロナによる経済ショックを防ごうと約束してきた中でのこの数字に対し、126百万の日本国民にとって、アジア第二位の経済がこのように急落することが誰の責任なのかという追求がでてくるだろう。多くのエコノミストの指摘では、各国の経済でもロックダウンが原因で人間移動が制限されて信用収縮を招いているのではないかとのこと。日本の10-12月のGDPはまた7.3%の下落になると予測があり、これはG7の経済でも同様に経済下落が予測されている。

  • なお、昨年Q4の結果は、昨年10月の消費税を10%に引き上げに起因するが、それにはまず、米国大恐慌時のHerber Hooverの時の事例を参照すべきで、いかにグローバル貿易戦争の時の緊縮政策は恐ろしい結果を招くかの指摘である。Googleを検索すると、Herbert Hooverのやったような経済政策が、(消費税増税前日の) 9/30に暴落をもたらしたかがよくわかる。日本は現在$\$$2.2兆を経済維持に注ぎ込んでいるが、(それを消費税増税の代わりにやれば)もっと少なく経済への影響は欧米と同様になると予想される。結局、消費税を上げたことで日本の負債を減少させようとしたが、実際には国債発行は記録的なレベルに上昇せざるを得なくなった。同様のことが安倍政権で、2014年に消費税を5%から8%に引き上げたことでも景気後退した。同様のことが1997年の消費税値上げの際にも発生した。

  • 日本の経済政策には新たな人材が必要ではないか。この9月に80歳になる麻生財務大臣の強気市場の発言は顰蹙を買っている。今までは、安倍首相は、3派閥のトライアングルとして麻生副首相兼財務大臣を必要としてきた。麻生は2008-09の12ヶ月間は日本の首相であった。不本意ながらその後財務大臣として復活した。2010年に安倍政権が復活して、大胆な改革を大胆に進める上で、麻生の存在はむしろ経済的レガシーとなった。西村大臣が実直で活力があれば、その過去の政策にも言及すべきである、あるいは安倍首相は大胆が内閣改造を行うべきである。日本はまさに内閣の戦時体制で課題に正面から対応すべきで、今後20-30年に賭けてみるしかない。日本は経済的な自己満足に対抗すると宣言する必要がある。

  • 19年前に、当時の小泉首相は経済改革ビッグバンを公約した。彼は官僚主義を廃し、起業を促進し、自由市場を推進した。2001-06の間に、小泉内閣は、世界最大級の銀行である郵政の民営化を推し進めた。その後、小泉は安倍にバトンタッチし、安倍は2006-07に首相を努めた。安倍は経済上昇を棚上げし、ナショナリスト的な案件を推進した。彼が再度、麻生と共に政権に復帰して、日銀を使った経済運営を行った。いわゆるAbe 2.0は、この日銀任せの形態のことである。日本の成長率が28%も急落したのは、コロナウイルスのせいもあるが、過去の9回もの政権が、高齢化など構造改革をしてくれば、経済はこれほど空洞化することはなかったと思われる。日本の官僚組織は、このような深刻な不況に対して、補欠選手のような対応しかしてこなかった。もっと早くビジョンと勇気のある新チームを投入すべきだったのだ。

>Top 3. Abenomics:
by Will Kenton , updated Jan 17, 2018

  • Abenomics:
    Abenomics refers to the economic policies of a particular politician, in the same way, that Reaganomics or Clintonomics does. It's a nickname for the multi-pronged economic program of Japanese prime minister Shinzō Abe.

  • >Top Breaking Down Abenomics:
    Abenomics refers to economic policies enacted by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe at the outset of his second term. 
    Abenomics involves increasing the nation’s money supply, boosting government spending, and enacting reforms to make the Japanese economy more competitive. The Economist outlined the program as a "mix of reflation, government spending, and a growth strategy designed to jolt the economy out of suspended animation that has gripped it for more than two decades."

  • >Top Context:
    That "suspended animation" dates back to the 90s, also known as the Lost Decade. It was a period of marked economic stagnation in Japan, following a massive real estate bubble burst in the 1980s, and Japan's asset price bubble burst in the early 90s.
    As a result, the Japanese government ran massive budget deficits, funding pubic works projects. In 1998, economist Paul Krugman argued in a paper titled "Japan's Trap" that Japan could raise inflation expectations, thereby cutting long-term interest rates and promoting spending, to break out of this economic stagnation. 
    Japan adopted a similar technique known as quantitative easing, expanding the money supply domestically, and keeping interest rates remarkably low. This facilitated an economic recovery, beginning in 2005, but did not stop deflation. 
    In July 2006, Japan ended its zero-rate policy. Though still having the lowest interest rates in the world, Japan could not stop deflation. The country saw the Nikkei 225 drop more than 50% between the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2009.

  • The Program:
    After serving as prime minister briefly from 2006 to 2007, Shinzō Abe began a second term in December 2012. Soon after resuming office, he launched an ambitious plan to bolster Japan’s stagnant economy.
    In a speech following his election, Abe announced that he and his cabinet would "implement bold monetary policy, flexible fiscal policy and a growth strategy that encourages private investment, and with these three pillars, achieve results."
    Abe’s program consists of three “arrows.” The first consists of printing additional currency – between 60 trillion yen to 70 trillion yen – to make Japanese exports more attractive and generate modest inflation—roughly 2%.
    The second arrow entails new government spending programs to stimulate demand and consumption—to stimulate short-term growth, and to achieve a budget surplus over the long term. 
    The third component of Abenomics is more complex—a reform of various regulations to make Japanese industries more competitive and to encourage investment in and from the private sector. This includes corporate governance reform, easing of restrictions on hiring foreign staff in special economic zones, making it easier for companies to fire ineffective workers, liberalizing the health sector and implementing measures the help domestic and foreign entrepreneurs. The proposed legislation also aimed to restructure the utility and pharmaceutical industries and modernize the agricultural sector. Most important, perhaps, was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was described by economist Yoshizaki Tatsuhiko as potentially the "linchpin of Abe's economic revitalization strategy," by making Japan more competitive through free trade.

  • The Effect:
    As of May 2017, though the Bank of Japan's preferred metric for inflation is up on 0.1% from a year ago, growth in Japan has run at an annualized 1.2%, well above Japan's underlying rate; unemployment is at 2.8%, a 22-year low. Japanese companies are trying to find ways to reduce the quality and quantity of their offerings instead of raising prices. According to the Financial Times, though, these cutbacks won't be enough: "Japan is primed for inflation." And this is against a difficult global economic backdrop, which has provided little support for economic recovery or inflation.

3. アベノミックス:
by Will Kenton (2018/1/17)

  • prong: 方面、段階
  • reflation: 通貨再膨張, デフレの後のインフレを起こすこと
  • jolt: push or shake arbruptly
  • susupended animation: 仮死状態, 休眠状態
  • linchpin: 要、中心人物
  • prime: make ready for use or action, 弾丸装填、燃料を入れる
  • アベノミックス: レーガノミックスやクリントノミックスと同様の安倍首相による多方面の経済政策のニックネームのことである。

  • アベノミックスの分析:

  • 経緯:
    その結果、日本政府は大幅な財政赤字による公共工事を推進した。1998年に経済学者Paul Krugmanは、日本の長期低金利政策による支出拡大やインフレへの期待は"日本の罠"であると論じた。日本は金融の量的緩和という手法を推進し、極端な低金利政策を大胆に推進し、超低金利を維持した。これによって2005年から経済回復をするものの、デフレ傾向は止まらなかった。2006年6月に、日本はゼロ金利政策をやめた。それでも世界の中での超低金利政策を続けたもののデフレは止まらなかった。日経平均は2007ー2009年にかけて50%も下落した。

  • 計画:

  • 効果:
    2017年5月には、日銀はインフレを0.1% から上げるよう試みたものの、日本の成長率は年1.2%のレベルに留まり、一方失業率は2.8%と22年間でも低レベルで推移している。日本企業は、価格上げるさせるよりも質と量の両面での製品価格値下げを模索している。Financial Timesによれば、価格の値下げでは十分でなく、日本はインフレを重視してきたはずだが、世界経済の後退局面の中でインフレを目指すのは至難である。

>Top 4. L-Shaped Recovery:
by Jim Chappelow, updated Jul 10, 2020

  • What is an L-Shaped Recovery:
    An L-shaped recovery is a type of recovery characterized by a slow rate of recovery, with persistent unemployment and stagnant economic growth. L-shaped recoveries occur following an economic recession characterized by a more-or-less steep decline in the economy, but without a correspondingly steep recovery. When depicted as a line chart, graphs of major economic performance may visually resemble the shape of the letter “L” during this period. 
    When referring to recessions and the periods of recovery that follow, economists often refer to the general shape that appears when charting relevant measures of economic health. For instance, employment rates, gross domestic product and industrial output are indications of the current state of the economy. In an L-shaped recovery, there is a steep decline caused by plummeting economic growth followed by a more shallow upward slope indicating a long period of stagnant growth. In an L-shaped recession, recovery can sometimes take several years.
    Recoveries can also be V-shaped, W-shaped, and U-shaped. As in an L-shaped recovery, these names are based on the shape seen on a chart of relevant economic data.

  • Key Takeaways:
    • An L-shaped recovery is when, after a steep recession, the economy experiences a slow rate of recover, which resembles the shape of the letter “L” when charted as a line graph.
    • L-shaped recoveries are characterized by persistently high unemployment, a slow return of businesses investment activity, and a sluggish rate of growth in economic output, and are associated with some of the worst economic episodes through history.
    • A common thread in L-shaped recoveries is a massive fiscal and monetary policy response to the preceding recession, which may slow down the economy’s recovery process.

  • Understanding the L-Shaped Recovery:
    An L-shaped recovery is the most harmful type of recession and recovery. Because there is a drastic drop in economic growth and the economy does not recover for a significant period of time, an L-shaped recession is often called a depression.
    The most important feature that defines an L-shaped recovery is a failure of the economy to progress back toward full employment after a recession. During an L-shaped recovery, the economy does not readjust and reallocate resources to get workers working and ramp up business operations very quickly. Large numbers of workers can remain unemployed for extended periods or even leave the workforce entirely. Likewise, capital goods such as factories and equipment may stand idle or underutilized for extended time-frames as well.
    A few economic theories have been advanced as to why and how this can occur. Keynesian economists argue that persistent pessimism, underconsumption, and excessive saving can produce a prolonged period of sub-normal economic activity, and even that this is normal and there is no strong reason to expect the economy to be able to adjust and rebound on its own. Others point out that L-shaped recoveries can typically be characterized as those in which monetary and fiscal policy interventions actively prevent the economy from adjusting and recovering from the losses of the preceding recession. These policies appear to ease the initial pain of recession and protect the financial sector, but slow down the economy’s adjustment process.

  • L-Shaped Recovery Examples:
    Three major examples of L-shaped recoveries stand out in the last century of economic cycles: the recoveries of the Great Depression of the 1930’s, the Lost Decade in Japan, and the Great Recession following the 2008 financial crisis. All three of these periods are well known for the massive campaigns of expansionary fiscal and monetary policy that were pursued at the time.

  • The Great Depression:
    Following the stock market crash of 1929 the U.S. entered the Great Depression, the worst recession ever seen. U.S. real GDP contracted sharply and unemployment rose to a peak of 23%. Stagnant growth and high unemployment persisted for over a decade. 
    In response to the crash and recession, President Hoover increased both spending and taxes and ramped up unprecedented peacetime federal deficits, hitting a deficit of 2.74% of GDP by the end of his term. Hoover led a concerted federal campaign to keep wages and prices from falling through new federal lending subsidies, labor legislation, federal funding for unemployment benefits, and influential, though not technically enforceable, demands that businesses not cut workers pay. The recession continued to deepen following these measures.
    Expansionary monetary policy was also pursued through this period. The Federal Reserve cut the discount rate and purchased large quantities of Treasury securities to inject new liquidity into the banking system. Eventually the U.S. would take the radical step to abandon the gold standard under President Franklin D. Roosevelt in order to protect the interests of the financial system and facilitate more inflationary monetary policy.
    After the 1932 election, FDR extended and doubled down Hoover’s policies with fiscal policy involving ongoing annual federal deficits of 2-4% of GDP to fund massive public works projects and dramatically expanded federal regulation of economic activity. In the wake of these policies, collectively known as the New Deal, high unemployment and lackluster growth would extend the L-shaped recovery through the entire decade of the 1930’s.

  • The Lost Decade:
    What is known as the lost decade in Japan is widely considered to be an example of an L-shaped recovery. Leading up to the 1990s, Japan was experiencing remarkable economic growth. In the 1980s, the country ranked first for gross national production per capita. During this time, real estate and stock market prices were quickly rising. Concerned about an asset price bubble, the Bank of Japan raised interest rates in 1989. A stock market crash followed, and annual economic growth slowed from 3.89 percent to an average of 1.14 percent between 1991 to 2003. 
    In response to the crisis the Japanese government would engage in 10 rounds of deficit spending and economic stimulus programs totaling over 100 trillion yen through the decade. On the monetary front, the Bank of Japan cut interest rates over and over, approaching 0% by 1999, and accelerated the supply of new reserves to the banking system. During this time, Japan experienced what is now known as the lost decade. It failed to recover from the crash for 10 years and experienced the consequences of a slow recovery for another decade after that.

4. L字型回復:
by Jim Chappelow (2020/7/10

  • plummet: おもり、急落
  • ramp up: 突進する、飛びかかる、強化する
  • double down: strengthen one's commitment to a particular stragey. 意固地になる、強化する
  • lackluster: 輝きがない、冴えない
  • L字型回復とは緩慢な回復、持続的な雇用、停滞的な経済成長のことをいう。急激な経済下落に続いては、むしろV字回復ではなくL字型の回復となる傾向がある。L字回復では、急激な経済下落の後は、緩慢な回復で数年かけたL字型の回復となる傾向がある。
  • 回復基調には、V字型、W字型、U字型がある。L字型回復の特徴は
    • 緩慢なL字型の景気回復
    • 長く継続する失業率の高止まりや緩慢な投資行動による緩慢な経済成長、および過去の失敗経験からの脱却の難しさ
    • その前の不況対策として実施した財政や金融政策と共通した脈絡自体が、むしろ経済回復プロセスを緩慢にしている側面がある。

  • L字型回復への理解:

  • L字型回復の事例:

  • 大恐慌:
    1929年の株式市場崩壊の後 、米国は大恐慌に突入し、実質GDPの縮小、失業率23%になった。その後の経済回復には十年を要した。当時のHoover大統領は、財政出動と増税を行い、平時での財政赤字はGDPの2.74%に達した。同時にHooverは、連邦からの資金供与や労働立法、失業対策、賃金カットをしないように要請した。不況はさらに続きこれらの政策を更に必要とした。またこの間、金融緩和策を拡大した。連銀は、金利を引き下げ、大量の国債を購入して金融システムに資金注入した。その結果、米国は、Roosevelt大統領の下で金本位制を離脱して金融機関の金利を守り、さらなる金融緩和策を続けた。
    1932年の選挙後、Roosevelt大統領はHooverの政策を倍増させ、GDPの2-4%の赤字となったと、巨大が公共プロジェクトを推進し、連邦によるNew Deal政策を推進したが、高失業率と低成長によるL字型回復は1930年代の十年間に及んだ。

  • 失われた十年:

>Top 5. Uncertainty is Slowing US-China Investment Flows:
Forbes China Forum, Russell Flannery, Forbes Staff, Aug. 28, 2020:

  • Heightened uncertainty about the outlook for overall U.S.-China relations is hurting investment flows between the two countries, the president of an influential U.S.-China business group said at an online forum organized by Forbes China on Wednesday. 
    “American businesses are not leaving China, and Chinese businesses are not leaving America, but uncertainty has led to rethinking of the marginal investment dollar. Where will the next investment go?” said Craig Allen, president of the Washington, D.C.-based U.S-China Business Council. 
    “In many cases, American companies will not be investing as much as they had planned to in China, and Chinese companies unfortunately are not as investing as much as they would like to — or could — in the United States,” Allen said.

  • Held against a volatile backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, stock boom, global politics and trade disputes, the 2nd U.S.-China Business Forum highlighted how American and Chinese businesses are trying to navigate the changing currents between two of the world’s largest economies and trading partners.   
    Underscoring how discordant U.S. voices on China have become in an election year, the country drew fire on Thursday in President Trump’s speech at the Republican National Convention.  Yet a day earlier, the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai published a survey that found a planned Trump ban on popular Chinese app WeChat on national security grounds would hurt American companies (see earlier story here). Fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic and high U.S. unemployment in an election year have caused disagreements between the two countries to be felt even more acutely, Allen noted.

  • “From a political science perspective, you could say that we're caught on the horns of a security dilemma,” Allen said. “That is, the American side takes a step that the Chinese side looks as that is threatening, so the Chinese side takes a step which the American side looks at as threatening.” 
    “A bit of a vicious cycle” has followed that extends from geopolitics into visas, trade, finance, technology, media, ideology and other areas, Allen said. In spite of those and other disputes involving Chinese businesses such as Huawei and TikTok, “bilateral trade and investment is relatively stable. And that’s a very good thing because it brings stability to the overall relationship.”
    One cause for optimism was a conversation this week between U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Robert Lighthizer and China Vice Premier Liu He on a Phase One trade deal worked out by the two sides earlier this year that would increase American exports to China. To date, the Phase One framework “has worked out very well for both sides,” Allen said.

  • Even there, however, China needs to step up further to meet agreement obligations.  “We're probably at roughly 26% of those commitments being met,” Allen said. “So there's a challenge moving forward.” 
    The U.S.-China Business Council is a private, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization representing over 200 American companies doing business with China. Businesses represented on its board include AIG, Boeing, Cummins, Fedex, Ford, GM and Walmart. Allen was a long-time U.S. commercial and foreign affairs officer before he became council president in 2018. 
    Other forum participants included Cho Tak Wong, chairman of Fuyao Glass Industry; IMAX CEO Richard Gelfond; Hao Hong, the Head of Research, BOCOM International, a subsidiary of the Bank of Communications; Ken Jarrett, a senior advisor at Albright Stonebridge Group; Duane Kuang, member of the 2020 Forbes Midas List and founding managing partner of Qiming Venture Partners; Dr. Bob Li, Physician Ambassador to China and Asia-Pacific, Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, George Wang, vice chairman of the Zhonglu Group; Wang Huiyao, president of the Center for China and Globalization, and Roger Wang, chairman of the Golden Eagle International Group and chairman of the Committee of 100.

5. 米中投資の停滞についての不確定要素:
by Russell Flannery, Forbes Staff (2020/8/28)

  • dicordant: 不協和音の
  • fallout: 副産物、予期しない影響
  • 8/26水曜の影響力のある米中企業グループによれば、最近の米中関係の状況により両国間の投資の不確定要素について注目されてきている。"米国企業は中国を去らないし、中国企業も米国を去らないが、不確定要素が限界的な投資について再考することになり、次の投資がどこに行くのかだ。多くの場合、米国企業は従来中国での投資計画のようには投資しないだろうし、中国企業も同様に米国での投資はできないだろう。"とCraig Allen(ワシントンDCの米中商工会議所会長)は言う。

  • 現状ではコロナウイルスによる不測な状況、株価ブーム、グローバルな政治や貿易摩擦の中での第2回米中ビジネスフォーラムが米中企業間で世界1位と2位の経済大国としてどう先導していくのかの議論があった。特に選挙年や共和党大会ということでトランプ政権の米国の中国に対する非難が高まっている。その前日に上海で、米国商工会議所は、トランプが計画しているWeChatサービスの禁止は、むしろ米国企業にとって損失になると公表した。選挙年に発生したコロナウイルス問題や米国の高い失業率などが、両国の摩擦を一層先鋭化させているとAllenは指摘している。

  • 双方は、相手方が脅威となる対象への対抗措置が拡大しており、ビザの発給、貿易、金融、技術、メディア、イデオロギーなどの分野での逆サイクルの傾向が生じている。但し、HuaweiやTikTokが問題となっているが、全般的には両国間の貿易や投資は比較的安定しているとしている。この楽観的な根拠としては、米通商代表のRobert Lighthizerと中国の刘鹤(Liú hè)副首相は第一段階の合意が今年実行され、米国の中国へ輸出が拡大していることがある。Allen曰く、第一段階の合意の実行は順調とのこと。

  • しかし、中国側の合意項目の実行率は約26%で、今後さらなる実行が必要という。
    なお、米中商工会議所は、私的機関、党派性なく、非営利の組織で中国と取引をしている米国企業200社(AIG, Boeing, Cummins, Fedex, Ford, GM, Walmartなど)が会員である。Allenは、2018年に商工会議所会頭になる前は、長い間米国の商務省や外務官僚をしていた。

>Top 6. Fauci Says Fast Development of Vacines Doesn't Threaten Safety:
by Anna Edney, Bloomberg, Aug. 5, 2020.

  • The rapid speed at which researchers are developing coronavirus vaccines doesn’t mean that safety is being sacrificed, said Anthony Fauci, the U.S. government’s top infectious-disease expert.
    “The rapidity with which we are moving relates more to technological advances with how you can make a vaccine even before you start testing it,” Fauci, the head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases and one of the top U.S. health officials, said on Wednesday in an interview with Bloomberg Television.
    Fauci has said numerous times he is cautiously optimistic that a vaccine for Covid-19 will be available at the end of this year or early 2021. He said in the interview that by working ahead to secure trial sites and manufacturing for the vaccine, it allows the process to move more quickly.
    Patients in the U.S. began late last month receiving shots in later-stage clinical trials of two different vaccines, one developed by Moderna Inc. and another by Pfizer Inc. and BioNTech SE. Several others are expected to soon follow.

  • >Top Fauci said he hopes a vaccine is at least 70% effective but if it is more like 50% to 60% effective, “I’ll feel good about that.” The measles vaccine is 97% to 98% effective, he said.
    Pfizer and BioNTech have said their goal is to submit data from the trial for regulatory review as soon as October. Results are also expected to potentially be available from Moderna’s trial the same month. Given that October would be months, if not years, ahead of typical vaccine development, there is concern the timeline is being rushed to give President Donald Trump a boost before the November presidential election.
    The Trump administration is spearheading the vaccine push out of a program it created called Operation Warp Speed, a name Fauci has criticized for giving the impression that development is being rushed. The Food and Drug Administration has said a vaccine must work in at least 50% of patients before it will approve the shot.

  • The Trump administration has yet to release a plan for who will get a vaccine first if one is approved or how the vaccines will be distributed.
    Separately, Fauci said in the interview that the U.S. needs to improve on efforts to test for the coronavirus.
    “We need to do better,” Fauci said about the amount of time it takes for some to get Covid-19 tests back. Results should come back in 24 to 48 hours, otherwise longer wait times obviate the reason for the test, he said. “No excuses, it needs to be done.”

6. ファウチ米国アレルギー感染症研究所長、ワクチンについて言及:
by Anna Edney, Bloomberg, 2020/8/19

  • obviate: remove, 無用にする
  • 米国の感染症対策の専門家 (NIAID所長=米国アレルギー感染症研究所) であるAnthony Fauci曰く、現在、Covid-19ワクチンの開発を急いでいるが、これは安全性を犠牲にしたものではない。迅速に開発できるのは、試験開始までのワクチンを製造する技術的進歩によるものだと、8/5にBloomberg TVで語った。Fauci によれば、Covid-19のワクチンは、2020年末〜2021初期に完成するだろうと慎重に楽観論を述べた。またワクチンの試験サイトと製造の確保を進めており、これらによってワクチン開発のプロセスを更に早められるとしている。
    米国での患者に対し、7月末に後期の臨床試験を2つの異なるワクチン(Moderna Inc.+NIAIDとPfizer Inc.+独BioNTech製)で実施した。その他のワクチンについても引き続き行っていく。

  • Fauciがいうには、"ワクチンの有効性は、少なくとも70%以上を期待はしているが、おそらくは50-60%であろう。その程度で良いと思っている。麻疹ワクチンの場合の有効性は97-98%もあるが"、と。Pfizer とBioNTechは、通常の臨床試験として検証したデータを提出することが目標で、今年10月を目指している。Modernaの試験データも同じく10月を目標としている。通常ワクチン開発は、年の単位でかかるが、それを月の単位で開発しようとしている。これはトランプ政権にとっては、11月大統領選挙までのワクチン開発を期待して、Operation Warp Speedと称する特急での計画によってワクチンの開発を急いでいる。Fauciはその名称は、いかにも特急の印象を与えるので批判的ではあるが。一方、食品薬品局によるワクチン承認を得るには、患者の50%以上に効果があることが必要としている。

  • トランプ政権は、ワクチンを承認されたら、誰が摂取し、どのように分配するのかまでまだ発表していない。それとは別に、Fauciによれば、米国はコロナウイルスの検査の改善の必要だとしている。検査結果は24-48時間後に判明すべきで、それ以上の時間がかかるようであれば検査する意味がなくなってしまう。"これは言い訳不要で、とにかくやらなければならない"と。

>Top 7. Warning of serious brain disorders in people with mild coronavirus symptoms:
by Ian Sample, science editor, The Guardian, Jul 8, 2020

  • UK neurologists publish details of mildly affected or recovering Covid-19 patients with serious or potentially fatal brain conditions. Doctors may be missing signs of serious and potentially fatal brain disorders triggered by coronavirus, as they emerge in mildly affected or recovering patients, scientists have warned.
    Neurologists are on Wednesday publishing details of more than 40 UK Covid-19 patients whose complications ranged from brain inflammation and delirium to nerve damage and stroke. In some cases, the neurological problem was the patient’s first and main symptom.
    The cases, published in the journal Brain, revealed a rise in a life-threatening condition called acute disseminated encephalomyelitis (Adem), as the first wave of infections swept through Britain. At UCL’s Institute of Neurology, Adem cases rose from one a month before the pandemic to two or three per week in April and May. One woman, who was 59, died of the complication.
    A dozen patients had inflammation of the central nervous system, 10 had brain disease with delirium or psychosis, eight had strokes and a further eight had peripheral nerve problems, mostly diagnosed as Guillain-Barré syndrome, an immune reaction that attacks the nerves and causes paralysis. It is fatal in 5% of cases.

  • “We’re seeing things in the way Covid-19 affects the brain that we haven’t seen before with other viruses,” said Michael Zandi, a senior author on the study and a consultant at the institute and University College London Hospitals NHS foundation trust.“What we’ve seen with some of these Adem patients, and in other patients, is you can have severe neurology, you can be quite sick, but actually have trivial lung disease,” he added.
    “Biologically, Adem has some similarities with multiple sclerosis, but it is more severe and usually happens as a one-off. Some patients are left with long-term disability, others can make a good recovery.”
    The cases add to concerns over the long-term health effects of Covid-19, which have left some patients breathless and fatigued long after they have cleared the virus, and others with numbness, weakness and memory problems.
    One coronavirus patient described in the paper, a 55-year-old woman with no history of psychiatric illness, began to behave oddly the day after she was discharged from hospital.
    She repeatedly put her coat on and took it off again and began to hallucinate, reporting that she saw monkeys and lions in her house. She was readmitted to hospital and gradually improved on antipsychotic medication.
    Another woman, aged 47, was admitted to hospital with a headache and numbness in her right hand a week after a cough and fever came on. She later became drowsy and unresponsive and required an emergency operation to remove part of her skull to relieve pressure on her swollen brain.

  • “We want clinicians around the world to be alert to these complications of coronavirus,” Zandi said. He urged physicians, GPs and healthcare workers with patients with cognitive symptoms, memory problems, fatigue, numbness, or weakness, to discuss the case with neurologists.
    “The message is not to put that all down to the recovery, and the psychological aspects of recovery,” he said. “The brain does appear to be involved in this illness.”
    The full range of brain disorders caused by Covid-19 may not have been picked up yet, because many patients in hospitals are too sick to examine in brain scanners or with other procedures. “What we really need now is better research to look at what’s really going on in the brain,” Zandi said.
    One concern is that the virus could leave a minority of the population with subtle brain damage that only becomes apparent in years to come. This may have happened in the wake of the 1918 flu pandemic, when up to a million people appeared to develop brain disease.
    “It’s a concern if some hidden epidemic could occur after Covid where you’re going to see delayed effects on the brain, because there could be subtle effects on the brain and slowly things happen over the coming years, but it’s far too early for us to judge now,” Zandi said.
    “We hope, obviously, that that’s not going to happen, but when you’ve got such a big pandemic affecting such a vast proportion of the population it’s something we need to be alert to.”

  • David Strain, a senior clinical lecturer at the University of Exeter Medical School, said that only a small number of patients appeared to experience serious neurological complications and that more work was needed to understand their prevalence.
    “This is very important as we start to prepare post-Covid-19 rehabilitation programs,” he said. “We’ve already seen that some people with Covid-19 may need a long rehabilitation period, both physical rehabilitation such as exercise, and brain rehabilitation. We need to understand more about the impact of this infection on the brain.”

7. ウイルス軽症でも深刻な脳障害の可能性:
by Ian Sample, The Guardian, 2020/6/8

  • delirium: acute confusional state, せん妄
  • Adem: 急性散在性脳脊髄炎
  • GBS: ギランバレー症候群
  • sclerosis: 硬変
  • hallucinate: 幻覚
  • readmit: 再入院
  • numbness: 麻痺
  • drowsy: 眠気
  • Gneral Practioner, GP: 総合診療医
  • neurological complications: 神経的合併症
  • prevalence: 流行
  • 英国の脳神経学者は、Covid-19の軽症の患者40名から深刻な脳障害を引き起こす可能性を詳細に発表した。これは脳の炎症やせん妄にによる神経の損傷や発作である。英国での第一波感染の患者で、急性散在性脳脊髄炎(Adem)が発症したという。Ademは、今回の感染前は月1例だったが、この4-5月には2-3事例/週で発生し、59歳の女性が合併症を引き起こして死亡した。さらに脳神経中枢の炎症では12名、せん妄症では10名、脳卒中で8名、周縁脳神経のギランバレー症候群で8名などが報告されている。なお致死率は5%。

  • Michael Zandi (London病院NHS foundation trust)によれば、"今回Covid-19以外のウイルスではこれら症状は見られない。Adem症候群の患者には重度の神経症をなり得て、一部は多発性硬化症など一層重症化する。また一部ウイルス除去後も呼吸困難、また一部はしびれや記憶障害となる。精神科の既往歴はなかった55歳女性患者の症例では、退院後も奇妙な行動を示した。何度も衣服を着脱したり、家の中に猿やライオンを見たとの幻覚症状を示した。別の47歳の女性は、1週間の咳と熱の後、頭痛と右手の麻痺で入院した。彼女はその後、睡魔と無反応となり、膨張した大脳による頭蓋骨圧迫除去手術を受けた。

  • "これらコロナによる認知や記憶障害や疲労や麻痺など複雑な症状を世界の医師達に警告したい。"とZandiは言う。"コロナの患者は入院していても病状から大脳スキャンなど受信できないので、実際、脳だ何が進行しているのか今後さらに精査する必要がある"と、Zaudiは語る。"ウイルスは、少数の感染者に隠れた大脳損傷を生じ、何年も経ってから症状が出現するのではと危惧している。これは19818年のスペインフルエンザの際にも百万人もの大脳障害が発生したことが知られている。"Covid-19の場合も同様に何年も経ってから大脳障害が発生することはあり得るが、今それを結論づけられない。当然そうならないことを望むが、Covid-19の感染拡大がこれほど大きくなっているのでこの警告は必要なことである"と、Zandiは言う。

  • David Strain (Exeter Medical Schoolの臨床講師曰く、"深刻な神経的な合併症を引き起こしている患者はまだ少数だが、今後この流行を調査継続する必要がある。それはポストコロナリハビリ計画というもので、身体と脳のリハビリを行うのである。"

>Top 8. The post Covid-19 world: Economic nationalism triumphant?:
by Mireya Solis, Brookings, July 10, 2020.

  • The damage caused by the worst global health crisis in a century is vast. The new coronavirus has traveled far and fast, infecting more than 8.7 million people and killing more than 460,000. One after another, economies have gone into lockdown to slow down the spread of the disease. The combined supply and demand shocks have ravaged the world economy with the most severe downturn since the Great Depression; anticipated drops to international trade and investment flows of 30% and 40%, respectively; and unemployment spikes in many countries. The pandemic has cost lives and livelihoods and has erased the chances of returning to the status quo ante, but it has also brought little clarity regarding what kind of international order it will usher in. Is the future one of deglobalization, decoupling, and reshoring of economic activity?

  • The pandemic hit an already wounded multilateral trading system. The chances that the World Trade Organization (WTO) can deliver a multilateral round of trade negotiations to slash tariffs across the board and update the trade and investment rulebook are nil. But the WTO has also lost its central role as arbiter of trade disputes among its members. In December 2019, the Appellate Body ceased to function due to the U.S. block of new appointments, citing judicial overreach. At a time of rising protectionism, the erosion of a rules-based mechanism to adjudicate disputes bodes ill.

  • Longstanding challenges to the WTO have been exacerbated by an abdication of leadership from the great powers to ensure its survival. China has been the godchild of globalization, leveraging its accession to the WTO to become workshop for the world and a huge domestic market coveted by foreign firms. But China lost its appetite for economic reform, reinvesting on a state capitalism model that imposes heavy costs on other nations. Unchecked subsidies and privileges awarded to its state-owned enterprises, insufficient protection of intellectual property, foreign investment restrictions, forced technology transfers, and cyber protectionism all make the Chinese government’s self-proclamation as champion of global free trade ring hollow.

  • The Trump administration judges the WTO incapable of tackling the China challenge, but instead of creating coalitions of like-minded countries to bring about effective multilateral trade governance, it appears determined to further cripple the international organization. It has offered no blueprint to fix the dispute settlement mechanism, has abused the national security exemption to raise tariffs against allies, and is gearing up for its most fundamental assault to date on the WTO: a tariff reset through which the U.S. may unilaterally abandon its commitments on bound tariffs and apply larger duties to force other countries to open their markets. Trade spats as other countries retaliate in kind is a more likely result.

  • Tariff wars and the battle for technology supremacy have come to define U.S.-China great power competition. After a grueling trade conflict, the United States and China reached a limited trade agreement in January 2020. The deal marked a pause in the tariff war and addressed some non-tariff barriers on foreign direct investment and intellectual property; but it left intact the core of Chinese industrial policy (public subsidies and state-owned  enterprises) and retained U.S. duties on $\$$360 billion worth of Chinese products. China’s massive purchase commitments ($\$$200 billion) were quickly rendered unattainable by the severe economic downturn in China due to COVID-19.

  • In fighting for the new economic order, setting standards on cutting-edge technologies will be at the forefront. China is using all the levers of industrial policy to gain technological primacy in areas like AI and quantum computing. Telecom and the battle over 5G offer a preview of quarrels to come. Deeply concerned with the cybersecurity risks that Chinese telecom giants like Huawei pose, the U.S. government placed the company on its Entity List, banning American exports without a license. It has since tightened the restrictions by barring foreign companies from supplying Huawei with products manufactured with American equipment and technology. National security concerns are increasingly encroaching on existing webs of economic interdependence. Wary of China’s acquisition of critical technology, countries like the United States, Australia, and Japan have tightened their screening of foreign direct investment. The pandemic has only exacerbated concerns that weakened companies in strategic sectors are at risk of foreign takeover.

  • COVID-19’s impact on the international trading system is twofold. It has reinforced existing trends such as the deceleration and now drop in the volume of international trade, the rise of economic security as governments expand their toolkit to restrict trade and investment flows, and it has laid bare the fallout in U.S.-China relations. But the pandemic also brought new challenges that exposed the extent to which trade cooperation is in short supply. Export protectionism has risen in prominence with national restrictions on shipments of essential medical supplies and personal protective equipment. The WTO allows for such curbs for public health purposes – provided the measures are temporary and transparent. Few countries, however, have bothered to comply with their notification commitments. The blow comes at a time when the WTO is adrift with the decision of Director General Roberto Azevedo to step down early, opening the search for new leadership in a climate of divisiveness.

  • Are we on the eve of a renationalized world economy? That is the aspiration of several American and European public officials who fault extended global supply chains and overdependence on China for the current mishaps in tackling the pandemic. But the view that economic nationalism and reshoring of manufacturing is a fail-safe path to security and prosperity is wrong. For one, it skirts the responsibility of governments to properly stockpile essential medical supplies. Furthermore, the export curbs will be counterproductive, eliminating incentives for producers to expand capacity and increasing the cost of much needed medicines and medical devices. If the recent lockdowns have taught us anything, it is that exclusive reliance on the domestic market is too risky. Diversification of supply, redundancies in the manufacturing chain, and stockpiling programs are better alternatives. In this endeavor, global supply chains are part of the solution, not the problem.

  • >Top COVID-19 will not produce an exodus of foreign companies from the Chinese market. Recent surveys of American companies with operations in China show that most firms intend to stay put. A February survey of Japanese companies conducted by Tokyo Shoko Research shows that only a fraction (4%) are considering exit from China. Therefore, the Japanese government’s $\$$2.2 billion fund to restructure supply chains should be understood as risk management, not decoupling. When international companies map out their business strategies, they must factor in heightened risks – protectionism, national security controls, and economic lockdowns. Hence, efforts by middle powers to offer an interim arbitration mechanism at the WTO to handle trade disputes and to commit to maintaining open supply chains in essential medical goods are the right antidote to rising economic nationalism. As a staunch supporter of rules-based trade and with its decision to forego export protectionism in the current crisis, Japan has much to contribute to these efforts.

  • The requiem for globalization has been sung many times. Announcements of its demise in the COVID-19 era are likely to prove premature. But it will be a harder-edged globalization forged by the crucible of geopolitical risk and pandemic disruption.

8. コロナ後の世界: 経済的ナショナリズムは勝利か?:
by Mireya Solis, Brookings (2020/7/10):

  • ravage: cause sever and extensive damage
  • status quo ante: preveiously existing state of affairs
  • usher: show or guide
  • Apellate Body: WTOの上級委員会
  • adjudicate: 裁定する
  • covet: yean to possess, 切望
  • assault: physical attack, 挑戦、襲撃
  • gruelling: extremely tiring and demanding、へとへとに疲れさせる
  • intact: not damaged or impaired, 無傷で
  • Entitty List: 米国の禁輸対象企業リスト
  • encroach: intrude, 侵害する
  • wary: 用心深い、慎重な
  • skirt: 問題を回避する
  • stay put: 留まる、動かない
  • middle powr: sovereign state that is not superpower, but has large or moderate influence
  • antidote: 緩和剤、解決法
  • staunch: 誠実、熱烈な
  • demise: 終了、死去
  • crucible: 激しい試練、闘争
  • 最悪の世界的な健康危機による損害は甚大である。新型コロナウイルスは、迅速かつ遠方まで感染が拡大し、870万人以上が感染し、死者は46万人に達した。感染拡大を抑えるために経済のロックダウンが次々行われた。世界経済の需給が、大恐慌以来の落ち込みとなり、貿易は30%、投資は40%の下落となり、失業率も多くの国で急増した。パンデミックは生命と生活に負担をかけ、元の状態に戻る機会が失われ、国際秩序がどのようになるのか先行き展望がなくなった。将来は反グローバリズミ、デカップリング、経済活動の国内回帰となるのだろうか。

  • パンデミックは、すでに多国間の貿易システムを傷つけた。WTOの役割である多国間の関税削減を推進し、貿易や投資のルールを策定していることも機能しなくなった。またWTOはメンバー国間の貿易上のトラブルの仲裁機能も失った。2019/12月に、WTOの上級委員会(Appellate Body) は米国が法的越権行為を理由に委員選出を拒否したことで機能しなくなった。保護主義が台頭してくることで、ルールベースでの紛争解決のメカニズムが崩壊した。

  • 長年のWTOの努力は、大国からのリーダーシップ放棄によってその存在が危うくなった。中国はグローバリゼーションの申し子であり、WTO加盟後は世界の工場となり、その巨大な国内市場が外国企業の切望する所となった。しかし、中国は経済改革の熱意を失い、高コストを強いる国家資本主義モデルに再投資した。また国有企業への補助金や特権はチェックされず、知的財産権の不十分な保護、外資既成、強制的な技術移転、サイバー保護主義などは中国政府が宣言するグローバル自由貿易のリーダーという呼び声を空虚なものにしている。

  • トランプ政権は、WTOは、中国の挑戦に取り組むには能力不足と判断し、代わりに同調する国々と一緒に効果的な多国間取引ガバナンスを確立するというが、それはさらに国際機関を機能不全にしてしまう。今までに、紛争解決の仕組みは示すこともなく、国家のセキュリティの理由を乱用することで、同盟国に対して関税を上げることは、WTOへの根本的な挑戦である。即ち、米国が一方的に関税を廃棄し、多額の課徴金をかけて相手国の市場開放を迫るやり方は問題である。これは相手国との報復の応酬を招くだけとなる。

  • 関税戦争と技術優位性を巡る闘いは、米中大国間競争の象徴となった。激しい貿易紛争の後、米中は2020/1に一定の貿易合意に達した。合意内奥は、関税戦争を一時中断し、外資と知的所有権についての非関税障壁に着目することとなったが、中国の産業政策 (公的支援と国有企業)は手つかずで、米国の中国製品に関する$\$$360Bの課徴金は残ったままである。中国の大量買付 ($\$$200B) は、中国でのCovid-19による厳しい経済下落によりまだ実施されていない。

  • 新たな経済秩序を巡る争いとして、最先端技術分野の標準化が中心課題となっている。中国は、あらゆる産業政策を通じて、AIや量子コンピュータ、5Gなどテレコムなどの分野での技術的優位性を巡る争いが次の最前線になる。サイバーセキュリティに関連して、Huaweiのような中国の大手通信会社に関し、米国政府はEntity List (禁輸対象リスト)に指定し、米国政府の許可なく輸出を禁止した。また外国企業が、米国製の機器を使って製造した製品をHuaweiに供給することも禁止した。国家セキュリティー問題は、既存の経済的な相互依存のネットワークをますます侵害しつつある。中国が先進技術を獲得することを警戒して、米国、豪州、日本は外国投資の選別を強化した。パンデミックによって、戦略分野において弱体化した企業が外資に買収されることの懸念がより深刻化した。

  • Covid-19が国際貿易システムにもたらした影響には2つの側面がある。一つ目は、国際貿易の量がまず減少し、セキュリティを理由に政府は貿易や投資を制限してきていることで、特に米中関係が崩壊してきている。またパンデミックは、貿易協力が不足している範囲をさらけだすことにもなった。
    輸出に関する保護主義は、医療品の供給や個人用防護機材の輸出制限として顕著に現れた。WTOは公衆衛生の目的であれば、このような規制は認められるが、この措置はあくまで一時的かつ透明的でなければならないとする。これらの通達はほとんどの国にとって困る条件ではない。大打撃となったのは、WTOのRoberto Azevedo事務局長(2013年就任、WTOにとって、、ブラジルの外交官)が任期を1年残して辞任を発表したことである。今後、新たな対立の中でのリーダー選任となる。

  • 我々は、再び一国主義の世界経済を迎えるのであろうか。それは現在のパンデミックという災難の中でグローバルサプライチェーンを分断し、中国への過剰依存をやめることが米国や欧州に切望することなのか。経済的なナショナリズムや製造業の国内回帰はセキュリティや繁栄へ向かうフェイルセーフであるというのは誤っている。まず必須となる医療供給を適切に備蓄するという政府の責任回避となる。さらに、輸出の抑制は逆効果を招き、生産者が生産能力を拡大する動機を失わせ、さらに必要な医薬品や医療器具のコスト高を招く。もし最近のロックダウンの教訓を見ればわかるように、それは専ら国内市場に依存することになるのであまりにもリスクが大きい。供給源の多様化、製造のチェーンの余裕度、また備蓄計画はもっと良い選択肢となる。このことから、グローバルサプライチェーンは解決の部分であって、問題の部分ではない。

  • Covid-19は、外国企業が中国市場から脱出をすることにはならないだろう。中国で操業している最近の米国企業の調査によれば、多くの企業はそこに留まるだろう。東京商工リサーチによる2月の日本企業の調査によれば、ほんのわずかの(4%)の企業が脱出を検討しているという。日本政府の$\$$2.2Bの資金によりサプライチェーンを再構築しようというのはリスクマネジメント対策であって、デカップリングではないことを理解すべきである。国際企業がビジネス戦略を描く場合、、注視すべきリスクとは、保護主義、ナショナル・セキュリティ管理、そして経済的ロックダウンである。したがって、(大国ではない)その次に影響力のあるmiddle powerが、WTOの一時的な仲裁機能を発揮して貿易紛争を処理し、必要な医療物資のオープンサプライチェーンを維持する解決をすることは、経済ナショナリズムへの緩和策となる。ルールに基づく貿易の熱心な支持者として、輸出保護主義が現状のような危機に瀕している中で、日本が貢献すべきことは沢山ある。

  • グローバリゼーションへの鎮魂歌は何度も聞くようになった。Covid-19で、その死亡を通告するのはまだ早すぎる。しかし、地政学的なリスクとパンデミックの混乱という試練によって、グローバリゼーションはさらに瀬戸際に立たされることになろう。

>Top 9. How the pandemic is reinforcing authoritarianism:
by Shadi Hamid,
Benior fellow in the centr for Middle East Policy. in the Foreign Policy program. (June 16, 2020 Brookings HP

  • Authoritarianism, in theory, and authoritarian regimes, in practice, were already gaining ground before the spread of the novel coronavirus. During—and after—the pandemic, governments are likely to use long, protracted crises to undermine domestic opposition and curtail civil liberties through increased surveillance and tracing. It will be challenging to assess the exact degree of deterioration in countries that were already extremely authoritarian, such as China and Egypt. In countries where the U.S. enjoys considerable leverage, as in the Middle East, the goal should be framed as pressuring autocrats to be less repressive than they might otherwise be, rather than engaging in false pretenses of “political reform” or “democratization.”
    In still-democratic countries like Brazil, Israel, and India or in hybrid contexts where strongmen had successfully constrained electoral competition and parliamentary oversight, such as Hungary, ambitious populists will push the limits, testing the levels of both domestic and international resistance.

  • How much does regime type matter?
    The pandemic is both reopening and intensifying one of the most vital debates of the post-post-Cold War era: that over whether democracy or authoritarianism is best suited to deal with new and unprecedented threats. In a perceptive essay from March, Francis Fukuyama argued that state capacity and trust in government were the crucial determinants, not regime type. If this is true, it still raises the question of what kinds of countries and societies are more likely to enjoy greater state capacity and trust.
    With its apparent success in reducing new infections and deaths, China has presented itself as a model for aggressively mobilizing state resources to fight the coronavirus. It has also taken advantage of the absence of U.S. global leadership to project soft power and provide aid—including through so-called “mask diplomacy”—to struggling countries, including Western democracies themselves. The Chinese regime is, in effect, making an argument about regime type, and one that authoritarian regimes are likely to appreciate, regardless of the merits.
    Then there’s the reality that the largest Western democracies (but not East Asian democracies) have suffered the most in terms of total cases and per capita deaths. This has led a growing number of Americans and Europeans to doubt not only their governments, which is only natural, but their own political systems. How, after all, could the world’s oldest, most advanced democracies end up with countless dead from the coronavirus?

  • Responding to China’s authoritarian challenge as well as the continued erosion of democratic confidence at home will be critical over the coming years. This requires American and European recovery and leadership, of course, but it also requires that Western democracies resist the urge to make permanent the temporary mobilization of state power and institution of overbearing surveillance systems. The temptation to be in perpetual state of emergency will only grow in the absence of a vaccine or cure. The deployment of wartime language—considering that wars against enemies, seen and unseen, have invariably been used to restrict individual freedoms—is as understandable as it is dangerous.
    For established democracies as well as hybrid regimes still holding somewhat competitive elections, there are three pandemic-specific risks worth highlighting: delayed elections, “democracy without protests,” and incumbent advantages.
    Postponing elections is obviously problematic (particularly when it’s seen to benefit one party over the other) but holding elections where the risk of transmission is significant creates its own legitimacy deficit. Turnout will be depressed, particularly among older voters. In either scenario, losers may be more likely to either challenge the outcome or claim the results do not accurately reflect popular sentiment. And that is precisely why elections, however flawed, are preferable to the alternatives; they remain the best way to gauge public preferences at regular intervals.

  • Despite, or perhaps because of, countries becoming “less free” over the past decade, protests have proliferated across the globe, culminating in 2019—an unusually active year for demonstrations and mass action. With the economic fallout from the pandemic, coupled with government missteps, the reasons to be angry are only likely to grow. The problem, though, is that it’s not easy to organize, at least not in proximate physical space, in an age of social distancing and public gatherings limited to 500 citizens or less. Relatedly, the lack of freedom of movement and access to public space exacerbate the incumbent advantages. In countries like Hungary and Turkey, where media space is dominated by ruling parties, challengers will have even less visibility than usual.
    While “reopening” can create its own authoritarian temptations around tracing and surveillance regimes, it at least removes emergency restrictions and, in due time, avails political parties, protestors, and grassroots movements to communicate their platforms and grievances to larger audiences.

  • The Durability of Regimes:
    The earliest phase of the coronavirus threat, in March and April, saw the disease exacting a devastating toll on Western democracies in particular. But judgments about the relative success of (some) democracies versus (some) autocracies will be made in months, if not years. And this is where democracies can claim a more encouraging medium- to long-term outlook.
    Authoritarian regimes are only good at responding to crises when they’re good, and when they’re not—which is most of the time—there is no obvious way to course correct. Correcting errors is entirely dependent on the very people who made the blunders in the first place. There are no strong or autonomous power centers that can counter or even temper the decisions of the authoritarian executive. Undemocratic regimes have a vested interest in suppressing information that reflects badly on senior officials, which is precisely what hobbled China’s response in the critical, early days of the virus. As Martin Gurri, author of The Revolt of the Public, puts it, “The first question that governments ask in response to a crisis is not how to stop it, but how to frame it in a way that makes them look as good as possible.” Since authoritarian regimes, particularly the few successful ones, are overly reliant on “performance legitimacy” rather than popular legitimacy, state authorities need to go into overdrive to sustain narratives of success, effectiveness, and paternalistic wisdom. After all, that’s the implicit social contract imposed upon citizen-subjects: they may have to forego their freedom, but at least they get something in return.

  • Democratic governments may try to suppress information and spin or downplay crises as well—as the Trump administration did—but they rarely get away with it. If anything, the intent to suppress on the part of the government can provoke an unusually intense desire to expose its mistakes on the part of the press, the legislative branch, and civil society. Even within the executive, experts and bureaucrats, as with the White House Coronavirus Task Force, can temper and balance the instincts of elected officials, including the president—and they can do so without fearing for their livelihoods or freedom. Over the long-term, questions around “legitimacy,” however difficult to quantify, grow more, rather than less, important. A general rule is that, in democracies, governments are unstable while regimes are stable. In autocracies, it is often the reverse: governments appear stable while regimes are unstable. For example, Italy’s coalition governments are notoriously fractiousand seemingly always on the verge of collapse. But few Italians call for overthrowing the political system and replacing it with something entirely different. Italians can generally sleep at night knowing that the risks of regime change—or some sort of coup—are slim. In autocracies, on the other hand, there is permanent, structural uncertainty. If the current dictator happens to be effective or “benevolent,” then such benevolence only persists while he or she remains in power. After he or she is removed or dies, a radically different leader, in terms of skills and temperament, may emerge.

  • Failure and Ideologial Competition:
    As long as the coronavirus remains a threat, in either human or economic terms, every failure and every victory is a mark, however misleadingly, for or against particular political systems.
    The Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani, author of Has China Won?, has already reached a conclusion about others’ conclusions, noting: “Many thoughtful leaders and observers in strategically sensitive countries around the world have begun making preparations for a world where China may become number one.”
    There’s only one way to truly find out: with the passing of time. But whatever the verdict, the stakes are high, not merely for a sometimes esoteric debate about the nature of political systems, but for the people who live under them.
    Even in regions where the coronavirus hasn’t hit as hard as many feared, such as the Arab world, the economic fallout will be tremendous. The region had a relatively mild recession after the 2009 financial crisis. There will be no such good fortune this time around, with plummeting oil prices, perhaps irreversible blows to tourism, and steep cuts in government benefits. This isn’t good news for what little hope there may have been for even the most minimal reforms. If some citizens respond to the economic fallout with protests, after fears around mass gatherings subside, Arab autocrats—in crisis mode and as nervous as ever—are likely to ramp up authoritarian measures and use (or misuse) emergency powers to further limit what political parties and civil society can say or do.

  • >Top This is the dark side of “performance legitimacy”: Even when autocrats are relatively competent, performance can never be quite guaranteed. Economic crisis cannot be staved off by mere expertise and force of will. Performance legitimacy, then, is always up for debate, at least eventually.
    Democracies aren’t looking great now, to be sure, but democracies have the virtue (or weakness) of generally being better than they look. As the political theorist David Runciman argues in The Confidence Trap, at any given moment democracies appear chaotic, ineffective, slow, and inelegant. They tend to look more appealing only in retrospect with the passage of time and the accumulation of insight and evidence.
    One option is to wait and hope. Until then, it is possible to take some solace in what we know empirically about democratic durability even when that durability is in tension with short-term effectiveness. This shouldn’t be an argument for resting on laurels. It should be the opposite: if the citizens of democracy believe in it, then they are best served by remaining vigilant. Whether the matter of regime type is the right or best debate to be having—as Fukuyama said, other variables may ultimately be more instructive—it is a debate that many will have and many are already having. Certainly, autocrats themselves are eager to press their case, and they seem to believe that theirs is a strong one. However strong it may seem, for now, that doesn’t make it right. If only there was someone to make the counterargument.

9. 伝染病は権威主義政権を強化している:
by Shadi Hamid (2020/6/16 Brookings HP).

  • protracted: 長引く
  • pretense: 見せかけ、口実
  • overbear: 威圧、圧倒する
  • turnout: 人出、投票総数
  • flaw: 欠陥
  • culminate: 最高潮に達する
  • durability: 耐久性、永続性
  • exact: demand 強いる、果たす、必要とする
  • blunder: 大失策、不覚
  • vested: 既得権
  • forgo: に先行する、なしで済ませる、控える
  • downplay: 過小評価、見くびる
  • temper: 平常心; 加減・抑制する、緩和する、和らぐ
  • verdict: 評決、判定
  • esoteric: 難解、深淵、秘教的
  • stave: 陥没、崩れる; stave off a crisis 危機を逃れる
  • dolace: 慰め、安堵、癒やし
  • empirically: 経験に基づいて
  • rest on one's laurels: be so satisfied with what one has already done
  • vigilant: keeping careful watch
  • 権威主義体制は、実際にはコロナウイルス拡大以前に存在していら。感染中やその後、政府は長引く危機を利用して反対派や市民の自由を監視や追跡で抑え込んできた。すでに権威主義的となっていた中国やエジプトのような国々を改めて再評価する必要がある。彼らの"政治改革"や"民主化"は見せかけのものかどうかである。ブラジル、イスラエル、インド、ハンガリーなどやや民主的な国々では、実力者が選挙に勝ち、議会と内外の抵抗を監視している。

  • 統制はどれほど重要か:

  • 中国型権威主義国家は、今後数年は、民主主義国家への信頼を衰退させることになり得る。このことは欧米のリーダーシップの回復のみならず西欧型民主主義として国家権力の一時的動員や過剰な監視システムの導入が必要になってくる。この緊急事態の権力集中はワクチンや治療薬なしで進めなければならない。戦時下での表現方法は、明示的か否かを問わず、個人の自由を制限することの危険性と理解の両面を含む。競合的な選挙制度はあるとはいえ、選挙が延期され、抗議なき民主主義や現職有利は、感染症がもたらすリスク要因である。選挙の延期は問題であり、正当性の欠如に通じる。投票率は下がれば、その結果は民意を反映できなくなる。投票制度は、欠陥があるといえ、民意を定期的に測るには最善の方法であり、その代替はない。

  • とはいえ過去十年に抗議活動は世界中で盛んになり、特に2019年はその頂点で民主化や大衆行動が行われた。さらにコロナ禍による経済下落、政府の不祥事など大衆の怒りは拡大してきている。にもかかわらず組織することすら容易ではなく、ソーシャルディスタンスを取り、集会も500人以下とされている。自由な行動や公共空間へのアクセスが制限されることで、自ずと現職が有利となる。ハンガリーやトルコでは、メディア空間も与党に支配され、それに対抗する力は通常より見え難くなっている。

  • <アイセイ> 体制の永続性:
    コロナ感染の初期段階の今年3-4月には、この問題は西欧民主主義に衝撃的な課題を突きつけた。民主主義か(少なくとも数ヶ月に及ぶ)専制政治かという判断である。民主主義は中長期の課題とするかである。権威主義体制は危機に対して、対応が良ければうまくいくが、対応を誤った場合はそうではない。失政を正すのは、まず大失策を起こした大衆そのものに依存しなければならない。権威主義の幹部の意思決定を正す強力な自主権力は存在しないからだ。非民主主義的な体制では、既得権益が幹部を告発する情報を抑制する。このことは中国でのウイルスへの初期対応で私的されている。"大衆の反乱"の著者であるMartin Gurri曰く、"危機に対する政府の最初の反応はそれを止めることではなく、その危機ができる限り見えるようにむしろ炎上させることである。"権威主義的体制による、成功する場合でも、大衆の正当化より、実行の正当化に過剰に依存し、成功の成果や父権主義的な評価を過剰に誇る傾向がある。結局、上から押し付けた評価でしかなく、もっと自由にやれば、得るものも多くなるにも関わらずである。

  • 民主主義的政府も、トランプ政権のように、情報を抑制し、危機を過小評価することがあるが、結局はうまく行かない。政府側が抑圧しようと意図すれば、その誤りについてメディアや司法や市民がさらにそれらを暴露しようとする。ホワイトハウスの官僚は専門家も結局は、平常心を維持し、長期的には、健全な正当性の重要性を認識することになる。一般的に言って、民主主義体制は安定的であっても政府は不安定的である。権威主義体制は、その逆で、政府は安定的であっても体制は不安定である。例えば、イタリアの連立政権は、いつも分断崩壊の危機にあった。しかしその政治体制を全く別のものに変えようとは国民は思わなかった。ほとんどのイタリア人は夜間にクーデターなどが起こることは思っていない。しかし対照的に権威主義では、構造的な不確定要素がある。独裁者が寛容に見えるのは、その人に権力があるからだ。もし辞任や死去すれば、すぐに別のリーダーが登場する。

  • 失敗とイデオロギー競争:
    コロナウイルスの脅威が続く限り、いかなる政策の失敗や成功も特定の政治体制にとって賛否となる。シンガポールの外交官であるKishore Mahbubani("中国は勝利したか"の著者)の結論として曰く"世界の多くの思慮深いリーダーは、中国がNo.1の大国となる準備をし始めている。"これは時の経過が明らかにするであろう。どのような判定であれ、政治体制の本質は難解な議論の中ではなく、大衆の生活と共にあるからである。

  • これは"達成の正当化"にとっての負の側面である。権威主義が相対的に強力であっても、達成力は保証されていない。経済危機は、専門性は意思のちからによって克服されるものではない。達成の正当化は、結局、議論されることになる。民主主義は今は素晴らしいものには見えないが、それは見えるよりは実はもっとよいものである。"The Confidence Trap"でDavid Runciman曰く、いかなる時でも民主主義は混乱的で、非効率で、遅く、優雅に見えない。しかし時の経過や洞察や証拠の集積と共にその価値が見直されてくるのだ。一つの考えは、待つことと希望することである。その時まで、民主主義の継続性については、短期的には危機に瀕することは経験上もあり得るという安心感を持つことが可能となる。それはこれまで達成したことに満足するということではない。逆に、市民の民主主義を信奉するなら油断するなということである。体制が正しいのかどうかは、それ以外の選択肢が役立つ。それは多くの人々がすでに持っているか持とうとしている議論である。確かに、権威主義者は自己の体制が強力であることを宣伝しようとする。しかしそれがどれほど強力に見えようともそれに対する異論を唱えるものは必ず存在する。

>Top 10. Lessons from China's economic reopening:
by Cheng Li & Jian Chen, May 16, 2020:

  • Lessons from China’s economic reopening
    Any comparative analysis of China and the United States––and any lessons or experiences that either country may learn from the other––should recognize the profound differences between these two nations in terms of their political systems, economic structures, social fabric, and cultural norms. Yet, as the world’s two largest economies, with vast territories and substantial populations, China and the United States often confront similar challenges. When it comes to the impact of the novel coronavirus, both countries have been devastated by its outbreak and the searing speed of its spread, though the developments have been experienced at different time intervals.

  • The Chineses experience:
    The spread of coronavirus in China began to plateau around mid-February when the country reported 75,567 confirmed cases and 2,239 deaths. At that time, only 1,152 cases had been diagnosed outside of China, resulting in eight deaths. At the time of this paper in late May, the number of recorded cases in the United States has accounted for around one-third of infections and 28 percent of COVID-19 deaths globally. These are astonishingly high proportions considering that the United States constitutes only around 4 percent of the world population. All 31 province-level entities in China reported infections, as did all 50 states in the United States, which were simultaneously placed under a federal disaster declaration for the first time in history. The closures in China began during the week of January 20, including a tight lockdown across the Wuhan metropolitan area and nearby regions beginning January 23. Facing significant growing pressure to combat a negative growth rate, the rapid rise of unemployment and the potential disastrous resulting domino effects, both China and the United States have been striving to reopen their economies. It should be noted that as a result of the continuing growth in infections and deaths in the United States, the U.S. economy had been shut down for a longer period than China’s economy. But a series of premature reopenings in the United States could potentially have catastrophic health and economic outcomes.

  • Given the currently widely held perception that the outbreak of Covid-19 in China occurred a few months earlier than in the United States, an empirical analysis of the measures China pursued throughout its economic reopening in March and April could be helpful to understanding the possible situation in other nations. No country, especially those with economies as colossal as China and the United States, could expect to completely reopen overnight. Therefore, the regional variations and sectoral priorities employed–either intentionally or spontaneously–in the economic reopening of China deserve particular attention. Table 1 provides an overview of the return-to-work rate in all of China’s 31 provinces and first-tier metropolises. It arranges localities by their share of national GDP, reflecting their respective economic weight. The table also provides relevant information about the population of each province/city, the reported number of infections and the number of people infected per million. The highlighted columns compare the return-to-work rates on average in March and April 2020, with January 24, 2020 serving as the control. The return-to-work rate is retrieved from the Mastercard Caixin BBD China New Economy Index—compiled by Caixin Insight Group—by recording the daily flow of people across the virtual perimeters around manufacturing facilities, office buildings, and shopping malls. There are three important observations that can be made based on the data.
  • >Top Chart-1:
    A correlation between the severity of regional infection rates and return-to-work rates:
    In examining the return-to-work rate across different provinces and first-tier cities, we found that the rate is negatively correlated with infected case numbers (per million people): this signifies the higher the infection rate, the lower the subsequent rate for workers who return to work. For example, Hubei and Beijing, the two localities that had the highest infection rates, also had the lowest return-to-work rates in March (with the exception of shopping malls in Tianjin). Yet, the correlation between these two variables in April is lower than it had been in March, which indicates that, over time, the infection rate has a declining impact on the return-to-work rate. This indicates that the gradual improvement in the COVID-19 situation over these two months enabled people to return to work at increasing rates.

  • Table-1: An overview of return-to-work rates in China:
    This gradual trend toward increasing economic activities is particularly evident in Chart 1, which provides nationwide information on a daily basis from the government’s order of closure of work around January 24 to the last week of April when a considerable number of manufacturing factories resumed, office clerks returned to work, and shopping malls reopened. The deep v-shaped valleys reflected weekly on the chart represent the drop in work over weekends. In a sense, this chart—which some might find reminiscent of an echocardiogram—has graphically tracked the “heartbeat” of a recovering economy.
  • Sectoral priority and online shopping:
    These data, as presented in Table 1 and Chart 1, show that manufacturing firms have the highest return-to-work rates, followed by office buildings, and subsequently shopping malls with the lowest rates. This observation reflects a clear priority order in the approach to reopening the economy: high-impact, low-risk businesses are reopening more quickly (indicating their higher priority), while low-impact, high-risk business are reopening at a slower speed. The nationwide changes in the return-to-work rate between March and April 2020 reaffirm the sectoral priority order. By late April, the flow of people at manufacturing firms and office buildings had already reached 81.3 percent and 74.7 percent, respectively, of their pre-lockdown peaks in early 2020. In comparison, the recovery rate of shopping malls was relatively low at 65.8 percent in April despite some expectations that Chinese domestic consumption would have a “strong rebound” after consumers had been sequestered at home for two months, especially considering that they had largely missed the spring festival shopping season. The relatively low rate of shopping mall traffic observed in this study is very much in line with a Financial Times report that customer traffic in Chinese cities was about half of its normal levels for both small brick-and-mortar stores and large Walmart stores during the same period. Two factors may have contributed to this phenomenon. First, Chinese urban dwellers have remained cautious after the pandemic, and they have tended to reduce nonessential activities. And second, with the world’s most advanced e-commerce systems, China has a much higher number (but lower percentage) of internet users than the United States. In 2020, China had 904 million internet users (64.5 percent of China’s population) while the United States had 313 million users (89.8 percent of the U.S. population). Similarly, 583 million people used mobile payment applications in China last year, almost 10 times the number using similar applications over the same time in the United States (62 million). It has been widely noted that, during China’s battle against the coronavirus, “stores had to quickly adjust their ideas about e-commerce in order to stay afloat.”

  • Health concerns before GDP concerns:
    The Chinese emphasis on the reopening of manufacturing facilities is clearly driven by concerns about economic growth and unemployment. But this does not necessarily contradict the government’s pronounced position and more general sentiment that public health should be the most important priority. A review of the GDP share of China’s 31 provinces and first-tier cities and their return-to-work rates does not show any significant correlation. For example, in terms of their share of national GDP, those provinces with the highest share (Shandong, Zhejiang, and Fujian), mid-range share (Chongqing), and lowest share (Gansu, Ningxia, and Tibet) all experienced a high return-to-work rate in the manufacturing sector in April. Some provinces with a relatively high share of national GDP—such as Henan, Hubei, Anhui, and Jiangxi—had the lowest return-to-work rate (see Table 1). It is widely known that, out of fear of a possible “second wave” of COVID-19 and an increase in imported cases from overseas, Chinese authorities implemented far more restrictive rules and requirements than U.S. local governments during both the lockdown and economic reopening periods. Also, China’s local governments and manufacturing enterprises, especially in coastal regions such as Guangdong and Zhejiang, have also adopted multi-step guidelines to gradually move toward full-scale reopening. However, more recently, given the continuing decline of infections, the country has begun to promote domestic tourism, including to Hubei province during the May holiday season, reflecting a new phase in China’s reopening. It is still too early to forecast the degree of success and limitations of China’s economic recovery. The expected drastic decline in exports, the uncertain nature of global supply chains and industrial realignment, the potential for a large-scale exodus of foreign companies, and U.S. export controls and other restraints on China constitute some of the new challenges that China will likely confront. Unemployment pressures will continue to be a primary concern for the Chinese leadership. It was officially reported that only roughly 5 million people lost their jobs during the first two months of 2020, with an urban jobless rate of 6.2 percent in February. These figures are remarkably lower than those in the United States at present. However, within both countries it is likely that the real rate of unemployment is significantly higher than reported.

  • China’s promotion of domestic consumption, strengthened by the new drive for urbanization, a growing middle class, advantages in e-commerce, and an ongoing emphasis on innovation, green development, public health, social welfare, and financial opening will likely make China even more competitive in the global economy in the years to come. It is in the interest of Washington to have an accurate and balanced assessment of this tremendously important economic competitor and partner.
  • china_map.gif

10. 中国経済再開の教訓:
by Cheng Li & Jian Chen (2020/5/16):

  • concern: 心配事、関心事
  • devastate: detroy or ruin
  • sear: burn, scorch
  • strive: make great efforts
  • colossal: extremely large
  • echocardiogram: 超音波心電図
  • sequenster: 押収、隔離、封鎖する
  • 中国の経済再開の教訓:

  • 中国の経験:
    中国でのCovid-19の拡大は2月中旬には、感染拡大が頭打ちとなったが、それまでに75千人の感染者と2,239名の死者を出した。その時点では、中国外での感染者はわずかに1,152名、死者は8名であった。5月末の報告では、米国での感染者は、世界のコロナ感染者の28%に及んだ。米国の世界での人口比率が4%であることを考慮すると驚くべき感染比率である。中国では全ての31省都で、さらに米国では50州で感染が拡大し、歴史上初の連邦レベルでの感染被害宣言が発出された。中国での都市封鎖は、1/20に武汉(Wùhán) で、1/2からは周辺地域での封鎖が行われた。これは経済に深刻なマイナス成長、失業率増大とドミノ的な被害拡大が続き、中国も米国も経済再開に腐心した。米国での感染拡大と死者数の増加によって経済停滞は、中国より長期間に亘ることとなった。しかも米国での早すぎる経済再開はさらなる医療と経済両面での損害が拡大した。

  • もし中国でのCovid-19の感染拡大の認識が、米国でのそれより2-3ヶ月早ければ、中国での3-4月の経済再開を通じて得られた臨床分析の知見が、他の国の対策に活かされたと思う。経済規模が大きくない国なら一日で経済再開は可能であろうが、中国のような国は、地域や各部門でどう経済を再開されるかは慎重に行う必要がある。(別表の31省都ごとの再開資料では)地域ごとのGDPによる経済比率、人口、感染比率等を示した。再開比率は2020/1/24と2020/3-4月の比較である。資料はMastercard Caixin BBD China New Economy Indexから工場・オフィス・ショッピングモールでの動線などからのデータである。

  • 図1: 各地域の感染率と経済再開比率である。Return-to-Work Rate (%) at Manufacturing firm, Ofiice building, Shopping mall in Apr. 2020: (source: China National Bureau of Statistics)

  • 表1:
    地域毎の感染率と経済再開率の表である。感染率と再開率とは負の相関関係がある。以下は、各地域では徐々に経済再開状況を示すいわば経済心電図である。再開率は、工場>事務所>生活空間の順番となっている。2020年始めにはロックダウンされていたが、4月末までに、工場再開は70-80%。なお、これらのデータは、Financial TimesやWalmartのいデータとも合っている。2020年のインターネットユーザ数は、中国 904百万(64.5%)、米国は313百万(89.8%)。一方モバイル支払は583百万で、米国は62百万の約十倍である。コロナの件もあり、電子取引は倒産を防ぐ上で必須となってきた。
Prov. GDP %
Infected people Infected per M Manuf. rate Office rate Shop. rate
广东省 10.9 113 1,588 14.0 73 75 59
江苏省 10.1 81 653 8.1 86 76 69
山东省 7.2 100 788 7.8 94 71 68
浙江省 6.3 57 1,268 22.1 101 84 58
河南省 5.5 96 1,276 13.3 64 73 60
四川省 4.7 83 561 6.7 72 67 68
河北省 4.6 59 68,128 1,151.4 67 59 48
福建省 4.3 39 356 9.0 99 93 75
湖南省 4.0 69 1,019 14.8 77 77 74
上海市 3.9 24 657 27.1 80 81 78
安徽省 3.8 63 991 15.7 67 83 79
北京市 3.6 22 593 27.5 76 54 43
河北省 3.5 76 328 4.3 82 69 59
陕西省 2.6 39 308 8.0 85 75 69
辽宁省 2.5 44 146 3.3 82 81 71
江西省 2.5 46 937 20.2 66 76 63
重庆市 2.4 31 579 18.7 131 78 88
云南省 2.3 48 185 3.9 76 76 71
广西 2.1 49 256 5.2 82 85 69
内蒙古 1.7 25 201 7.9 86 94 63
山西省 1.7 37 198 5.3 77 72 55
贵州省 1.7 36 147 4.1 94 78 80
天津市 1.4 22 190 12.2 76 61 47
黑龙江省 1.4 38 944 25.0 86 65 66
新疆 1.4 25 76 3.1 88 74 72
吉林省 1.1 27 112 4.1 89 81 62
甘肃省 0.9 26 139 5.3 93 63 63
海南省 0.5 9 168 18.0 75 71 80
宁夏 0.4 7 75 10.9 103 58 62
青海省 0.3 6 18 3.0 84 63 56
西藏 0.2 3 1 0.3 172 150 65
Prov. GDP %
Infected people Infected per M 40-44 50-54 60-64
45-49 55-59 65-69
  • GDP復活よりもまず公衆衛生:
    上記数字は、中国は経済再開を、経済成長や失業率対応を考慮している進めている状況だが、これは感染拡大防止最優先という政策を無視している訳ではない。中国の31省都と掲載再開率の間に相関関係は見られない。GDP比率の高い省都 (山东省,浙江省,福建省)、中程度の省都 (重庆市)、低い省都 (甘肃省,宁夏省,西藏)の全てで4月の経済再開率が同程度である。いわゆるコロナウイルス第2波の対応では、中国政府は、米国の各州よりも厳しい都市封鎖を行った。また海岸部 (河南省,湖北省,安徽省,江西省)はいずれも経済再開が遅れた。また最近では、感染率の低下に伴い国内観光の推進を始めた。 (湖北省では5月の休暇期間など) 中国での経済再開が成功か否かは今後の推移を注視する必要がある。輸出は相変わらず激変しており、グローバルサプライチェーンや産業への海外再配置の不確定要素、さらに米国による輸出規制は、新たな課題でもある。特に失業率の動向は、中国指導部の最大の関心事である。公的には、2020年1-2月で約5百万人が失業し、都市部では6.2%に達したとのこと。これは米国よりも低いレベルである。実際の失業率は、両国とももっと高い可能性がある。

  • 今後数年を展望すると、中国での内需、都市化、中産階級化、電子商取引、イノベーション、グリーン開発、公衆衛生、社会保障、金融自由化等の推進が進展し、グローバル経済における競争力がより強まる可能性がある。米国政府にとっても正確かつバランスの取れた分析評価は、経済的な競争者かつパートナーとして重要な関心事である。

>Top 11. The fastest route to ending this crisis involves China:
by Ryan Hass, Jun 16, 2020, Brookings

  • Instead of serving as a shared threat that catalyzes a coordinated response, Covid-19 has intensified frictions between the US and China. The deadly global spread of the COVID-19 pandemic has coincided with a period of diminishing capacity among multilateral institutions such as the G-7, the G-20, and the United Nations to mount a coordinated international response. It also has occurred amidst a period of deteriorating relations between the world’s two most capable powers, the United States and China. Instead of serving as a shared threat that catalyzes a coordinated response, COVID-19 has intensified frictions between the United States and China. This has manifested in a “narrative war” between Washington and Beijing over the source of the virus and the apportionment of blame over its global spread. Leaders in both countries have each calculated the impacts of the pandemic on their political fortunes and decided that their best path forward is to blame the other and stoke nationalistic impulses in the process.

  • A period of reciprocal rancor:
    This dynamic of reciprocal rancor is both unnecessary and unlikely to stop any time soon. It is unnecessary because it is not a source of uncertainty as to where the virus originated and what led to its global spread. No one who has been closely watching the unfolding of the pandemic outside of China could be confused that the virus emerged anywhere other than China, or that China’s negligent initial response to the outbreak did not contribute to its spread. China appears to have sought to muddy this picture by having one of its spokespeople spread a conspiracy theory that the virus may have originated in the United States. China’s propaganda services similarly have been energetic in efforts to deflect blame and instead promote China’s response to the outbreak as a model for the world. But as Joseph Nye has observed, influence and power on the international stage rest on credibility, and when governments are perceived as pushing propaganda, their credibility is undermined.

  • Prior to this crisis, there had been precedent for the world’s two leading powers to stand at the core of international efforts to galvanize global responses. This pattern was visible during the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union rallied global action to eradicate smallpox. It also was seen more recently when the United States and China coordinated actions to rescue the global economy during the 2008–09 global financial crisis and then halt the spread of Ebola from Africa in 2014. Sadly, it likely already is too late to revive such a pattern of national-level coordination between the United States and China during this crisis, given the ill will that has been generated in both countries about the other in recent weeks. China’s recent efforts to tighten control over Hong Kong have further poisoned U.S.-China relations. This is an unfortunate outcome. If it was possible to set aside politics and look at the COVID-19 problem through a narrow interest-based lens, there would be a clear rationale for both countries to collaborate to save lives, stop the spread of the virus, and hasten a global economic recovery. The simple reality is that neither country will be able to stamp out the virus in every corner of the world on its own. There are no multilateral institutions with the capacity and the credibility to do so without the strong backing of the United States and China. Unless the virus is eradicated everywhere, citizens in both countries will remain at risk, both countries’ economies will suffer, and the international reputations of both will be tarnished for failing to exercise leadership amidst a global crisis. If somehow the relationship between the United States and China were in a better spot, and the political calculations of both countries’ leaders were different, there is much that could be done at little cost to either. Such collaboration could be driven by dispassionate self-interest.

  • Practical steps to shorten the period of suffering induced by Covid-19:
    Initial steps that both countries could take to hasten the process of getting COVID-19 under control and create conditions for reopening the global economy could include:
    • reaching a reciprocal understanding on expediting visas for medical personnel and encouraging other countries to follow suit so that health experts can travel quickly to where they are most needed to contain the spread of the virus;
    • announcing a joint decision to remove all tariff barriers on medical equipment and urging other countries to follow suit;
    • jointly agreeing to refrain from export bans on life-saving medical equipment and to coordinate efforts to stabilize global supply chains for manufacture of such goods;
    • convening a virtual summit between both US and Chinese leaders to affirm that both countries commit to:
      • support—and not to impede—coordination among sub-national actors, including at the state, city, scientific, philanthropic, and corporate levels;
      • offer full support for accelerating clinical testing of any vaccine, without regard for where it is first developed;
      • refrain from any form of traditional or non-traditional espionage to attempt to subvert progress or steal information from the other on research toward a vaccine;
      • pool funds now to construct a constellation of facilities around the world for rapid manufacture of a vaccine. Because it is not yet known what equipment will be needed to manufacture the vaccine that ultimately emerges, facilities will need to be built to specification for mass producing a range of potential vaccines, accepting that some will never get used;
      • coordinate delivery of medical and financial aid to the developing world in order to avoid redundancy and maximize impact.

  • A more ambitious effort could include jointly standing up teams composed of leading international medical experts to fan across the global south and get ahead of the next wave of the virus, which is already starting to hit the Southern Hemisphere. These expert teams could share best practices with local health leaders for protecting medical staff, patients, and medical systems, provide resources and best practices for testing and tracing, and share lessons learned from various treatment models. Washington and Beijing also could jointly boost the efforts of a global group convened by the European Union to coordinate funding for vaccine research, development, and production. If the United States and China each were to make significant contributions to this fund, it could mobilize other countries to elevate their support for the effort.

  • The Need for a Ceasefire:
    Creating diplomatic space for such a constructive agenda, though, likely would require some sort of ceasefire in the promulgation of incriminating theories about the source of the virus. One way for both sides to set down their rhetorical sticks would be for Washington and Beijing simultaneously to commit to support an international investigation led by scientific experts into the causes of the outbreak and rapid spread of the virus. President Xi made a rhetorical step in this direction during his May 18 address to the World Health Assembly. Washington should test Beijing’s intentions by pushing for a firm Chinese commitment to support a science-based, UN-led after action review to identify lessons learned, mistakes made, and best practices to be emulated for preventing a recurrence of this crisis.

  • Some may counter that China is America’s foremost rival and, as such, the United States should be seeking to use this moment to weaken China’s standing rather than lift it up to peer status in the fight against COVID-19. Others may see such a collaborative approach toward China as unwarranted due to China’s negligent initial response to the outbreak, which contributed to its global spread. Still others may argue that Washington should work with its allies, not Beijing, to fashion a global response. All these arguments deserve a hearing. The Trump administration is justified in weighing risks and rewards of working with China on COVID-19 response. Ultimately, though, COVID-19 is indifferent to national borders and American feelings about China’s culpability for the pandemic. America’s prestige on the world stage at the end of this crisis will be determined by its performance in stopping the spread of the virus, saving lives, and restoring the American and global economies to health. For the moment, all other considerations must be subordinated to these objectives.
    If there is a more efficient and effective way for addressing challenges presented by COVID-19 than by taking measured steps with Beijing to galvanize global action, now is the time to hear them. There should be a robust debate about the costs and benefits of working with China versus attempting to work around China on global efforts to create conditions for reopening. Rosy assumptions—either about China supporting America’s lead or about the G-7 or G-20 falling in line to advance an American agenda—should be interrogated. The crisis has imposed an urgency for the best ideas to come to the surface. There is no time to waste.

11. 中国を含めたウイルス危機の早期解決:
by Ryan Hass (2020/6/16)

  • rancor: 憤慨
  • apportionment: 分配、配当
  • stoke: add coal or fuel to fire
  • rancor: 憤慨
  • muddy: 不明瞭、曖昧
  • deflect: そらす
  • galvanize: 活気づかせる
  • tarnish: 変色、曇る、損なう
  • dispassionate: 冷静な、公平な
  • epionage: スパイ行為
  • subvert: undermine the power & authority
  • promulgation: 公布、発布
  • incriminate: 有罪を立証する
  • culpability: 有罪性
  • no-deal Brexit:合意なき離脱
  • コロナウイルスは、米中が協調して対応するよりもさらなる摩擦要因を拡大しつつある。この間G7やG20のような多国間期間が、コロナ感染拡大期間と重なり機能縮小し、米中二大国の関係も劣化し、摩擦は拡大し、ウイルスの起源や世界への感染責任を巡って”言論戦争”を呈している。両国指導者は、相手の責任を追求することで感染拡大の影響への自国の対応がベストであることを計算しているように見える。

  • 非難の応酬の期間:
    しばらくの間は、この相互非難の応酬は止みそうもない。ウイルスの起源についても確たる根拠もなく、また世界への汚染拡大の要因も定かはない。中国外でのパンデミック状況を精査するとこのウイルスが中国外の発生の可能性なのか、中国の初期の対応無視が原因なのかはまだ混乱している。中国は、このウイルスが米国起源という当初の説は曖昧にしているし、中国の感染対策は世界のモデルになると宣伝している。しかしJoseph Nyeによれば、国際の舞台での影響力は信頼性にあるのであって、喧伝することはむしろ信頼性を損なう。

  • このコロナ危機以前には、米中両国はグローバルな対応は活発であった。冷戦中であっても米国とソ連は、天然痘撲滅では協力してきた。また最近でも2008-09の世界経済危機の時や 2014年のアフリカからのEbola感染の時も、米中は協調してきた。残念ながら、今回のコロナ危機では、「米中のこのような国家レベルの協力関係を回復するには、相互に相手に悪意があると決めつけているので、遅すぎる。最近の中国の香港締付けを強化していることも米中関係の悪化要因となっている。政治的な問題は一旦脇に置いて、まず生命を救出し、コロナ感染を止めることでグローバル経済を再開させることが可能であった。明確な事実だが、どの国も一カ国で世界中のコロナウイルスを撲滅させることが不可能である。米中の後押しなしで多国間機関がそれを推進する能力も信頼性もない。ウイルス除去が進まなければ、両国の国民はリスクに晒され続け、両国の経済は打撃を受け、世界的危機で両国は指導力を発揮できないことで評判を傷つけることになる。もし米中関係が好転し、両国の指導者の政治的思惑は異なれば、もっと多くのことが安価に成し遂げられる。

  • Covid-19感染被害期間を短縮する現実的な方法: 米中両国がCovid-19をコントロール下に置くプロセスを早めるための初期対応として
    • 医療従事者の相互派遣、それによりウイルス拡散防止システムの場所に医療スタッフが迅速に対応取ることが可能。
    • 医療機材に関わる関税を無税とし、他の国々もそのように対応するよう米中共同声明を発する。
    • 救命のための医療危機の輸出禁止を共同で中止し、これら製品のグローバル製造チェーンを安定化させる。
    • 米中両国による実質的サミット会議を行い以下確認する。
      • 支援:国レベル以下の州、市、科学者、社会奉仕、企業レベルでの協力支援
      • どこが最初に開発するかを問わずワクチンの臨床試験促進への最大支援
      • ワクチン製造に当たっては、進歩を損なういかなるスパイ行為や情報盗用をしない。
      • 早急なワクチン製造のための集合組織への共同出資。ワクチンの大量生産に必要な設備機材はまだ確定的でないので。
      • 重複を避けて効果最大にするために協調して、途上国に対する医療および金融支援を実施。

  • さらに大胆な共同での努力があり得る。特に、すでに南半球では始まっているウイルス感染の次の波に備えて、南半球への国際医療専門家をグローバル派遣するこれらの専門家チームは、現地の医療sタッフ、患者、医療体制について医療リーダーを協力し、必要な試験や追跡、様々な診療モデルの教訓の共有など行う。さらに米中は共同でEUによるワクチン研究についても共同で協力を要請する。米中がこのように資金援助について協力するなら、それは他の国々からも同様の支援を引き出すことが可能となる。

  • 休戦の必要性:
    このような建設的な行動計画を外交的に確立するには、ウイルスの起源についての有罪追求について、まず休戦協定を結ぶ必要がある。米中両国の修辞的な応酬を収める一つの方法は、ウイルスの出現原因と急拡大の原因追求については、科学的専門家による国際調査を同時に約束することである。習主席は、5/18にWorld Health Assemblyにてこのような方向での宣言を行った。米国ももっと科学ベースで国連主導におけるこの感染危機のさらなる拡大阻止のための教訓や失敗やベストプラクティスの検証について中国の約束の意図をさらに確認すべきである。

  • 一部の人は、中国は米国の主要なライバルなので、この機会にCovid-19に対して協力するより、中国の立場を弱体化するよう追求すべきとしている。また他の人は中国に対するこのような協力的なアプローチは、中国が初期の感染勃発を無視している、世界的な感染拡大に取り組むのは信用できないとしている。また他の人は米国は中国ではなく、他の同盟国と協力して行うべきと主張する。これらの議論は聞く価値がある。トランプ政権は、Covid-19対応で中国を協力することのリスクとメリットを測っている。しかしCovid-19は、国境や米国の中国への責任追及の感情とは無関心の存在である。米国のこの危機を終了させるという世界の舞台での栄誉は、実際にウイルス感染拡大を防止し、命を救出し、米国および世界経済の復活する上での実行力にかかっている。現在の段階では、それ以外の考察はすべて二の次である。


>Top 12. Britain bungles its lockdown and garbled its reopening:
by Amanda Sloat, Jun 16, 2020 Brookings HP.

  • The UK lagged behind its continental neighbors in introducing measures to slow the spread of the coronavirus, leading critics to blame the government for doing too little too late.By early May, the United Kingdom achieved the dubious distinction of surpassing Italy to have the highest death toll in Europe from the novel coronavirus. Its losses were second globally to the United States, which has a population five times greater. Surveys suggested the British were among the most pro-lockdownin the world, more reluctant to reopen businesses before the virus was fully contained than people in similarly affected countries. Favorability ratings for Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who was slow to implement a lockdown then nearly died from the virus himself, were initially high. However, his efforts to reopen the country on May 10 were marked by mixed messages and public skepticism. Public support for Johnson plummeted 20 points and backing for his government fell 16 points over the late May holiday weekend, after news emerged that Dominic Cummings—Johnson’s controversial advisor who spearheaded the Brexit campaign and guided the COVID-19 response—had flouted lockdown rules by driving his wife and son 260 miles for childcare assistance from relatives after his wife became ill. Britain’s reopening was also marked by significant regional variation. Responsibility for major public services (such as health and education) are devolved to governments in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland—all of which declined to follow Johnson’s guidance for England.

  • Slow Start:
    The UK lagged behind its continental neighbors in introducing measures to slow the spread of the coronavirus, leading critics to blame the government for doing too little too late. Johnson relied on scientific advisors, who recommended against beginning social distancing measures too quickly lest people become fatigued and advocated “herd immunity” (though one advisor later denied this was the strategy). On March 12, Johnson announced a move from the “contain” to the “delay” phase. He advised anyone feeling unwell to stay home, people over 70 to avoid cruises, and students not to travel abroad. However, he did not shut schools or ban large gatherings. Hours after Scotland and Wales closed schools on March 18, Johnson announced their shuttering in England; Northern Ireland soon followed. On March 23, Johnson introduced a national lockdown that prevented people from leaving home for anything other than essential work, medical care, grocery shopping, and once-daily exercise.

  • The Prime Minister's Near Death:
    Four days later, Johnson said he had tested positive for the coronavirus. His health secretary, chief medical officer, and other senior officials (including Cummings) also fell ill. Johnson was hospitalized for a week, including three nights in intensive care on oxygen. There was widespread goodwill for the prime minister during his illness, despite some head shaking over his boast several weeks earlier about shaking hands with hospitalized COVID-19 patients. British institutions calmly carried on, as Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab temporarily filled in for Johnson, Queen Elizabeth II rallied the nation in a televised message, and the Labour Party elected a capable new leader. The prime minister was released from the hospital on April 12.Two weeks later, his fiancée—who suffered her own bout of coronavirus—gave birth to their first child.

  • Reopening Plans:
    Johnson’s near-death experience made him more sober about the seriousness of the virus. Yet he is a libertarian by nature, having lamented that restrictions were “taking away the ancient, inalienable right of free-born people of the United Kingdom to go to the pub.” He also faced pressure from some Conservative Party members, who warned about the financial consequences of the closures. Chancellor Rishi Sunak said in mid-May it is “very likely” the UK is already in a “significant recession,” as the economy had contracted at the fastest pace since the 2008 financial crisis. The Bank of England warned it could shrink by 14 percent this year. Nearly 2 million people have applied for unemployment benefits, a six-fold increase from normal rates. The British government was quick to implement economic measures in mid-March, including a $\$$38 billion fiscal stimulus to provide welfare and business support.
    On May 10, Johnson offered general parameters for reopening the country in a televised address. The following day, his government published a 60-page recovery strategy, which he discussed with a “virtual parliament.” During the intervening 24 hours, there was widespread confusion about the guidance. A snap YouGov poll during this period found only 44 percent of respondents wanted restrictions eased while 43 percent were opposed, with Conservative voters twice as likely to support lifting them (61 percent) as Liberal Democrats (37 percent) and Labour voters (32 percent).

  • There was particular criticism of the government’s decision to replace its initial message (“stay home, protect the NHS [National Health Service], save lives”) with a muddled one (“stay alert, control the virus, save lives”). Although 91 percent of those polled felt the first one was clear, only 30 percent said they understood the new one. Critics also lamented the lack of specific instructions, with Johnson repeatedly telling legislators that the public should rely on “good, solid, British common sense.” Days later, a YouGov poll showed those who believed the government was handling the crisis well dropped below 50 percent for the first time.

  • The reopening rules, which only applied to England, followed a phased approach. From May 13, those able to work from home should continue to do so; those who cannot (including workers in manufacturing, logistics, scientific research, and food production) were “actively encouraged” to return to their jobs with appropriate safety measures. The government recommended wearing masks when taking public transportation or shopping. People were allowed to leave home to exercise for an unlimited period of time and meet one person from a different household in public. Travelers from abroad are required to self-isolate for 14 days, with the exception of Ireland (given the shared border with Northern Ireland). In late May, Johnson announced that schools could begin a phased re-opening on June 1 and non-essential shops could resume business on June 15. Bars, restaurants, hair salons, and cinemas may reopen after July 4, if infection rates have not increased.
    The government created a new monitoring system. “COVID-19 Alert Level,” a 1-to-5 grading system like the terror threat level, will use input from a new joint biosecurity center to determine the pace of reopening. In addition, five ministerial 76 taskforces are looking at pubs and restaurants, non-essential retail, recreation and leisure (such as tourism, libraries, sport, worship), and air travel. The government’s plans depend on keeping the reproduction number (how many people the average infected person infects) below 1, yet critics noted the UK struggled to develop large-scale testing and numbers vary widely across the country.

  • Regional Variation:
    Britain’s constituent nations and regions coordinated their shutdown responses, including the creation of a UK-wide action plan in early March and similar messaging about restrictions later that month. Yet the devolved administrations opted not to follow Johnson’s reopening guidance, leading to variable rules across the country and charges that he had become prime minister of England only.

  • Scotland: First Minister Nicola Sturgeon criticized Johnson for retiring “stay home” as the official message. She said adopting the same strategy in Scotland would be playing “Russian roulette” with people’s lives, given “the risk of the virus potentially running out of control again.” She extended the lockdown until May 28, encouraging Scots via Twitter to “Please continue to #StayAtHome.” In late May, Sturgeon announced a relaxation of restrictions; this included the reopening of garden centers, outdoor cafes, and drive-through restaurants as well as permission to visit parks and meet friends outdoors. Non-essential shops, pubs, and restaurants will remain closed for at least three more weeks, with no set reopening date. Schools will open in mid-August with a “blended model” of regular and online learning.

  • Wales: First Minister Mark Drakeford noted “some differences in the messaging between England and Wales which I am concerned may cause confusion,” encouraging people to “please continue to stay at home.” Although Wales has not yet reopened the economy, it passed a law requiring employers to ensure workers can stay six feet apart. Garden centers can reopen, people can exercise outside more than once a day, but gatherings in public places remain prohibited. Drakeford said he has not seen sufficient evidence to require masks. The government planned to announce further changes in late May. Schools will not open in early June.

  • Northern Ireland: The region, which shares a border with the Republic of Ireland, has faced political strains from differing approaches by the British and Irish governments. Although hardline unionist politicians eschewed differences during Brexit debates, First Minister Arlene Foster acknowledged “slight differences” in Northern Ireland’s position and said its moves would be “nuanced.” The power-sharing government retained the Stay Home slogan. It published a five-stage plan for easing lockdown, though without a timetable. The first step included re-opening places of worship for private prayer, “drive-through church services,” and permission for four to six people who do not share the same household to gather outside at an appropriate distance. Those unable to work from home were allowed to return on a phased basis if infection rates remain low. Schools will remain closed until September. The government is creating its own contact tracing app, which will be compatible with a version being developed in Ireland.

  • English regions: Although England does not have a regional assembly, some local leaders raised concerns about Johnson’s approach. The mayors of Manchester and Liverpool sent him a letter, which warned that removing the “Stay Home” message was premature in the badly affected northwest and called for reproduction numbers to include local breakdowns.

  • Brexit Implications:
    Despite the coronavirus, Brexit looms large. When the UK left the EU on January 31, it began an 11-month transition period. During this time, the two sides planned to determine their future relationship, including a free trade agreement. The outbreak of COVID-19 hampered talks, given social distancing restrictions and ill negotiators. When the third round resumed via videoconference in mid-May, significant gaps remained. Either side could ask to extend the transition period by one to two years. Polling shows over two-thirds of Britons support an extension, which would allow the government to focus on the pandemic. Yet Johnson has long opposed remaining bound by EU rules and financial obligations longer than necessary. In the days after this negotiating round, British civil servants detailed to work on the coronavirus returned to no-deal planning. Although leaving the EU without a trade deal would create an economic shock, some argue its effects would be masked by the coronavirus-induced recession. Time is short, as any extension must be agreed before July 1.

  • Conclusion:
    Five months after Boris Johnson won a decisive election with a pledge to “get Brexit done,” thousands of citizens have lost their lives to COVID-19, the economy is in recession, devolved governments rejected his initial reopening plans, and post-Brexit arrangements are far from done. Although he planned to remake the UK’s relationship with Europe, he must now remake Britain itself after the pandemic. The challenge of reunifying a country polarized by Brexit could become even harder if Cummings retains his position and regional divergences over the coronavirus continue. Johnson’s decisions in the coming months will be critical to Britain’s health and economy, as well as its domestic unity and foreign relations.

12. 英はロックダウンに失敗し、再開も歪む:
by Amanda Sloat (2020/6/16 Brookings HP)

  • bungle: carry out a task clumsily or incopetently, しくじる
  • garble: ゆがめる
  • flout: 無視する
  • devolve: 委ねる
  • herd: 群れ
  • sober: serious, sensible, 思慮深い
  • inalienable: 奪うことのできない
  • muddle: ごちゃ混ぜ
  • Basic Reproduction number, $R_0$: 基本再生産数
  • implications: (政治経済的)影響
  • constituent; 憲法制定権のある
  • eschew: deliberately avoid, 意識して避ける
  • nuance: 微妙な違いを与える
  • loom: appear as a vague form, 次第に迫ってくる
  • 英国は、大陸の隣接国に対して、コロナウイルスの感染拡大防止で遅れをとっており、行動は小さすぎかつ遅すぎるとの批判が高まっている。
    この5月始めまでに、英国はコロナウイルスではイタリア以上の不名誉記録となり、欧州での最大の死亡者比率となり、米国に次いでいた。英国は世界でもっとも徹底的にロックダウンを実施し、経済再開についても最も慎重だった。Boris Johnson首相にとっても最初の対応は遅かったが、その後自身が感染したこともあり対応強化した。しかし5/10に国の再開をしたことはメッセージとして混乱しており国民の疑念は消えていない。5月末に、首相支持率は20%また、政府支持率は16%も下落した。特にBrexitキャンペーンやコロナ対策でのアドバイザであるDominic Cummingsが、ロクダウン規則に反し、彼の妻と息子を260マイル離れた親戚に避難したという報道が出てから支持率が下落した。英国の再開方針は地域によって異なる。スコットランド、ウェールズ、北アイルランドでは医療や教育は公的サービスなので、Johnson首相のイングランドでの対策に従ってはいない。

  • スロースタート:
    英国は、コロナ感染拡大対策で大陸の隣国に比べて遅れを取った。Johnson首相は、科学アドバイザーに従って、当初のソーシャルディスタンスの方針ではなく、"集団免疫"策を採用した。(アドバイザーは後にこの戦略を否定しているが)3/12に、Johnson首相は、目標を"感染阻止"から"感染を遅らせる"方針を採用した。体調不良を感じる人はStay homeをして、70歳超の人は旅行を避け、学生は海外旅行を控えようという勧告である。しかし、学校閉鎖や大規模集会は禁止しなかった。3/18にスコットランドとウェールズで学校閉鎖された数時間後には、イングランドでも同様の措置を採り、北アイルランドもそれに続いた。3/23に、Johnson首相は、国家的なロックダウンを導入し、エッセンシャルワーカー、医療従事者、食料品店を除きStay homeとして、外出は一日一回のみとした。

  • 英首相、感染で死にはぐった:
    その4日後、Johnson首相は自身がウイルスに感染したと発表した。彼の医療スタッフは(Cummingsを含め)陽性だった。Johnsonは一週間入院し、3日間は酸素吸入での集中治療を受けた。数週間前にJohnson首相は、Covid-19での入院患者を握手をしたことが原因と言われ、同情が集まった。Dominic Raab外相がこの間代理首相と努め、Elizabeth IIからのTV放送が報道され、また労働党は有能な新リーダーを選出した。首相は4/12に退院したが、2週間後には、彼の婚約者(Carrie Symonds)もコロナで感染したものの、第一子を出産した。

  • 再開計画:
    Johnson首相は、自身の感染を通じてウイルスの深刻さを実感した。彼は自由主義者なので、規制には否定的で、"英国の自由な国民が自由にパブに行けない状況"を嘆いていた。また保守党の一部からは閉鎖に伴う経済的は影響を危惧する圧力を得ていた。Rishi Sunak財務大臣は、5月中旬には、2008年の経済危機以来急激に経済が縮小し、"英国はすでに深刻な不況下"に陥っていると言った。イングランド銀行は今年は14%、経済は縮小するとの予測を出した。従来の6倍に当たる約200万人が失業手当を申請した。英国政府は、3/中旬の段階で、$\$$38Bに及ぶ福祉やビジネス支援を急いで決めた。5/10には、Johnson首相は、国の再開についての一般的な指標を放送した。翌日政府は60頁もの復興戦略を発表し、"バーチャル議会" との議論を始めた。24時間のインタビューを通じて、そのガイダンスについての混乱が生じた。この間のYouGovの世論調査によれば、44%が制限に賛成で、43%はそれに反対だった。また、保守党支持率は61%と上昇し、自由党37%、労働党32%の2倍となった。

  • 政府の当初の方針 (stay home, 医療機関支援, save lives)を、(Stay alert (気をつけて), control the virus, save lives)という混乱したメッセージを変えることへの批判はあった。91%の世論調査は、最初のメッセージの方が明快であるとし、新たな方針へはわずか30%の支持しかなかった。Johnson首相は繰り返し、国民は"健全で、強固で英国的なセンス"に頼るべきとの発言に対し、具体性がないとの批判が強まった。数日後のYouGov世論調査では、政府の危機対応策は、初めて50%を割り込んだ。

  • 英国で採用された経済再開ルールは、段階的なものである。5/13から家でリモートワークできる人はそれを継続する。それができない製造業、輸送業、科学研究、食料生産については適切な安全対策を前提に職場に戻ることを"積極的に推進する"というもの。政府は、公共交通機関やショッピングの際のマスク着用を推奨した。人々は一定時間なら運動のための外出、また他の一人との公共での面談は許可されるとした。海外からの旅行者は14日間の隔離を要請される。但し、アイルランドは北アイルランドと陸続きなので例外とする。5月末には、Johnson首相は、感染がこれ以上拡大しない限り、学校は6/1から再開し、必須でない業種の店舗についても6/15から再開を認めた。
    政府は新たな監視システム"Covid-19 Alert Level" (1から5までの5段階の警鐘レベル)を作成し、新たな共同バイオセキュリティセンターに導入して再開のペースを決定することとした。更に、大臣レベルの76名のタスクフォースがパブ、レストラン、非必須分野の小売、リクレーション、レジャー施設(観光、図書館、スポーツ、宗教施設)空港など視察した。政府の計画は基本再生産数($R_0$)が1を下回るかどうかである。しかし、英国では「大規模な検査数とこの数字とは英国内地域によって大きな隔たりがあるとの批判がある。

  • 各地域での個別対応状況:

  • スコットランド:
    Nicola Sturgeon自治政府首相(First Minister)は、Johnson首相の"stay home"をやめることを正式に反対した。スコットランドがイングランド同様の戦略を採用することは、国民声明を"ロシアンルーレット"に晒すような"ウイルスのリスクを管理不能な状況にするもの"と主張した。彼女(Sturgeon首相)は、5/28までロックダウンを延長し、ツイッターを通じて"#StayAtHome"で呼びかけた。また5月末には、制限を緩和し、園芸用品店、野外カフェー、ドライブするー食堂を含め、公園や野外での友人との面談を許可した。なお、必須でない店舗、パブ、レストランはさらに3週間閉鎖され、再開の予定はない。学校は8月中旬に再開され、通常とオンライン学習との併用となる。

  • ウェールズ:
    Mark Drakford自治政府首相は、"イングランドとウェールズとでは指示内容に若干の違いがある"として、国民に対し引き続き"Stay at home"するよう勧奨した。ウェールズでは経済再開はまだ行われていないが、雇用者に対し、労働者が6フィート (1.8m)の社会的距離を取るようにするように制度化した。園芸用品店は再開し、人々は野外で1回以上運動ができるが、公共の場所での集会はまだ禁止される。Drakeford首相は、マスク着用を義務付ける効果はまだ確認できていないと言う。自治政府は、5月末にはまた状況は変わるだろうとした。学校は6月初旬の段階ではまだ再開していないだろうとした。

  • 北アイルランド:
    この地域は、アイルランド共和国と国境を接しており、栄光およびアイルランド政府の政治的対応の違いに戸惑っている。Brexitをめぐる論争を意図的に避けながら、Arlene Foster自治政府首相は、北アイルランドの"若干の立場の違い"を認識して、その行動は"微妙に異なる"ものとなろう。自治政府としてはStay Homeスローガンを継続した。また5頁に及ぶロックダウン緩和策を発表したが、時間的計画は示していない。第一段階としては、個人的な礼拝、ドラブスルーでの協会参列」および野外で4-6人での社会的距離を取った上での集まりを認める。リモートワークができない人は感染状況が下がれば段階的に復帰を認める。学校は9月まで閉鎖を継続する。自治政府は、アイルランドで開発中のバージョンと互換性のある独自の追跡アプリを作成した。

  • イングランド地域:
    イングランドでは地域議会は存在しないが、一部の地方リーダーはJohnson首相のアプローチに関心を示している。ManchesterやLiverpoolの市長は、首相に手紙を送り、"Stay Home"政策の放棄に警鐘を鳴らし、北西部に悪影響を生じるので時期尚早として、経済再開に当たっては、地方と分けて取り扱うよう訴えた。

  • Brexitへの影響:

  • 結論:
    Boris Johnson首相は、"Brexitの実行"を公約に選挙に大勝利を収めた5ヶ月後に、数千の市民がコロナウイルスで死亡し、経済は不況に落ち込み、当初の経済再開計画は頓挫し、Brexit後の初整備も遥か先送りとなってしまった。彼は欧州と英国との関係を再構築する計画だったが、今やパンデミック後の英国をいかに作り変えるかが必須となった。Brexitで分断した国家を再団結することは、たとえCummings補佐官がその地位に留まり、各地域のコロナウイルス状況がそのまま続いたとしても一層厳しくなるであろう。今後数ヶ月での、Johnson首相の決断は英国の健康と経済にとって、国内の団結と外国との関係同様にクリティカルになると予想される。

>Top 13. Reopening Germany:
by Constanze Stanzenmüller & Sam Denney, Jun 16, 2020

  • Given that experts and politicians in Germany are warning that the pandemic may last until the end of the year, it is perhaps too early to speculate about the post-coronavirus order.
    For Germany, the “reopening” phase of the coronavirus pandemic presents two challenges. The first is finding and maintaining the delicate balance between saving lives and saving the economy. The second is preserving the ability to treat the country’s pre-existing conditions, notwithstanding its much-praised resilience in the first two months of the crisis: a political order in transition, an economy that despite its wealth faces significant structural and technological hurdles, and an increasingly unfavorable strategic environment. Because of Germany’s relative political weight and its importance as a large anchor economy in the middle of Europe, the consequences of its success (or failure) extend well beyond the country’s borders.

  • Saving lives versus saving the economy:
    Germany’s nationwide pandemic shutdown began with an announcement of “radical measures” by Chancellor Angela Merkel on March 16, followed by even more restrictive rules on March 22. This emergency management framework received a great deal of praise at home and abroad for being decisive, evidence-based, and judicious. Arguably, it was key in flattening the German infection curve. But the decision-making process reflected both the weaknesses and the strengths of the country’s federalist culture: mayors, state leaders, and the federal government bickered in public over who was responsible while the infection curve vaulted upward in late February and early March. In the end, careful closed-door negotiations between Merkel’s Chancellery and the governments of the Länder, Germany’s sixteen states, led to a dependable political consensus.

  • By early May, Germany had recorded just over 160,000 COVID-19 infections, 127,000 recoveries, and nearly 6,500 deaths (a mortality rate of 4.0 percent). The reproduction factor (which measures how many people are infected by each new case) had dropped below 1. Across the country, 2.7 million tests had been administered, at a rate of more than 330,000 per week. On May 6, Chancellor Merkel announced a carefully controlled restarting of public life, nearly two months after decreeing a nationwide shutdown. “We can afford a little audacity,” she said.
    According to the statement agreed by the federal and state governments, social distancing rules are to be maintained (with masks still obligatory in many places) in slightly looser form until June 29. Large gatherings remain prohibited until at least August 31. But schools, stores, restaurants, tourism, cultural centers, and outdoor recreation spaces are to gradually reopen; and the Bundesliga, Germany’s soccer league, began playing games to empty stadiums from mid-May. The details of implementation, however, are left to the states. Local health agencies (often working through call centers staffed by students) are tasked with tracing. An emergency mechanism now requires states to reinstate restrictions in reaction to new coronavirus flare ups (defined as 50 new infections per 100,000 inhabitants over a week). All this pushes decision-making to the local level, permitting a differentiated response to significant regional variances in infection levels.

  • >Top Still, Merkel noted that the country remains at the beginning of the pandemic, and “we will have to deal with this virus for a long time.” German districts in several states have since reported outbreaks in senior care homes, refugee centers, and in meat-packing plants, triggering a local return to stricter rules. The Robert Koch Institute, Germany’s equivalent of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, warned sternly that it would be “necessary to observe the development very closely over the coming days.” Some German epidemiologists weighed in, calling the trigger threshold of 50 per 100,000 inhabitants arbitrary and probably too high. In mid-May, the Bundestag (the federal legislature) took the precaution to mandate more testing (especially for those working with at-risk groups), greater transparency in reporting test results, and more financial support for care-workers tending to the elderly. Clearly, audacity will have to be tempered with prudence and patience. In late May, the outlook seemed more hopeful than not: Germany’s COVID-19 deaths were nearing 8,000 (4.6 percent), but the number of new cases was flattening, and the reproduction factor was less than 1.

  • As for Germany’s economy, the federal government tore up its fiscal rule book with the most comprehensive package of salvage measures in Europe on March 25. It is unparalleled in the country’s postwar history, and even the measures taken in the context of the global financial meltdown of 2009 pale in comparison. Funding for Kurzarbeit (short-time work), a scheme whereby the state compensates employers for keeping furloughed employees on the books by paying two thirds of their wages, was massively expanded. The government also announced €400 billion ($\$$433 billion) in liquidity guarantees for larger firms and direct grants for 3 million small companies and freelancers, totaling around €700 billion ($\$$834 billion)—the equivalent of two annual national budgets. To accomplish all this, the government had to invoke an emergency clause to that most sacred of all sacred German cows: the Schwarze Null (black zero) constitutional debt brake. Bureaucracies across the country went into overdrive to ensure that companies and individuals got their money within days.
    However, economic reality quickly overtook the government’s actions. By late April, German companies had registered a “breathtaking” (in the words of Detlef Scheele, the head of the federal labor agency) 10.1 million employees for Kurzarbeit. Companies have to pre-register their employees for this scheme based on very rough estimates, so the actual number of workers furloughed in the end may be smaller. By comparison, 3.3 million workers were registered during the global financial crisis of 2009, and 1.4 million received furlough compensation. At the time, this enabled big industrial plants to call their workers back in and ramp up production again quickly. Yet many of the registrations came from small and medium enterprises, many of whom might not survive the crisis at all, ultimately leaving their workers jobless despite the protective measures. Job losses surged by more than 300,000 in April to a total of 2.64 million, pushing the unemployment rate to 5.8 percent.

  • Meanwhile, the Federal Statistical Office reported that while consumption of disinfectant, soap, toilet paper, and condoms has jumped, production of key German export goods—chemicals, machine tools, cars, and car parts—fell to levels comparable to those of the financial crisis. The private Statista consumer confidence index has plummeted. Surveys conducted in April by the Ifo Institute for Economic Research show production expectations across German industry, but in the auto industry in particular, at historic lows.The government is reportedly mulling an economic stimulus package of up to €150 billion, but has said it won’t decide before June. The automotive lobby, specifically, has called for purchase premiums or scrappage bonuses, which are supported by the minister presidents of Lower Saxony, Baden Württemberg, and Bavaria, where hundreds of thousands of jobs depend on car and car parts manufacturers. But the German Council of Economic Experts, an independent group that advises the federal government, foresees a recession with a GDP drop in 2020 between -2.8 and -5.4 percent; the IMF’s prediction is even more dire at -7.0 percent. Tax revenue estimates, according to reports from an expert advisory group to the finance ministry, are down €100 billion ($\$$108 billion) — and possibly a total of €300 billion ($\$$335 billion) over the next four years.

  • Pre-Existing Conditions:
    Given that experts and politicians in Germany are warning that the pandemic may last until the end of the year, it is perhaps too early to speculate about the post-coronavirus order. Nonetheless, some developments are worth noting.
    Pre-pandemic Berlin was obsessed with the slump in the polls of Merkel’s fourth and (according to her) last coalition government, and with the surprise resignation in February of her heir presumptive, defense minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer as leader of Merkel’s center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In a nation-wide poll from early May, however, the CDU’s approval rating shot up by more than 10 percentage points to 39 percent (its coalition partner, the Social Democrats, continues to languish at pre-pandemic levels of 16 percent). Merkel herself leads the personal popularity rankings with 68 percent, followed by her vice chancellor and finance minister Olaf Scholz at 59 percent. The man preferred by respondents as her successor, however, isn’t even an official candidate: Bavarian minister president Markus Söder (53 percent), who has been praised for managing the situation in his hard-hit state effectively and judiciously. Majorities of 54–56 percent dislike the three official candidates: Armin Laschet (minister president of North Rhine-Westphalia), Friedrich Merz (ex-parliamentarian and businessman), and Norbert Röttgen (chair of the foreign policy committee in the Bundestag).

  • The same poll suggests that Germans overall approve of the federal government’s crisis management (satisfied/very satisfied: 67 percent), are optimistic that they will keep their jobs (84 percent), and that the restrictions on their freedoms are temporary (60 percent). While 54 percent want restrictions loosened, 41 percent would prefer the status quo.
    Yet the voluntary self-discipline exercised by politicians and citizens alike in March when the county went into shutdown mode has visibly eroded; and this despite the fact that Germany’s restrictions were much more liberal than those in France, Italy, or Spain, and were initially successful in flattening the infection curve. State minister presidents have competed to present the earliest and most liberal opening rules, and opposition politicians and pundits inveighed against “government by epidemiologists.” Even the usually calm Merkel briefly lost her temper at what she called “Öffnungsdiskussionsorgien” (roughly: self-indulgent debates about loosening the rules).

  • The hard-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party, which before the crisis had had some success in splitting and infiltrating the right-wing fringes of the CDU, has largely been sidelined during the first months of the crisis and has sunk in the polls. But on the weekends after the gradual opening policy was announced, several German cities saw thousands of people demonstrating angrily against the shutdown, including some well-known far right populists and conspiracy theorists. Will the AfD manage to turn this mood to its political advantage, as it did during the refugee crisis of 2015? Federal President Frank Walter Steinmeier was careful to emphasize the right of citizens to criticize government handling of the pandemic. But an unnamed former minister told the daily Süddeutsche Zeitung that the protests seemed like a déjà vu to him, with a huge open-ended crisis, highly complex issues, a growing need for simple answers, and the radical right attempting once more to profit from the situation. “The only difference,” he said, “is that the problems today are even bigger.
    ”Pre-pandemic economic policy debates had centered on the question of whether the wealth and trade surplus of Europe’s largest economy were politically and economically sustainable, given a growing list of risks: the Trump administration’s trade war threats, a decade of underinvestment in physical and digital infrastructure, and the failure of key industries (the car industry foremost among them) to adapt to new trends and technologies. As one of the world’s largest exporters, Germany is also uniquely exposed to disruptions of its global supply chains, or in cross-border labor movements, and these vulnerabilities remain.

  • >Top In geopolitical terms, Germany has yet to adapt to the stark climate change in international relations: the increasingly predatory behavior of the great powers China and Russia, and a United States that under the Trump administration has become recklessly volatile and often hostile toward its European allies. All these are arguments for reinforcing the strategic sovereignty of European nation states as well as of the European Union. But pre-pandemic Germany tended to zigzag between hard-edged national self-interest and hand-wringing appeals to multilateralism. Nationalist reflexes led it to prohibit exports of medical goods and close its borders at the outset of the pandemic. Since then, it has lifted the exports ban, flown in patients from other European countries, and pledged to take part in a global vaccine effort; borders are scheduled to open again by mid-June. The May 5 constitutional court ruling questioning the legality of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy was widely criticized as a major blow to the unity of Europe. Chancellor Merkel’s May 18 announcement, made together with French president Emmanuel Macron, of a €500 billion European recovery fund, was all the more sensational. One test of Germany’s EU presidency in the second half of 2020 will be persuading skeptical member states—the so-called “Frugal Four” (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden)—to go along.

  • An Uncertain Outlook:
    The elements of Germany’s successful initial management of the pandemic are well-known: early, rigorous testing and tracking, large quantities of ICU beds and ventilators, a functioning civil service, considerable public trust and solidarity by citizens, political elites willing to put emergency action before partisan politics, a functioning social welfare economy with near-total insurance coverage, and a healthy national budget surplus.
    Yet its failures have been equally visible: a combination of federalism and fractious politics meant time for political action was lost in the first weeks of the outbreak; early nationalist reflexes cost Germany political credit. And efforts to develop a German tracing app are still ongoing; according to media reports, it will not be available before mid-June.
    The jury is still out on the long-term political, economic, and social consequences of the pandemic; some of the scenarios are relentlessly bleak. Yet there is proof that miracles do happen in Germany: the new BER international airport on the outskirts of Berlin, much derided for construction delays and design flaws that set it back by nearly a decade, is set to open in October. If this pig can fly—perhaps others can, too.

13. ドイツの再開:
by Constanze Stanzenmüller & Sam Denney, (2020/6/16 )

  • judicious: showing with good judgment or sence, 思慮深い
  • arguably: it may be argued (argue=give reasons), おそらく、きっと
  • vault: 跳び越す
  • bicker: argue about trivial matters
  • Länder: G. country
  • audacity: willingness to take bold risks, 大胆、無謀
  • weigh in: 意見を言う、論争に加わる
  • furlough: 休暇(を与える)、一時帰休
  • Schwarze Null (Black Zero) rule: a budget balanced between fiscal spending and tax receipts.
  • breath-taking: 息を呑むような、驚くべき
  • Kurzarbeit: short-time working
  • ramp up: 増産する
  • disinfectant: 消毒剤、殺菌剤
  • Ifo: Information and Forschung (research): Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich-based largest economic think-tanks.
  • mull: think about deeply, 熟考、思案する
  • scrappage: goverment program that gives drivers a financial incentive to replace old cars with newer, more fuel-efficient ones.
  • dire: extremly serious or urgent、悲惨な
  • heir presumptive: 推定相続人
  • languish: 停滞する
  • minister president: ドイツ13州の首相
  • pundit: 専門家、有識者
  • inveigh: 罵倒する
  • epidemiology: 疫学
  • Alternative für Deutschland (AfD): ドイツのための選択肢党(極右政党)
  • stark; sever or bare in appearnce, 厳しい、避けられない
  • wring: squeeze and twist, 引き出す、絞り出す
  • outset: 最初
  • legality: 合法性
  • GFCC (German Federal Constitutional Court) vs. ECB on 2020/5/5:
    GFCC insists that ECB's purchases of sovereign debt under the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) of 2015 violate the boundaries that the European Treaties set to the ECB's activities. Such actions go beyond the competence that national legislators have provided to EU institutions through the Treaties, must not be tolerated; otherwise the basic rights of German citizens would be violated.
  • Frugal Four: Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden; conservative members of EU, disagree with the idea of Eurobonds, and corona bonds aswell.
  • bleak: cold and miserable, 荒涼とした
  • BER: Berlin Brandenburg Airport, 2020/10/31開港
  • deride: あざ笑う
  • ドイツの専門家や政治家は、パンデミックが年末まで続くを見ており、ポストコロナがどうなるのかを予想するのは早すぎるとしている。ドイツにとって、コロナウイルスからの経済再開には2つの局面がある。一つは、声明と経済の救出との微妙なバランスをどう取るのかという問題。2つ目には、コロナ危機の最初の2ヶ月間はうまくいったが、それ以降の国の既存の状況にどう対処していくのかという問題、即ち、政治体制の移行問題、構造的技術的な課題を抱えている経済問題、戦略的な環境問題等である。ドイツは欧州中央の経済の重鎮として政治的比重も大きく、その成否は国外にも影響する。

  • 生命の救済か経済の救済か:
    ドイツの全国的なパンデミック封鎖はAngela Merkel首相の3/16に、また更に厳格なルールを示した3/22の"抜本的対策"宣言から始まった。この緊急対策の枠組みは、決定的で、根拠があり思慮深い内容であると内外から評価された。(>メルケル首相声明)おそらくドイツの感染曲線が頭打ちになっていることがキーであった。しかし、意思決定プロセスはドイツ連邦の風土(市長、州のリーダー、また2-3月に感染がぶり返したことの連邦政府の責任を問うこと等)を考慮すると強みにも弱みにもなる。結局、メルケル首相とドイツ16州リーダーとで密室でうまく政治的妥協がなされた。

  • 5月初までにドイツのCovid-19患者は16万人に達し、内12.7万人が回復し、6,500人が死亡した。 (死亡率は4.0%) 基本再生産数も1以下になった。全国では270万件、毎週33万件の検査が行われた。5/6には、Merkel首相は、2ヶ月近くの全国の閉鎖措置の後、公的活動を注意しながら再開することを宣言した。"我々は少し大胆になることができるようになった"と彼女は語った。連邦と州政府の合意により、ソーシャルディスタンスの規制は(多くの場所でのマスクの着用も含め)、6/29までは少し緩和されたやり方で継続されることになった。大規模集会は、少なくとも8/31までは引き続き禁止された。しかし、学校、店舗、レストラン、観光、カルチャーセンター、野外のリクレーション施設は徐々に再開した。またサッカーリーグ(Bundesliga)は5月中旬より無観客で継続試合を開始した。細かな進め方はコロナの状況次第となる。地方の保健センター (しばしば学生にコールセンタ)はコロナ感染の追跡を行う。新たにコロナ感染が拡大する場合には、(具体的には、1週間で10万人当り50人の新規感染者が出る場合)緊急措置が発動される。この基準は地方レベルにも適用されるが、地方の感染レベルによっては異なる対応もあり得る。

  • さらにMerkel首相は、地方はまだ感染拡大の初期段階であり、"このウイルスについては今後もっと長期間対抗しなければならない"と語った。ドイツのいくつかの地区では感染発症以来、シニアケアホーム、難民センター、肉詰加工工場などには更に厳しい規則を適用するとのこと。ドイツの疾病管理防止センターに相当するRober Koch Instituteは、"今後数日の状況推移を注視することが肝要"としている。また一部の感染症学者は、10万人当り50人の感染者の基準は恣意的で高すぎるとの意見である。5月中旬に、ドイツ連邦議会(Bundestag)は、さらなる検査、特にリスクの高いワーカーに対して実施し,その検査結果を透明性をもって公表すること、また高齢化が進むケアワーカーへのさらなる財政支援を行うよう義務化した。明らかに、大胆にやることは慎重さと忍耐によって緩和されるという面がある。5月末には、感染状況はさらに従来よりは希望が持てるようになった。ドイツでのCovid-19による死亡者は8,000人(4.6%)近かったが、新規感染者数は頭打ちになって、基本再生産数も1以下となった。

  • ドイツの経済については、連邦政府は、欧州での最も普遍的な救済政策集を、3/25に破棄した。それは戦後で初めてのことで、2009年の世界的な金融メルトダウンの際の政策に比べても画期的なものである。短時間労働(Kurzarbeit)、この制度は被雇用者が一時帰休された場合、国が給与の2/3を支払うというもので、これをさらに拡充するという。また政府は、大企業向けの流動性保証のために、€400B ($\$$433B)を、また中小企業や自由業者向け救済資金として€3Mを、合計€700B ($\$$834B)これは2年分の国家予算に相当、を行うと発表した。これを実施するには、政府として金科玉条としてきた財政規律(Schwarze Null (black zero), 財政支出と税収とはバランスさせる)に関わる緊急事態を覚悟しなければならなくなる。全国の役人、会社や個人がこれらの資金を期日までに届けるための超過作業が必要となる。しかし経済的な現実は政府の行動を追い越してしまった。4月末までに、ドイツの会社は、10.1百万の被雇用者を短時間労働者(Kurzarbeit)に登録という画期的なことをしてしまった。会社は予め従業員を、概数でこの対象者を事前登録しておかなければならず、その結果、実際の対象者数は結局少なくなった。2009年の世界経済危機の場合は3.3百万の労働者が登録されたが、実際には1.4百万人がこの一時帰休の補填を受けた。この時は、大企業の工場は労働者を呼び戻し、早期に想定以上の増産にこぎつけた。しかし、この登録者は中小企業からが多いので、危機の時には倒産しかねず、それらの労働者は、政府の補填があっても失業してしまうかもしれない。失業者は4月には30万人以上となり、失業率は5.8%に達した。

  • 一方、連邦統計局によれば、消毒液、石鹸、トイレットペーパー、コンドームの需要が急増し、ドイツの主要輸出品である化学品、機械器具、自動車、自動車部品は経済危機の時のレベルに低下した。ドイツのオンライン統計ポータル(Statista)によれば、消費者指数は急落した。ドイツ最大のシンクタンクであるIfo Institue for Economic Researchが4月の調査によれば、ドイツの産業、特に自動車産業は歴史的な低い水準であるとのこと。政府は経済刺激策として€150Bを準備した6月までに決まらないという。自動車産業のロビーは、特に、購入プレミアムやScrappage bonuses (燃費の良い車への購入補助金)を要求しており、これら政策は、自動車や自動車部品産業の従業員の多いLower Saxony, Barden Württemberg, Barvariaの州知事の支援を得ている。しかしドイツ経済専門家会議は、独立グループとして連邦政府に進言し、2020年のGDP下落を-2.8から-5.4%であると予測した。IMFは更に深刻な-7.0%を予測している。財務大臣に報告された税収の下落見込幅は、€100B ($\$$108B)と予測し、おそらく今後4年間は、税収は€300B ($\$$335B)で見込んでいる。

  • 既存の諸条件:
    パンデミック以前のベルリンでは、Merkel首相の第4期と最後の(彼女によれば)連立政権の支持率は低迷していたが、彼女の後継者と見られていた中道右派のキリスト教民主同盟(CDU)のリーダーでもあるAnnegret Kramp-Karrenbauer防衛大臣が急遽辞任してしまった。5月初の全国世論調査でも, CDUの支持率は10%も上昇し、39%となった。(連立の相手である社会民主党(SPD)はパンデミック以前の16%レベルで停滞)またMerker自身も個人的な人気は68%となり、それに次ぐのが副首相兼財務大臣のOlaf Scholzで59%であった。Merkelの後継者(まだ正式ではない)として人気があるのは、Bavaria州首相のMarkus Söder (53%)で打撃を受けた州をうまく管理したことが評価された。また54-56%の不人気となったのはArmin Laschet (North Rhine-Westphalia州首相)、Friedrich Merz (前国会議員で企業人)、およびNorbert Röttgen (連邦議会(Bundestag)の外交委員長)である。

  • 同じ世論調査で、ドイツ人は概ね連邦政府の危機管理能力を評価している (満足+非常に満足 67%)、仕事を維持できることを楽観視 (84%)、一時的な自由の制限支持(60%)であった。一方、54%は制限緩和を望み、41%は現状を支持した。国が踏み切った3月のシャットダウンについて自主的な行動制限は段々価値を下げている。実際にはドイツの制限は、フランス、イタリー、スペインに比べて、ずっと自由度の高いものであったが、当初の感染率はそれでも抑えられた。各州の首相は競って早急な開放ルールを要求し、さらに政治家や専門家は"感染学者による政府"として強烈に反対した。普段は穏便なMerkel 首相も、ついに"ルールを緩和することは余りにも手前勝手だ!"と叫んだ。

  • 極右政党であるAfD (ドイツのための選択肢)党は、コロナ危機前は、CDUの右派の一部としてある程度成功していたが、危機の最初の数ヶ月で人気は下落した。しかし経済再開政策が発表されると、一部の都市では過激な右翼ポピュリストと含め、数千のデモ隊がシャットダウンに激しく反対した。この動きを、2015年の難民危機の時のように、AfDは政治的に利用しようとするのかは疑問。ドイツ連邦大統領であるFrank Walter Steinmeier (SPD)は慎重な表現ながら、右派の市民は政府のコロナパンデミック政策に批判的なのだと語った。但し、これは彼にとってデジャブであって、終わりの見えない危機で複雑な問題では、単純な回答の方が人気となり、急進右派はその状況を利用しているのだとの某前大臣の意見を日刊紙南ドイツ新聞(Süddeutsche Zeitung)は伝えている。連邦大統領曰く、"唯一の違いは、今日の問題が遥かに大きいことである。パンデミック以前の経済政策論議は、欧州最大経済の富と貿易黒字は、政治経済的に維持可能であった。しかしながらリスク要因が拡大している。例えばトランプ政権による貿易戦争、物理的かつデジタルインフラに対する十年に亘る過小投資、中核産業の失敗 (自動車産業はその最たるもの)即ち、新たなトレンドと技術に適応しなかったことである。世界最大の輸出国家として、ドイツはそのグローバルサプライチェーンが損なわれてきており、国境をまたぐ労働力の以上など不確定要因が存在している"と。

  • 地政学的な意味では、ドイツはこの厳しい国際的な変化にまだ適応可能である。中国、ロシア、トランプ政権の米国という利己的な大国は、欧州連合国に対し、激しくかつしばしば敵対的になってきた。これらは全て欧州の国民国家とEUの戦略的な主権を強化するための議論であった。しかしパンデミック以前のドイツは、強固に自国の利益を主張する面と、なんとかして相互主義を絞り出すようなジグザグな行動を取ってきた。国家主義者は、すぐさま医療部品の輸出を禁止し、パンデミックの当初からの国境封鎖を主張した。その後輸出禁止は解禁し、他の欧州各国からの患者も空輸し、グローバルなワクチン開発に関わった。国境は6月中旬には再開する予定である。5/5にドイツ連邦憲法裁判所(GFCC)による欧州中央銀行(ECB)による金融政策が(合法性に疑問を呈した)ことは、欧州の統一にとって大打撃となると非難されている。Merkel首相は、5/18のフランスEmmanuel Macron大統領との共同声明で、€600Bの欧州救済基金を発表したことは更に世間を騒がした。ドイツとしては、2020年後半にはEU大統領選挙が試金石であり、いわゆるFrugal Four (オーストリア、デンマーク、オランダ、スウェーデン、EU内の保守派)をいかに説得できるかである。

  • 不確定要素の展望:
    パンデミックに対するドイツの初期対応の成功はよく知られている。初期段階で、積極的な検査と追跡を行い、大量のICU用ベッドと換気装置を準備し、市民サービスを徹底し、国民の信頼と団結を勝ち取り、政治エリートは分派行動よりも緊急対応に邁進し、保険で完全にカバーする社会福祉経済を機能させ、かつ健全な国家財政黒字を達成した。しかしながらその失敗についても同様に明らかになっている。連邦主義と分権政治との政治的な調整に手間取り、ウイルス感染が拡大した最初の数週間、時間ロスした。初期段階で国家主義者による反対運動がドイツの政治状況の信頼を残った。その後、ドイツの感染追跡アプリの開発を続行したものの、6月中旬前には導入できなかった。また司法によるパンデミックの結果による長期的な政治・経済・社会的な状況についての意見も乖離している。そのシナリオは厳しく荒涼としたものである。しかしドイツに何か奇跡的なことが起こるかも知れない。それはベルリン郊外に建設される新たなBER (Berlin Brandenburg Airport)で、工事遅延やデザインなどで評判悪かったが、いよいよ2020/10月に開港となる。もしこのブタが飛び立つのなら、おそらく他のものもそうできるであろう。

>Top 14. The Day France reopened, by Célia Belin & Agneska Bloch, Jun 16, 2020 Brookings HP.

  • Two months after the beginning of the COVID-19 lockdown, with a death toll among the top four in Europe (along with the U.K., Italy, and Spain), France began to reopen gradually. Over April, the numbers of case related hospitalizations and patients in intensive care had started to decrease regularly, allowing the country to enter a new normal on May 11. Yet, the strict eight week lockdown will undoubtedly leave a trace. A series of controversial decisions and communications blunders, fueled by a general fear of what’s ahead, have nourished public mistrust of President Emmanuel Macron and his government. In the long run, the challenge for the French executive is to learn to manage a deeply apprehensive public and convince the French people to accept a degree of uncertainty in the scope, geographic distribution, and evolution of the reopening.

  • Avoiding Collapse:
    As Prime Minister Édouard Philippe stressed in an April 28 address to the National Assembly, reopening the country was critical to avoid “collapse.” With its vibrant tourism and entertainment industries shuttered, France’s economy suffered acutely under lockdown. Its GDP contracted by 5.8 percent in the first quarter of 2020, compared to 1.9 percent in Germany, and roughly 5 percent in Italy and Spain. Many professional sectors, home to most small- and medium-sized enterprises such as shops, hotels, restaurants, construction, and car rentals, closed almost entirely. In March and April, they alone accounted for 64 percent of requests for partial unemployment benefits. The lockdown also took a heavy social toll: domestic violence increased by 30 percent, remote education left many behind (5–8 percent of students were “lost” to teachers who couldn’t reach them), and after two months indoors, most could not wait to visit their loved ones.
    Thanks to a robust healthcare sector and unemployment support, however, confinement under the coronavirus has proven an acceptable evil for the French. Only 13 percent reported finding their lives “unpleasant” under lockdown and they were, among Europeans, the second least concerned (after Germans) about the consequences of COVID-19 on their individual employment and economic prospects. Reopening amid an active pandemic is a dangerous endeavor, and fatal mistakes are bound to occur. Yet President Macron and his government persevered, all the while pleading to the French for flexibility. Indeed, the only way forward, as Philippe repeated on May 7, is to learn to live with the virus.

  • Reopening Schools and Workplaces:
    To prevent a second wave of infections, the government announced a threefold reopening strategy: protect (with masks and social distancing), test (massively), and isolate (COVID-19-positive people and their contacts). But that is only the public health part. For everything else, the question is what to open, how quickly, and how safely.
    In a country where employment of both parents is very high (74 percent of parenting women and 87 percent of parenting men work), the priority is to reopen schools. Teachers returned to the classroom on May 11, followed by a gradual reopening of nursery schools, kindergartens, and primary schools on May 12.
    The virus has spread unevenly across France, as the strict lockdown protected large parts of the west and southwest from severe outbreaks. A map classifying the country’s départements as red or green depending on the level of infections was thus released by the government, and reopening measures differed accordingly. Middle schools in green départements, for instance, reopened on May 18, while those in red areas had to wait. The government also accepted that mayors fine tune their own reopenings according to situations on the ground, in coordination with prefects, who represent the state. Yet differences across the territory prove challenging for a country of Jacobin tradition that stresses unity of the Republic.

  • Even since reopening, life has been nothing like the status quo ante. In the first phase of deconfinement, telework and “differentiated schedules” remain strongly encouraged. In the Paris region, written justification is needed to ride public transportation at peak hours. Travel beyond 100 kilometers is permitted only in exceptional situations with the proper justification, and the country stays closed to international travel. Hotels, restaurants, and cafés, as well as high schools will not reopen until further notice. All these decisions will be closely re-evaluated at every turn over the summer, when phases two or three of reopening are reached, depending on the rate of new infections.
    Seeking to strike a delicate balance between civil liberties and public health, the French government largely refrained from imposing the most drastic health measures. Wearing a mask is not required in the street despite being compulsory on public transportation, in elementary schools (only for staff and teachers), in middle schools, and in any business that so chooses. In a much-anticipated decision, the government authorized the French to travel for summer vacations within the country in July and August. A contact tracing app, “StopCovid,” is set to be released, but only after having been debated in the national parliament. And although President Macron had once suggested that vulnerable people might have to stay home longer, he and the government ultimately opted to defer to citizens to exercise their sense of civic duty and responsibility.

  • Preemptive Anxiety:
    What might seem like excessive caution on the part of the government can be explained by the fact that, coming out of lockdown, the mood in France has been somber and apprehensive. Surveys in April showed that the French were consuming more sleeping pills, anxiety medication (+7 percent) and alcohol (+30 percent) than usual. One-fifth reported problems with self-esteem, while a third said they couldn’t concentrate. And yet, because mitigation mechanisms sheltered many from acute pain, it is the future that the French especially dread. In public opinion studies, some confided they were terrorized by the prospect of reopening; many worried that life would feel abnormal and dangerous. Compared to Italians, Spanish, Britons, and Germans, the French were the most fearful that either they (54 percent) or a loved one (71 percent) would catch the virus.
    Unlike in the U.S., where protests erupted in favor of opening the economy, many in France worried that the government’s decisions were premature. In April, a majority of French (57 percent) expressed their support for a reopening date beyond the one set by the government. Polls also showed support for more drastic measures than those proposed by the executive: 70 percent favored longer stay-at-home orders for at-risk people; 60 percent wanted an obligatory contact tracing app; and 57 percent supported restrictions of movement within the country. Three out of four wanted masks to be compulsory outside the home at all times. These fears translated into demands by professional sectors, whose representatives worried employees faced unnecessary risks: major transportation unions, for instance, demanded access to hospital-level personal protective equipment.
    As for school reopenings—as fervently awaited as they were feared—the public expressed outrage over the Élysée’s decision: in fact, six in 10 French were opposed. This sentiment was only exacerbated when press reports revealed that the government’s guidelines diverged from the recommendation of Macron’s scientific council that schools remain closed until September. The president tried to backtrack, insisting that his goal was to ensure all children who needed to go back to school could. But in choosing the political middle ground between strict health experts’ recommendations and laissez-faire, Macron took the risk of leaving everyone unhappy.

  • Public Mistrust and Anger:
    At the heart of post-confinement anxiety lies a deeper problem: low public confidence in the government. In mid-April, 45 percent of French felt “angry” about the situation, and a staggering 62 percent were dissatisfied with the government’s management of the crisis, up 16 points from March. In this regard, the French stood out among Europeans: while 60 percent of Germans, 41 percent of Italians, and 29 percent of Britons said at the end of April that their governments had “managed the coronavirus better than most other countries,” only 12 percent of French agreed. Indeed, for many, the government’s original sins lie in the early stages of Macron’s “war” against the coronavirus: first, for allowing the first round of municipal elections to take place in mid-March although the pandemic was already gaining momentum across France; and second, for the confusion and lack of transparency over masks and testing. Indeed, weeks of reporting closely monitored by the homebound French revealed frontline health professionals with inadequate equipment while the government appeared to minimize the importance of masks and large scale testing. At best, inconsistencies in official discourse laid bare the executive’s lack of preparedness and internal tensions. At worst, political extremes and others accused the government of spreading “State lies” to cover up the shortage of medical supplies.

  • Although the government reassured the public that masks would be widely available and that testing capacity would reach 700,000 per week by May 11, skepticism solidified. After the prime minister’s first speech on “de-confinement,” only 46 percent believed that he was “telling the truth.” A majority (55 percent) said they did not trust the government to successfully reopen the country. Trust was highest among supporters of Macron’s La République en Marche (89 percent), and lowest among far right Rassemblement National and far left La France Insoumise voters (21 percent and 31 percent, respectively). This underlines persistent polarization between Macron’s camp and the populist extremes, demonstrating that entrenched biases held before the crisis have only been reinforced.

  • Although Macron initially benefitted from a small “rally around the flag” effect, his approval ratings then plummeted, especially compared to other European leaders. With a meager 38 percent approval coming out of confinement, the French president trailed German, Italian, and British leaders by 20 to 30 points. This reality, though, should be put into perspective: Macron is still faring better than during the dark days of the yellow vest crisis, and the French have been structurally unhappy with their presidents for some time. Nonetheless, with locally tailored reopenings and myriad guidelines to design, implement, and follow, France’s future remains blurry at best. The government, like the president, is disliked when it appears to exercise power vertically. The public appears more responsive to an apologetic and humble Macron, like the one who addressed them on April 13 at the height of the crisis, and was briefly rewarded with a subsequent bump in the polls.

  • As the executive asks the French for flexibility and benevolence as it moves forward with deconfinement, it is learning to refrain from imposing top-down solutions. Building on lessons learned from the yellow vest protests, Macron and his government—often described as “elitist” and “out-of-touch”—should continue to empower local authorities like mayors, trusted by 75 percent of French, to implement recommendations appropriate to their municipalities, as well as trust citizens to act responsibly in following guidelines. Only by demonstrating faith in its own citizens will Macron’s government, in turn, begin to win back their trust.

14. フランスの再開, by Célia Belin & Agneska Bloch, (2020/6/16 Brookings HP)

  • blunder: 不手際、失策
  • vulnerable people: 災害弱者
  • somber: 深刻、憂鬱、地味な、ぼんやり
  • apprehensive: 心配して、恐れて
  • dread: 心配、恐怖の種
  • fervent: 熱心な
  • backtrack: 撤回
  • discourse: 対話、会談、談話
  • meager: 乏しい、やせた
  • Yellow vests movement: protest movement in France in 2018/10, initially against rising fuel prices and high cost of living.
  • fare: 事が運ぶ
  • Covid-19感染初期の2ヶ月間は、死亡者数で欧州内トップ4 (英国、イタリー、スペイン)だった。フランスは段階的に経済再開した。4月を通じて、入院およびICU患者数は徐々に減少してきており、5/11にはnew normalの段階に入った。しかし、厳格な8週間に及ぶロックダウンは、傷跡を残した。異論の多い意思決定やコミュニケーションの不手際、今後に対する一般的な脅威と相まって、Emmanuel Macron大統領および政府に対する大衆の不信は膨らんでいった。

  • 衝突の回避:
    Édouard Philippe首相は、4/28の議会で、経済再開は国家の"崩壊"を防ぐには必須であると強調した。活発だった観光業と娯楽産業を閉鎖することで、フランス経済は激しく打撃を受けた。GDPは、2020年第1四半期で5.8%下落した。(ドイツは1.9%、イタリーとスペインは約5%下落) 多くの産業分野、ホームオフィスから中小企業、例えば店舗、ホテル、レストラン、建設業、カーレンタルなどは完全に閉鎖された。3-4月だけでも、失業給付金の請求は64%となった。閉鎖は、社会の重い負担となった。家庭内暴力は30%増加し、リモート教育は大きな課題を残した (5-8%の学生は、リモート教師への接続不可だった。) 2ヶ月にも家に閉じこもったので、そのほとんどは恋人と会うことができなかった。しかし堅実な医療部門や失業支援のお陰で、コロナウイルスによる封鎖はフランス人にとって受容可能な悪魔(acceptable evil)であることを証明された。わずか13%の人が、、ロックダウンの下での生活は"不快である"と回答している。また欧州の中でもCovid-19の結果、個人的な雇用や経済展望について二番目に(ドイツに次いで)無関心であることを示した。まだパンデミックが活発な中での経済再開は危険な試みであり、決定的な間違いとなる。それでもMacron大統領や政府は、一貫して国民に対策を遵守するよう要請してきた。Phillippe首相が5/7に繰り返したように、今後は、ウイルスと共に生きることを学ぶべきだとした。

  • 学校および職場の再開:
    ウイルスの第二波感染を防ぐために、政府は3段階の再開計画を発表した。まず防護(マスクやソーシャルディスタンス)、検査(大量に)、そして隔離 (Covid-19の陽性者及び接触者)。それらは公衆衛生に関わる部分である。それ以外は、問題は何をオープンにし、どれほど迅速にし、どれほど安心にするかである。
    フランスでは、共稼ぎの家庭が多い(家庭女性の就業率74%、家庭男性は87%)中での優先度は、学校の再開である。教師は5/11に教室に復帰し、その後、保育園、幼稚園、小学校は5/12に再開した。ウイルスの感染状況はフランスの地域で異なる。西部および南西部では激しい感染爆発が起きたので厳格な封鎖が採られた。感染のレベルによって地域毎に赤、緑表示が政府によって発表され、それによって再開方針が異なった。例えば、緑色地域の中学校は5/18に、赤色地域は閉鎖継続となった。政府としては、各地の市は州県と調整の上で再開については状況によって細かく対応することを認めた。このように地域によっての対応の違いは、フランス革命以来国家の統一的行動重視の伝統(Jacobin tradition)に対する挑戦でもあった。

  • 経済再開がされたとしても、生活はコロナ以前の状態とは異なる。封鎖解除の第1段階では、テレワークと"分割出勤スケジュール"が強く推奨された。パリ地域では、ピーク時間に公共交通に乗るには許可証が必要であった。100kmを超える旅行は正当な理由のある場合のみ例外とし、国際旅行については封鎖されたままであった。ホテル、レストラン、カフェー、またハイスクールはさらに通知があるまで再開されなかった。これらの決定は、感染状況によって、第2、第3段階の再開となった場合、頻繁に再評価された。

  • 先回りの心配:

  • 大衆の不信と怒り:
    4月中旬にはフランス人は、その状況に対し45%が"怒り"を表し、3月から16%も上がって62%もの人が政府の危機管理について不満を示した。これに関連して、欧州の他と比較すると、4月末の段階で、ドイツでは60%、イタリアでは41%、英国では29% が、それぞれの政府は"他の国と比べてコロナ対策をよりうまく管理している"と評価したのに対し、フランスでは12%の評価であった。確かに、初期段階でのMacron大統領のコロナウイルスに対する"戦争"での政府の失策があった。第一に、3月中旬には、パンデミックが欧州で勢いを増していたにも関わらず市長選挙を実施したこと。第二には、マスクと検査について混乱と透明性の欠如があったこと。医療専門家の感染防具が不適切だったこととマスクと大規模な検査の重要性を政府は軽視していたことが判明したことによる。よく言えば、公的な会談での意見の不一致や、幹部の準備と緊張感の欠如があったこと。悪く言えば、政治的な極論として政府は、ウイルス感染について"国家の嘘"をついて医療品供給不足を隠蔽した。

  • 政府は、国民がマスクを広く調達できるように保証し、また検査容量も5/11までに毎週70万件として疑念を払拭した。首相の最小の演説で"閉じ込め解除"については、46%が、"真実を語っている"とした。多数意見(55%)としては、政府がうまく国の経済再開を行っていることへの不信を表明した。信頼はMarcron大統領の政党(La Républiue En Marche! =The Republic On the Move =共和国前進)支持者の中では89%が支持したが、極右 (Rassemblement National =国民連合)では21%および左派 (La France Insoumise)では31%の支持だった。このようにMacron大統領の陣営と他の党派の支持層とでは、コロナ対策を巡っては本質的な支持の分裂状況となっている。

  • Macron大統領の場合、他の欧州のリーダーに比べて、対策への支持率が急落している。閉鎖の方針についてもわずか38%の支持であり、フランス大統領は、ドイツ、イタリア、英国のリーダーに比べて20-30%も差がある。このことは今後の見通しにも念頭に入れておく必要がある。Macron大統領は、(2018/10のフランスでの石油価格値上げなどでの抗議活動)での黄色いベスト運動の時に比べれば、遥かにうまくやっている。フランス人は構造的に時々自国の大統領に不満を爆発させる。にも関わらず、地域によってこまめに再開や様々なガイドラインなどを進めており、フランスの将来はまだ不透明といえる。4/13の危機の最中には大統領への非難は高まったが、その後若干持ち直した。

  • 業界幹部は、フランスは、今後閉鎖解除に向かって前進すべしと要望しているが、それまでの経験から、これをトップダウンで押し付けるのは控えるようにとしている。Macron大統領は、しばしばエリートと目されているように間接的に、引き続き各地の市長などにそれぞれの地域の事情に合った勧告をして、市民がガイドラインに従うようにしている。

>Top 15. England further restrictions from 14 Sept. 2020:

  • Social gatherings of more than six people will be illegal in England from Monday - with some exemptions - amid a steep rise in coronavirus cases:
  • The law change will ban larger groups meeting anywhere socially indoors or outdoors, the government said. But it will not apply to schools, workplaces or Covid-secure weddings, funerals and organised team sports.
    It will be enforced through a £100 fine if people fail to comply, doubling on each offence up to a maximum of £3,200.
    The new rules - which come into force on 14 September - mark a change to England's current guidance.  At present, the guidance says two households of any size are allowed to meet indoors or outdoors, or up to six people from different households outdoors. Until now the police have had no powers to stop gatherings unless they exceeded 30.
  • Prime Minister Boris Johnson will give further details of the changes at a Downing Street news conference at 16:00 BST on Wednesday, alongside senior advisers Prof Chris Whitty and Sir Patrick Vallance.
    • "One of the pieces of feedback we had including from the police was that we needed the rules to be super simple so that everybody knows what they are," said Health Secretary Matt Hancock. 
      "And now this will now be rigorously enforced by the police."
    • Mr Hancock told BBC Breakfast: "This is really simple. Gatherings are ok, they should be socially distanced of course, but groups only of up to six."
      He said it means that some families will not be able to see both grandparents at the same time. "You know, I have three children," he said. "We have a family of five. And so we'll be able to see one other person at a time, as a whole family."
      Challenged on whether the new rules could stop grandparents helping out with childcare, Mr Hancock said: "I'm not actively trying to do that".
      But he said the government is "quite worried about" the "very serious problem" of children potentially passing on the virus to older grandparents.
  • 'Hope to turn it around by Christmas':
    • Matt Hancock said the rules would be in place for the "foreseeable future".
      "I really hope we can turn this round before Christmas. I think that, in a pandemic, Christmas is a long way off," he told BBC Radio 4.
      "Three months is a long time in a pandemic and I very much hope this strong rule, together with the local action we've taken in places like Bolton... I very much hope therefore this can work to do that by Christmas."
    • Mr Hancock was also asked about testing, after people with symptoms struggled to access testing in recent days.
      "Unfortunately we have seen this quite sharp rise in the last couple of weeks of people without symptoms who don't have a good reason coming forward and getting a test," he said, saying 25% of people who were getting a coronavirus test were not eligible.
      "I've even heard stories of people saying 'I'm going on holiday next week therefore I'm going to go get a test'. No. That's not what the testing system is there for."
    • At-a-glace: What are the new rules?
      • Social gatherings of more than six people in England will not be allowed in law from Monday 14 September 
      • The new rule applies to people in private homes, indoors and outdoors, and places such as pubs, restaurants, cafes and public outdoor spaces
      • It applies to all ages
      • The rule does not apply to schools and workplaces, or weddings, funerals and organised team sports
      • A full list of exemptions is due to be published before the law changes
      • People who ignore police could be fined £100 - doubling with each offence to a maximum of £3,200
    • Professor Sir Jeremy Farrar, who sits on the government's scientific advisory committee, said the next four to six weeks "will be absolutely pivotal to the sort of autumn and winter we have". 
      "So I am very supportive of the restrictions coming in and sincerely hope they are going to be enough." 
    • There are some exceptions to the new rules. Households and support bubblesbigger than six can socialise together - but not with anyone else at the same time - and gatherings can be more than six if it is for work or education purposes.
    • The Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, said the new rules did not affect places of worship as that is "not a social gathering".
      And Parkrun - which earlier this week announced it was to resume in England- is "unaffected" as it is an organised sport, its organisers said.
      No 10 said any group of seven or more people gathering anywhere "risks being dispersed by police or fined for non-compliance".
    • BBC political correspondent Nick Eardley pointed out that pubs and restaurants would be allowed to have more than six customers inside, but that the groups of six would have to be socially distant from each other. 
      The rationale behind allowing this, but not allowing larger groups of people inside other people's homes, is that businesses can only be open if they follow safety and hygiene measures set out by the government, he added.
      Downing Street said Mr Johnson held a virtual roundtable with police forces last week, and heard officers wanted clearer rules and enforcement on social contact.
    • The devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are able to set their own coronavirus restrictions and, while largely implementing similar rules, have moved at their own pace during the pandemic. 
      The number of people allowed to meet inside or outside varies in the UK's four nations. If you are meeting indoors: up to eight people from three different households can meet in Scotlandup to six people from two households in Northern Irelandup to four households can form an "extended household" in Wales.
    • Ministers and government advisers earlier expressed concern over a "sharp rise" in cases and a "heartfelt" apology was issued following shortages in England's testing system.
      Overall, there have been 8,396 new cases reported since Sunday - with 2,460 reported on Tuesday alone.
      There were also 32 deaths reported, but these will not have been related to the most recent rise in cases.
  • Large gatherings 'greatest risk':
    • The banning of gatherings of over six people is partly about solving a specific problem - giving police powers to crackdown on large gatherings.
      It also provides ministers and officials the opportunity to warn the public against complacency with signs infections may be on the rise.
    • But what is more important is where the UK goes from here.
      Lockdown bought us time, but has essentially only deferred the problem - how to protect people, particularly the most vulnerable, from the virus while keeping society functioning. Better treatments, more testing and a network of contact tracers has put the UK in a better position than it was in the spring - even though there are problems with the last two.
      Further restrictions of more or less any sort come at a cost - whether to health, education, the economy or all three. 
      It means the UK, like all nations, is faced with the impossibly difficult task of balancing harms.
      With winter around the corner - the time when respiratory viruses thrive - the decisions are just going to become even more difficult.
    • The UK government's chief medical adviser, Prof Chris Whitty, who No 10 said backed urgent action in England, has said Covid-19 rates are now rising, especially among people between the ages of 17 and 29.
      He warned that if people stopped social distancing then "Covid comes back".
      England's deputy chief medical officer Prof Jonathan Van Tam has also voiced concern saying: "People have relaxed too much. Now is the time for us to re-engage, and to realise that this is a continuing threat to us."
    • In other developments:
      • Businesses in England that are required to close because of coronavirus restrictions will be able to claim £1,500 per property every three weeks, the Treasury announced. But the British Chambers of Commerce said for most "this will not be enough to offset the resulting cash crunch"
      • A new public information campaign will be launched across the UK reminding people of the "basics" - washing their hands, covering their face and giving others space
      • Doncaster Racecourse has been told by public health officials to stop spectators attending its meeting from Thursday. More than 2,500 spectators are expected there on Wednesday
      • The quarantine rule on travellers coming into England from seven Greek islands came into force at 04:00 on Wednesday
      • Lockdown measures are being reintroduced in Bolton, Greater Manchester,after a local rise in cases. It includes a ban on people socialising with people outside their own household in any setting, even outdoors
      • The first clinical trials for a coronavirus vaccine at Oxford University have been put on hold after a participant had an adverse reaction.

15. イギリスは9/14から再び規制強化:

  • neology, neologism: 新造語
  • bubble: 感染レベルの間同士の交流緩和
  • parkrun: 毎土曜の公園での5km走行
  • No.10: London Downing St. No.10; 首相官邸
  • UK; Covid-19, 2020/9/8:
  • BBCcovid19.gif
  • コロナウイルスの急増を受けて、イングランドでは、2020/9/14月曜から、(例外はあるが) 7名以上の集会は、屋内・屋外を問わず禁止される。
  • 例外は、学校、職場、コロナ対策を行う結婚式、葬式、組織されたスポーツ試合である。罰金は£100、回数毎に最大£3,200まで倍増する。現在は、2家庭での屋内外での集会、または各家族6名までなら複数家族での野外集会ならば許可されていた。今まで警察は30名を超えなければ強制執行しなかった。
  • Johnson首相は、9/6水曜16:00にProf. Chris WhittyおよびSir Patrick Vllanceと共に詳細説明する。
      • 友人との会合の新規則について
      • Covid-19急増の5つの理由など
    • Matt Hancock保険相がBBCに語ったことは、"警察による強制力を伴う誰もがわかりやすい規則とする"。
    • "規則は明解だ。6名までの集会はOKだが、社会的距離を取ること。この人数では双方の祖父母は呼べないかも知れない。私の場合は、子供が3人で、家族は5名なので、祖父母は1名しか呼べない。祖父母については子供達がウイルスを感染させることを危惧している。"
  • クリスマスまでには改善させたい:
    • Matt Hancock氏は、この規則は、予想できる当面の間とし、クリスマスまでには、まだ3ヶ月も時間的余裕があるので、パンデミックの状況改善ができることを期待しているとのこと。
    • Hancock氏は、兆候がある人達が検査を受けるのに大変苦労していることについて聞かれ、コロナウイルス検査を受診しようという人達の25%はその理由が適切ではない。例えば、来週休暇を取りたいので、検査をうけたい場合などは、検査はそのような目的のためのものではない。
    • 新ルールの要点は
      • 7名以上の社会的な集会は9/14月曜から法律で許可されない。
      • 新ルールは、自宅、室内外、パブ、レストラン、カフェー、公園などでの集会に適用される。
      • いかなる年齢の人にも適用される。
      • 但し、このツールは学校、職場、結婚式、葬式および組織された団体スポーツは、例外とする。
      • 新ルーツが公表されるまでには、例外事項の詳細を発表する。
      • このルールを無視した場合、罰金£100、また、重ねて無視する場合は、罰金を倍々とし、最大£3,200とする。
    • 政府の科学顧問であるSir Jerey Farrar教授が言うには、"今後4〜6週間は、秋冬に向けてが正念場となる。これらの規制は当然であり、これで十分であることを心から期待する。"
      • Laura Kuenssberg氏: 政府の警戒レベルは赤信号が点滅している。
      • 英国のコロナ感染者は2,460名増加した。各地の状況をチェックして欲しい。
    • 新ルールには、例外がいくつかある。7名以上の会合の場合、家庭内で同じ程度の感染状況なら良いが、職場も学校の場合、7名以上の時間場所を共有する集会は禁止である。
    • Canterbury大司教であるJustin Welby氏は、祈りの場は、社会的集まりではないので新ルールは適用されないという。また公園でのランニング(Parkrun)は、イングランドへは今週始めから再開されているが、これも組織化されたスポーツではないので、新ルールには影響されない。首相によれば、7名以上の集会は、警察による解散命令、従わなければ罰金となろう。
    • BBCのNick Eardley記者によれば、パブやレストランには7名以上の客が入るが、6名以下のグループは互いに社会的距離を取らなければならない。家庭内では駄目だが、レストラン等では許される理由は、ビジネスとして政府の公衆安全基準を遵守することで開店が認められる。Johnson首相が、警察とのバーチャルな会議では、ソーシャルコンタクトについて明確な基準が必要との指摘があった。
    • スコットランド、ウェールズ、北アイルランドの各地では、コロナ対策の規制は、それぞれの感染状況によって、概ね同様のルールが適用される。室内外での集合の人数については英国内の4地域によって異なる。スコットランドでは、室内の会合は、3家族で8名まで、ウェールズでは、4家族までは、拡張家族とみなす。
    • 閣僚や政府顧問は、感染者の急拡大に懸念を示し、イングランドの検査体制が不足していることを真摯に陳謝した。前の日曜以来の新規感染者は8,396名で、木曜だけでも2,460名の感染者となった。死亡者数は32名で、これは最近の感染拡大とは関係ない。
  • 大規模集会は'より大きなリスク'である。:
    • 7名以上の集まりを禁止したこと、警察による介入を具体化させる目的でもある。同時に国民に対し、感染率が上昇していることに対する安心感を提供する意味がある。
    • しかし重要なことは、これから英国がどこに向かおうとしているかである。都市封鎖は時間的余裕を与えてくれるが、本質的には問題の先送りであり、如何にして感染弱者をウイルス感染から防御するかである。より良い措置、検査の拡大、接触者追跡など、この春の段階に比べて、まだ課題はあるものの英国は進展した。これ以上の規制強化は、健康、教育、経済いずれにとってもコストが高くつく。このことは、英国も他国と同様に損害のバランスをいかに取っていくのか非常に難しい選択肢となる。冬季が正念場となる。その季節に呼吸器のウイルスは活性化し、対策は一層困難になってくる。
    • 政府の医療顧問であるChris Whitty教授曰く、特に17-29歳の若者のコロナ感染率が上昇している中で、首相官邸によるイングランドの緊急対策は妥当とのこと。もし、人々が社会的距離を取ることをやめることは"コロナの復活"を意味する。Johanthan Van Tam医療副顧問が言うには、"人々は油断してしまった。今や再度決心して、まだ脅威が継続していることを認識すべき"としている。
    • その他関連事項:
      • 財務大臣が言うには、イングランドの企業は、コロナ規制によって閉鎖を求められた場合は、3週間毎に£1,500を補填を受けることができる。しかし英国商工会議所は、"資金繰りを補うにはこれでは不十分である"としている。
      • さらに英国中での新たな衛生キャンペーンとして、手洗い、マスク着用、他人との距離を取ることの基本を再度徹底した。
      • ドンカスター競馬場は、水曜に2,500名の観客が予定されていたが、木曜にその開催は衛生当局によって中止の通告を受けた。
      • グレーター・マンチェスター地区ボルトンでは、その地区の感染拡大によって、都市閉鎖手段が再度取られた。そこでは野外であっても家族以外の人達との社交が禁止された。
      • Oxford大学でのコロナウイルスワクチンの最初の臨床実験は、副作用の患者が発生したことを受けて、一時中断された。


>Top 16. Japanese Dr. Tatsuhiko Kodama's View:

  • Japanese prominent Dr. Tatsuhiko Kodama of Tokyo Univ. explained the latest findings of Covid-19, published on 18 Nov. 2020:
    • It becomes horrible situation that the number of infections has increased rapidly since last Oct. worldwide:
    • The type of Covid-19 has mutated: Wǔhàn in Feb., Milano in Mar-Apr. (D614G changing 614th amino acid), Tokyo-Saitama in Jul-Aug. evolved in Japan, and now seems fourth Spanish type (20A.EU1) mutated in northern Spain by vacation visitors, causing zoonotic infection by mink (vison) in Denmark, killing 17 million minks, causing a new wave of infection resetting the existing immune system against Covid-19.
    • The spread of infection varies depending on the areas; WHO should originally analyze them all together, but could not it due to non-cooperation policy of Trump's administration.
    • The problem is that the former types of Covid-19 could not be suppressed; causing mixed infection of various types, which needs to be analyzed epidemiological analysis.
    • It is urged that special task force composed of recision medicine and epidemiological analysis including genetic engineering, measurement science, and information science; present members of governmental advisory board could hardly understand the latest automated PCT tests.
    • Under such situation, it seems abnormal to promote the Tokyo Olympics for any sacrifice, when Bach president of the Olympic Committee recently visited Japan to reiterate promoting of the games, which should be held originally for health and peace.
    • Instead, collaboration of local government, researchers, and related corporations are essential to promote the social system for precision medicine, which enables to further R&D, expanding PCR tests, effective collaboration between medical institutions.
    • Development of treatment technology; Avigan (Favipiravir) which is effective in asymptomatic or mild cases, mRNA vaccine (being developed by Phizer=BioNtec, and Moderna) having less side effects (than DNA vaccine of AstraZeneca, using virus vector using Adenovirus) is expected to be supplied in latter half of 2021
    • Cross-reactivity: 4 type of antibody against common cold, appearance of IgG antibody after IgM antibody; such wide area cross-reactive memory T-cells seem prevailing particularly in East Asia. Also less ACE2 as virus receptor in younger generation indicates showing of mild cases. The problem is that this cross-reactivity may persist effective only about 100 days, and that such cross-reactivity may cause to prevent to make full-scale immunity, making mutated virus escape the immunity
    • More scientific approach is needed to watch the development of vaccine, including side effects, risk factor of becoming serious, and its duration of effectiveness.
      • also precise monitoring by conducting social PCR tests are needed at care centers, medicals, schools, and bars & restaurant, etc.
      • use of more sensitive reagents, and automated process of PCR tests.
      • first analyzing the infected points (hot spots), then infected connected lines, and now infected areas (particularly city epicenters).
    • Recent symptoms by Corona-19: (>Fig.)
      • emergent cytokine storm may occur from even mild stage of disease (1-2%).

16. 日本の児玉龍彦医師の見解:

  • zoonotic: disease can be transmitted to humans from animals
  • epidemiology: 疫学 <epidemia
  • Favipiravir: Avigan
  • vector: carrier of genes, 1) virus vector, 2) plasmid vector
  • cross-reactivity: 交差反応性
  • ACE2: angiotensin-converting enzyme 2: a kind of virus receptor
  • ground-glass opacities: 胸部のすりガラス陰影
  • dyspnea: 呼吸困難
  • ARDS: acute respiratory distress syndrome 急性呼吸窮迫症候群
  • acute cardiac injury: 急性心臓損傷
  • コロナウイルスは変異している。
    • 2020/2月武漢型、3-4月ミラノ型(D614G) 、東京埼玉型7-8月、現在はスペイン型(20A.EU1)か
    • WHOも世界的な状況分析ができない状況 (トランプ政権の非協力)
    • 日本では精密医療と疫学調査 (計数学的分析) が必須。地域での行政・研究者・企業の連携による社会システム構築が必要;技術開発・検体採取・医療機関との連携等
    • その中で、健康と平和の祭典であるべきオリンピックの強行は愚策
  • Covid-19の症状:


>Top 17. Covid-19 mutated. Can vaccines keep up?

  • Faye Flam, Bloomberg, 19 Nov. 2020 (distributed by The Japan Times):
  • One of the factors that will drive the future of the COVID-19 pandemic is how the virus evolves. And last week, scientists announced the first evidence that the virus has evolved to be more transmissible.
  • The mutation happened around late February, as the virus moved from East Asia to Europe. The first group to publish a paper raising this possibility was led by computational biologist and HIV evolution expert Bette Korber at Los Alamos National Laboratory. She couldn’t quite convince the scientific community, but virologist Ralph Baric of the University of North Carolina was persuaded enough to continue this line of investigation. Last week, after a series of experiments in cells and hamsters, he and Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin published a more complete case in Science. The implications for the history of the virus and its likely future are profound.
  • Natural selection favors organisms that are better at survival and reproduction. For viruses like Sars-CoV-2, that means reproducing prolifically and transmitting to new hosts easily. So far, scientists have found only one mutation that improves the survival ability of the virus. The more transmissible strain is referred to as G614, and the ancestral one as D614. It doesn’t look like the G strain is any deadlier than the D. Being deadlier might actually make a virus less evolutionarily fit, because viruses die with their hosts.
  • The other good news, says Baric, is that the structure of the spike proteins on the now-dominant G strain make it more vulnerable to being wiped out by vaccine-induced antibodies. That’s true even though the vaccines were all developed to work against the ancestral D strain. And G is probably more vulnerable to antibodies from past infections as well.
  • To test G’s transmissibility, they started with cultured cells that mimic cells from the nasal passages down to the deepest parts of the lung. Then they genetically manipulated the D strain, adding just the one mutation that Korber thought gave the G strain an edge. And indeed, the mutation did allow the virus to spread from cell to cell better than the original. They also infected the same cells with both viral strains and found the mutant strain dominated, over and over.
  • That may have been how it all started — with the mutation cropping up in a human host, becoming dominant in the airways of that person, and spreading to other people in a chain of transmission that crossed continents.
  • To test the possibility that the mutant strain is more contagious, the researchers also used hamsters housed in separate cages. They found viruses with the mutation were much more likely to travel through the air from infected hamsters in one cage to uninfected ones in another.
  • That mutation in the G strain may explain why the virus became so explosive once it got to Europe, and why, while early U.S. outbreaks were traced to China, the bulk of U.S. infections have now been traced to Europe. Even the predominant strain in Southern California came not from Asia but from Europe via New York. The D strain is still around, but it makes up about 2% of infections worldwide. Baric says there are reasons the G strain didn’t explode in China — mostly to do with the country’s much more Draconian lockdown policies as well as a system set up to support people who have to miss work if they need to quarantine.
  • Will the G strain find a way to evolve resistance to vaccines? It’s possible, Baric says. Once immunity builds up, the virus will be under pressure to change. As time goes on and more people develop immunity, evolution favors the viruses that are best at evading antibodies.
  • One way it could do that is to jump to another species, where it can evolve rapidly — as in Denmark’s minks. Another concern is the possibility that the virus could jump to one of the world’s 1,400 bat species. Bats are good hosts for coronaviruses, and it’s still thought they were the most likely source of SARS-CoV-2.
  • That’s where the danger lies, Baric says. If the virus changes what he calls its antigenic structure, our antibodies might not recognize it.
  • But it’s also likely that this virus will do what other coronaviruses have done and become another common cold. Vaccine- and infection-induced immunity will likely protect people from the virus infiltrating the lower respiratory tract and beyond, but it might not protect everyone from getting a sniffly infection confined to the upper respiratory tract.
  • It would then join the four common coronaviruses already circulating among humans, all of which cause colds. Those viruses may have started off as deadly pandemics; one appears to have spread right around 1890, when there was a deadly pandemic known as Russian flu.
  • “Remember the virus really doesn’t want to kill anybody,” Baric says. “It just wants to replicate and transmit … so if it can manage to do that and take advantage of your nose as a major site for replication and transmission, then it’s happy as a lark because it’s surviving.”
  • If the vaccines work as well as hoped and the virus becomes the sniffles, we should feel the same way.

17. Covid-19は変異した。ワクチンは対応可能か? 

  • prolific: producing more offsprings
  • culture: 培養する
  • strain: 血統→ウイルスなどの株
  • nasal passage: 鼻腔
  • crop: related things
  • airway: 気管
  • contagious: trasmitted by direct contact with other people,接触感染
  • Draconian: excessively harsh and severe <Draco
  • infiltrate: enter or gain access to
  • Faye Flam, Bloomberg (2020/11/19) The Japan Times配信
  • Covid-19感染の今後の予測は、ウイルスの進化次第である。科学者は先週、ウイルスが進化しさらに感染力が増したと発表した。
  • 変異は、2月頃、東アジアから欧州へ移動した辺りで起こった。この可能性を指摘した最初の論文は、HIV進化の専門家で計算生物学者であるBette Korber (Los Alamos National Laboratory)である。彼女の論文は学会を説得できなかったが、ウイルス学者であるRalph Baric (North Carolina大学)が賛同し、研究を続けてきた。先週、細胞およびハムスターで一連の実験で、彼とYoshihiro Kawaoka (Wisconsin 大学)は、Science誌に、さらに具体的なケースを発表した。ウイルスの過去と将来動向は興味深い。
  • 自然淘汰によって、生物は生存と再生産を有利な方向に行っていく。Sars-CoV-2のようなウイルスにとっては、再生産が容易になり、新たな宿主に転移しやすくなる。今迄、科学者はウイルスの生存力を高めた変異は只一度あったとしてきた。さらなる感染力をもつ株はG614と呼ばれ、その先祖の株はD614である。G株は、D株より致死率が高いようには見えない。致死率が高くなる方向は、ウイルスにとっては進化とならない。ウイルスにとっては宿主と共に死滅してしまうからだ。
  • Baricは、良いニュースとしては、G株ウイルスのスパイク構造は、ワクチン接種による抗体によって一掃されやすくなっていると言う。今までのワクチン開発は、先祖であるD株に対して行ってきたことは事実だが、過去の感染からも、G株も抗体に対してもおそらく壊れやすくなっていると思われる。
  • G株の感染力をテストは、鼻腔から肺深部にかけての似た細胞からの培養液を使って行われた。またD株を遺伝子操作によってKorber が考えた変異をG株周辺に起こさせた。実際に、変異によってウイルスは細胞から細胞へ、元の株よりもさらに拡大した。また両方の株を持つ同じ細胞にも感染したので、変異株はさらに支配的になった。
  • 変異が人間の宿主で発生するメカニズムは、人の気管で優勢となり、その後次々と他の人に感染し、ついには大陸間に感染するということのようだ。
  • 別々の飼育籠で飼育したハムスターの実験によれば、変異株は、さらに接触感染力が強い可能性がある。また変異したウイルスは感染したハムスターから別の非感染のハムスターに空気感染する可能性が高いことも判明した。
  • G株での変異は、欧州でなぜ爆発的に感染が拡大しているかもうまく説明できる。一方、初期の米国での感染は中国型だったが、その後の感染爆発の多くは欧州型となっている。南カリフォルニアで感染しているのも、アジア型ではなく欧州からNY経由のものである。D株もまだ存在しているが、それは世界で2%程度と見られる。Baricが言うには、G株が中国で感染爆発していないのは、中国での厳格なロックダウンと、仕事上、検疫が必須の人達への対策が徹底したことによるとしている。
  • G株は、今後ワクチンへの耐性を獲得するように進化するのだろうか。Baricは、その可能性はあると言う。免疫が一旦確立すると、ウイルスは変化するように圧力を受ける。時間が経過し、より多くの人が免疫を獲得するようになると、ウイルスは抗体をかいくぐるように進化する方が有利になる。
  • 一つの可能性は、他の種に転移することで、急速に進化することが可能となるのは、デンマークのミンクの事例がそうである。もう一つの可能性は、世界の1400種ものコウモリに転移する可能性である。コウモリはコロナウイルスにとって好都合な宿主であり、それはSARS-CoV-2の発生原因として最も可能性が高いと思われている。
  • Baricが言うには、さらに別の危険性がある。ウイルスが、抗体に対して耐性を獲得するように変異したとしても、我々の抗体はそのことを認識できないのである。
  • しかもこのウイルスは、他のコロナウイルスがやってきたことやほかの一般的な感冒と同じように振る舞うものと見られる。ワクチンや感染後の免疫獲得によって、ウイルスが気道下部やその奥に侵入することを防いでくれる可能性が高いが、気道上部へ吸い込むことによる感染を防ぐことはできないだろうと見られている。
  • したがって4種のコロナウイルスは、すでに人間を取り囲んでおり、そのすべてが風邪の症状を示す。それらにウイルスは致死性の感染として拡大しており、それは1890年頃のロシア風邪と呼ばれた致死性の感染に似てきている。
  • Baricが言うには、"ウイルスは誰をも殺したいとは考えていないことは留意すべきだ。ウイルスは単に、再生し感染したいだけであり、それであるならば、ウイルスのやり方としては呼吸や感染の主要ルートである鼻を利用して感染することで生き延びようとすることで満足するような選択をするだろう。"
  • もしワクチンが期待通り効くとすれば、ウイルスは鼻風邪を起こすようになるので、我々もそのように考えるべきである。

>Top 18. Covid vaccine update: When will one be ready?

  • James Gallagher, BBC News, 20 Nov. 2020
    There has been encouraging recent news about coronavirus vaccines, with some successful trials reported. But which vaccines are likely to be the most effective and how do they work?
  • Why do we need a vaccine?:
    The vast majority of people are still vulnerable to coronavirus. It's only the current restrictions that are preventing more people from dying.
    A vaccine would teach our bodies to fight the infection by stopping us from catching coronavirus, or at least making Covid less deadly.
    Having a vaccine, alongside better treatments, is "the" exit strategy.
  • Pfizer/BioNtech vaccine:
    The big breakthrough came when Pfizer/BioNTech published its first results.
    • They showed it stops more than 90% of people developing Covid symptoms.
    • The UK should get 10 million doses by the end of 2020, with another 30 million ordered.
    • It is given in two doses, three weeks apart.
    • About 43,000 people have had the vaccine, with no safety concerns
    • The vaccine must be stored at a temperature of around -70C. It will be transported in a special box, packed in dry ice and installed with GPS trackers.
    • The new vaccine would need a deep-freeze delivery chain. (Source: MSF, Pfizer, BioNTech SE.
      1. Vaccine sent to destination country in special dry ice packs each holding up to 5,000 doses.
      2. Destination country can choose to store the vaccine in a 'freezer farm' for up to six months at -70C.
      3. In the unopened, dry ice packs the vaccine has ten days to reach the vaccination centre.
      4. Once delivered, the vaccine can be stored for up to five days in a fridge between 2C and 8C.
    • The vaccine is a new type called an RNA, and uses a tiny fragment of the virus's genetic code. This starts making part of the virus inside the body, which the immune system recognises as foreign and starts to attack.
      An RNA vaccine has never been approved for use in humans, although people have received them in clinical trials for other diseases.
  • Moderna vaccine:
    Moderna uses the same approach as the Pfizer vaccine.
    • It protects 94.5% of people, the company says
    • The UK will have five million doses by the spring.
    • It is given in two doses, four weeks apart.
    • 30,000 have been involved in the trials, with half getting the vaccine and half dummy injections
    • It is easier to store than Pfizer's, because it stays stable at -20C for up to six months.
  • Oxford University/AstraZeneca vaccine:
    Trials of the Oxford vaccine have shown a strong immune response in older people.
    • Two weeks after a second dose, more than 99% of trial participants appeared to be protected
    • The UK has ordered 100 million doses
    • It is given in two doses
    • Trials are still continuing
    • This may be the easiest of the three vaccines to distribute, because it does not need to be stored at very cold temperatures.
    • It is made from a a weakened version of a common cold virus from chimpanzees, that has been modified to not grow in humans.
  • What other vaccines are being developed?:
    Other trial resuls are also expected in the coming weeks.
  • Who will get the vaccine first?
    This depends on where Covid is spreading when the vaccine becomes available and in which groups each is most effective.
    Older care home residents and staff top the UK's preliminary priority list,followed by health workers like hospital staff, and the over-80s.
    Age is, by far, Covid's biggest risk factor.
  • What still needs to be done?
    • Trials must show the vaccine is safe
    • Huge-scale development must happen for the billions of potential doses
    • Regulators must approve the vaccine before it can be given.
    • Researchers still need to find out how long any protection may last.
    • It is thought that 60-70% of the global population must be immune to stop the virus spreading easily (herd immunity) - billions of people, even if the vaccine works perfectly.
  • Would a vaccine protect everyone?
    • People respond differently to immunisation.
    • History suggests any vaccine could be less successful in old people because an aged immune system does not respond as well, as happens with the annual flu jab. But data so far suggests this may not be a problem with some of Covid vaccines.
    • Multiple doses may overcome any problems, as could giving it alongside a chemical (called an adjuvant) that boosts the immune system.

18. コロナウイルス・ワクチン動向: いつ実用化なるか; James Gallgher, BBC News (2020/11/20)

  • How an RNA vaccine would work: (Source: Nature)
    Scientists take part of the virus genetic code that tells cells waht to build and coat it in a lipd so it can ente the body's cells.
    • This is injected into the patient. The vaccine enters the cells and tells them to produce the coronavirus spike protein. This prompts the immune system to produce antibodies and activate T-cells to destroy infected cells.
    • If the patient encounteers coronavirus, the antibodies and T-cels are triggered to fight the virus.
  • adjuvant: applied after intial treatment for cancer
  • コロナウイルス・ワクチンについて、一部で成功の検査結果が報告されるなど希望の持てる情報が出てきた。しかしどのワクチンが最も効果的なのか、それはどのように作用するのか。
  • なぜワクチンが必要なのか。
  • PfizerBioNtechのワクチン:
    • コロナウイルスの症状の進行が90%で阻止できた。
    • 英国は2020年末までに10百万本を得る予定。
    • それは3週間を開けて2回接種する。
    • 約43,000人にワクチンを接種し、安全性の問題は特段生じていない。
    • ワクチンは、約-70ºC以下での保管が必要で、ドライアイスで保存し、GPS追跡装置付きで、特殊な箱に入れて輸送する。
    • 極低温での輸送方法が必要となる。即ち、
      1. 5,000本毎にドライアイスを詰めて特殊な箱に入れて仕向国へ輸送する。
      2. 仕向国は、そのワクチンを-70ºCで6ヶ月間まで冷凍工場で保管可能
      3. 未開封でのドライアイスパックのワクチンはワクチン接種センターまで10日間以内に輸送する。
      4. 輸送後は、ワクチンは2-8ºCの冷蔵庫で5日間保管可能
    • ワクチンは、ウイルスの遺伝子片を利用した新しいRNAタイプである。これを接種して身体にウイルスの部分を感染させる。それは免疫機構が異物と判断し攻撃する。RNAワクチンは今迄人間には承認されてこなかったが、他の病気用に臨床実験では人間に接種したことはある。
  • Modernaのワクチン:
    • 接種した人の94.5%に効果があったとの会社の報告あり。
    • 英国は、来春までに5百万本を取得予定。
    • 4週間開けて2回接種する。
    • すでに30,000人に試験した(半数がワクチン、半数はプラセボを接種)。
    • -20ºcで6ヶ月間保管可能なので、Pfizer製のワクチンより保管が容易。
  • Oxford大学/AstraZenecaのワクチン:
    • 2週間開けて2回接種で、試験者の99%で安全性を確認。
    • 英国は100百万本を発注した。
    • 2回接種する。
    • 試行は続行中
    • 極低温での保管は不要なので輸送には前述の3ワクチンの中では最も容易と見られている。
    • これはチンパンジーの風邪ウイルスから作成し、人間用に改良したワクチン。
  • その他のワクチンの開発状況:
    • ロシア製のSputnik Vワクチンは、Oxford製と同様に92%有効と言われている。
    • (Johonson & Johonsonの) Janssen ワクチンは英国での6,000人を含め世界で30,000人対象に試験。2回接種すると強力となり免疫性は1回の場合より持続する。
    • 中国のWuhan Institue of Biological Products社とSinopharm社、ロシアのGamaleya Research Instituteは試験の最終段階とのこと。
    • 但し、中国のSinovac社はブラジルで開発試験中だが、深刻な副作用で試験が中断した。一説にボランティアが死亡したと見られている。
    • どのワクチン製品が最善なのかは非常に重要である。人々にわざと接種して感染させて試験するので。
      • コロナウイルスの処置にはどの薬剤が効くか
      • 誰がワクチンを最初に入手してそれを接種するか
  • 誰から最初にワクチン接種するのか
  • 今後やるべきこと
    • 試験によってワクチンの安全性の確認
    • 感染範囲拡大から何十億本の接種が必要になる。
    • 接種の前に当局によるワクチン認可が必要
    • ワクチン効果の持続性についてさらに研究が必要
    • もし数十億人にワクチン接種が有効としても、集団免疫獲得には全世界人口の60-70%の免疫が必要とされる。
  • ワクチンは全ての人に有効か:
    • 免疫力は人によって異なる。
    • 今迄の経験では、毎年行うインフルエンザワクチンで見られるように、老人は免疫システムがうまく作用しないのであまり成功しなかった。しかしコロナウイルスワクチンについてはこの問題はないかも知れないとのデータが出ている。
    • 複数回の接種によって免疫システムが強化される可能性はある (adjuvant効果)

>Top 19. The COVAX explained: Dr. Seth Berkley, CEO of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, 3 Sept, 2020:

  • At an early stage during this pandemic, it quickly became apparent that to end this global crisis we don’t just need COVID-19 vaccines, we also need to ensure that everyone in the world has access to them. This triggered global leaders to call for a solution that would accelerate the development and manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines, as well as diagnostics and treatments, and guarantee rapid, fair and equitable access to them for people in all countries. Today we have that solution – COVAX. The result of an extraordinary and unique global collaboration, with more than two-thirds of the world engaged – COVAX has the world’s largest and most diverse portfolio of COVID-19 vaccines, and as such represents the world’s best hope of bringing the acute phase of this pandemic to a swift end.

  • What is COVAX?
    • COVAX is one of three pillars of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, which was launched in April by the World Health Organization (WHO), the European Commission and France in response to this pandemic. Bringing together governments, global health organisations, manufacturers, scientists, private sector, civil society and philanthropy, with the aim of providing innovative and equitable access to COVID-19 diagnostics, treatments and vaccines. The COVAX pillar is focussed on the latter. It is the only truly global solution to this pandemic because it is the only effort to ensure that people in all corners of the world will get access to COVID-19 vaccines once they are available, regardless of their wealth.
    • Coordinated by Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and the WHO, COVAX will achieve this by acting as a platform that will support the research, development and manufacturing of a wide range of COVID-19 vaccine candidates, and negotiate their pricing. All participating countries, regardless of income levels, will have equal access to these vaccines once they are developed. The initial aim is to have 2 billion doses available by the end of 2021, which should be enough to protect high risk and vulnerable people, as well as frontline healthcare workers.
    • For lower-income funded nations, who would otherwise be unable to afford these vaccines, as well as a number of higher-income self-financing countries that have no bilateral deals with manufacturers, COVAX is quite literally a lifeline and the only viable way in which their citizens will get access to COVID-19 vaccines. For the wealthiest self-financing countries, some of which may also be negotiating bilateral deals with vaccine manufacturers, it serves as an invaluable insurance policy to protect their citizens, both directly and indirectly. On the one hand it will provide direct protection by increasing their chances of securing vaccine doses. Yet, at the same time by procuring COVID-19 vaccines through COVAX, these nations will also indirectly protect their citizens by reducing the chances of resurgence by ensuring that the rest of the world gets access to doses too.

  • Why we need COVAX:
    • COVAX is necessary because without it there is a very real risk that the majority of people in the world will go unprotected against SARS-CoV-2, and this would allow the virus and its impact to continue unabated. COVAX has been created to maximise our chances of successfully developing COVID-19 vaccines and manufacture them in the quantities needed to end this crisis, and in doing so ensure that ability to pay does not become a barrier to accessing them.
    • To do this, first we need COVID-19 vaccines that are both safe and effective, which is by no means a certainty. There are currently more than 170 candidate vaccines in development, but the vast majority of these efforts are likely to fail. Based on previous vaccine development, those at the preclinical trial stage have roughly a 7% chance of succeeding, while the ones that make it to clinical trials have about a 20% chance. To increase the chances of success, COVAX has created the world’s largest and most diverse portfolio of these vaccines, with nine candidate vaccines already in development and a further nine under evaluation.

  • COVAX has been created to maximise our chances of successfully developing Covid-19 vaccines and manufacture them in the quantities neeed to end this crisis.
    • By joining COVAX, both self-financing countries and funded countries will gain access to this portfolio of vaccines, as and when they prove to be both safe and effective. Self-financing countries will be guaranteed sufficient doses to protect a certain proportion of their population, depending upon how much they buy into it. Subject to funding availability, funded countries will receive enough doses to vaccinate up to 20 per cent of their population in the longer term. Since demand is initially likely to exceed supply once vaccines do become available, allocation will be spread across countries based on the number of doses that are available and increase as that availability increases.
    • To make all this a reality, Gavi has created the COVAX Facility through which self-financing economies and funded economies can participate. Within this also sits an entirely separate funding mechanism, the Gavi COVAX Advance Market Commitment (AMC), which will support access to COVID-19 vaccines for lower-income economies. Combined, these make possible the participation of all countries, regardless of ability to pay.

  • What is the COVAX Facility?
    • The principal role of the COVAX Facility is to maximise the chances of people in participating countries getting access to COVID-19 vaccines as quickly, fairly and safely as possible. By joining the Facility, participating countries and economies will not only get access to the world’s largest and most diverse portfolio of COVID-19 vaccines, but also an actively managed portfolio. The Facility continually monitors the COVID-19 vaccine landscape to identify the most suitable vaccine candidates, based on scientific merit and scalability, and works with manufacturers to incentivise them to expand their production capacity in advance of vaccines receiving regulatory approval.
    • Normally, manufacturers are reluctant to risk making the significant investments needed to build or scale-up vaccine manufacturing facilities until they have received approval for a vaccine. But in the context of the current pandemic, which is costing the global economy US$ 375 billion every month, this would inevitably lead to significant delay and initially vaccine shortages once vaccines are licensed. To avoid this, the Facility is working with manufacturers to provide investments and incentives to ensure that manufacturers are ready to produce the doses we need as soon as a vaccine is approved. The Facility will also use the collective purchasing power that comes from having so many countries participate in order to negotiate highly competitive prices from manufacturers that are then passed on to participants.

  • The Facility coninually monioters the Covid-19 vaccine landscape to identify the most suitable vacine candidates, based on scientific merit and scalability.
    • Self-financing countries and economies participating in the Facility can request vaccine doses sufficient to vaccinate between 10-50% of their populations. The amount they pay into the Facility will reflect the number of doses they have requested. For these countries the Facility serves as a critical insurance policy that will significantly increase their chances of securing vaccines, even if their own bilateral deals fail. And by pooling resources through the Facility, participating countries and economies are essentially helping to increase the world’s chances of bringing about COVID-19 vaccines as quickly as possible, and in the quantities that we need.
    • While there are no guarantees that any COVID-19 vaccine candidates will ultimately succeed, taking this global approach and sharing the risks through the Facility offers our best shot at beating this virus by enabling the world to share the rewards.
    • At the time of writing this, 78 higher-income countries and economies have now confirmed their interest in participating the COVAX Facility, with more possibly to follow. This shows that the COVAX Facility is open for business and attracting the type of interest across the world that we had hoped for. Countries now have until 18 September to commit to legally binding agreements to participate and make their upfront payments into the Facility by 9 October.
  • Commtted vs. Optional purchase:
    • Self-financing countries joining the COVAX Facility have two ways in which they can participate, through a Committed Purchase Arrangement or an Optional Purchase Arrangement. 
    • As the name implies, self-financing countries opting for a Committed Purchase will need to make committed guarantees to procure an agreed volume of doses through the Facility. In exchange for this firm commitment these participants will be required to provide a lower upfront payment of US$ 1.60 per dose, or 15% of the total cost per dose. Under this type of agreement, participants are effectively committing to purchase a set number of vaccines that, once available, will be fairly and equitably allocated amongst participants. Countries will have the ability to opt out of purchasing a vaccine should the price of the vaccine be twice (or more) that which was expected.
    • For the Optional Purchase Arrangement, participants can choose to opt out of receiving any vaccine, without jeopardising their ability to receive their full share of doses of other candidates, subject to supply becoming available. This type of agreement may be more attractive to participants that already have bilateral agreements with manufacturers, through which they may already have secured sufficient doses of that particular vaccine. 
    • The trade-off for these participants, who will have greater choice, is that they will be required to pay a higher proportion of the total cost per dose up front, making a down payment of US$ 3.10 per dose and a risk-sharing guarantee of US$ 0.40 per dose to help protect the Facility against any liabilities resulting from participants deciding not to purchase a particular vaccine candidate after the Facility has already entered into a contract with the manufacturer. Also, by opting out of vaccines that have been allocated to them and waiting for another to become available, these countries may inevitably experience a delay in receiving their full committed volume of vaccines.  In the end, the total cost for the vaccines will be the same for the two options. As a pass-through facility, participants will pay the amount for the doses that was negotiated by the facility, plus a speed premium invested in accelerating and scale-up of manufacturing, as well as a very small fee for the operation of the facility. Some manufacturers will be providing vaccines at flat prices where others will be tiering the prices based upon income levels.
  • What is the GAVI COVAX AMC?
    • The primary focus of the Gavi COVAX AMC is to ensure that the 92 middle- and lower-income countries that cannot fully afford to pay for COVID-19 vaccines themselves get equal access to COVID-19 vaccines as higher-income self-financing countries and at the same time. Funding for the Gavi COVAX AMC is entirely separate from that of the COVAX Facility, which means that the AMC is in no way cross-subsidised by the funds of self-financing participants. Instead the AMC will be funded mainly through Official Development Assistance (ODA), as well as contributions from the private sector and philanthropy. 
    • So far, the AMC has raised about US$ 700 million of the initial seed capital target of US$ 2 billion that is needed by the end of 2020. So, in addition to deciding how they participate in the Facility, sovereign donors will need to decide to what extent they wish to contribute or allocate ODA towards this target and do so in a timely manner. Since no one is safe until everyone is safe, the Gavi COVAX AMC is the only way in which all countries will get equal and fair access to COVID-19 vaccines. 

  • How will vaccine doeses be allocated?
    • Once any of the COVAX portfolio vaccines have successfully undergone clinical trials and proved themselves to be both safe and effective, and have received regulatory approval, available doses will be allocated to all participating countries at the same rate, proportional to their total population size. A small buffer of about 5% of the total number of available doses will be kept aside to build a stockpile to help with acute outbreaks and to support humanitarian organisations, for example to vaccinate refugees who may not otherwise have access. 
    • Even though self-financing participants can request for enough doses to vaccinate between 10-50% of their population, no country will receive enough doses to vaccinate more than 20% of its population until all countries in the financing group have been offered this amount. The only exception is those countries who have opted to receive fewer than 20%.

  • What Now?
    • The fact that the global community has come so far so quickly and built such a comprehensive and effective global solution to this pandemic is a remarkable accomplishment. Now we need to implement it, and this hinges on countries buying into the COVAX Facility so that it can make urgent investments now.
    • Having so many self-financing economies sign up to join the COVAX Facility is a tremendous step forward, and means we can now begin work signing formal agreements with vaccine manufacturers and developers to secure doses. This will not only allow COVAX to increase our chances of successfully developing COVID-19 vaccines, but also ensure that we have necessary productive capacity in place to manufacture the volumes of doses we need, the moment a vaccine is ready.
    • In addition to this we need countries to urgently fill the funding gaps that still exist for research and development in COVID-19 vaccines. CEPI is leading the COVAX vaccines research and development work, with nine vaccine candidates already supported, eight of which are already in clinical trials. Governments have already committed US$ 1.4 billion towards this effort, but an additional US$ 1 billion is still needed to continue to move the portfolio forwards.
    • It is also essential that the Gavi COVAX AMC meets its fundraising target of at least US$ 2 billion by the end of 2020, and also continues to discuss details with AMC-eligible economies what their participation will mean for them. This will be critical to ensuring that ability to pay does not become a barrier to accessing COVID-19 vaccines, a situation that would leave the majority of the world unprotected and which would allow this pandemic to continue far longer than necessary.

19. COVAXワクチン配布機関, Dr. Seth Berkley, Gavi CEO (2020/9/3)::

  • このパンデミックの初期段階において、この世界的な危機を終結させるには、Covid-19ワクチンが必要となるだけでなく、それを世界中の誰にでも確実に届けることが必要であると我々は主張してきた。世界の先見性のあるリーダーは、Covid-19ワクチンの開発と製造を加速し、同時に、診断と処方とを全ての国々の人達に迅速・公平に届けることを保証することが求められている。今日、この目的のためにCOVAXがある。これは、世界の2/3以上が参加する画期的な国際協力の結果であって、COVAXは世界で最大かつCovid-19ワクチンの最も普遍的な品揃えを有しており、このパンデミックを素早く終結に導く上での最大の希望となっている。
  • 【注: 9/22段階で、チーム欧州の29カ国や日本を含む高所得国の64カ国が参加。また中低所得国の92カ国も参加、合計156の国・地域が参加。世界人口の64%。中国も参加方向。20億回分の確保を目指す。なお、トランプ政権は不参加】

  • COVAXとは何か
    • COVAXは、Covid-19対策ワクチンを確保するための3本柱の一つの、いわば推進母体(Accelerator)あり、このパンデミックに対応して、WHO・EC・フランスによって2020年4月に設立された。各国政府、世界の保険機関、メーカー、科学者、企業、市民組織、慈善団体と協力し、Covid-19の診断、治療、ワクチンに創造的かつ公平にアクセスすることを目的としている。COVAXの柱については後述する。それはこのパンデミックに対する唯一の世界的な解決策である。それは世界中の全ての人々が、それを希望に応じて、裕福か否かに関係なく、Covid-19ワクチンを確保することができる保証を行う唯一の解決策であるからである。
    • Gavi、ワクチン連合、CEPI (感染症流行対策イノベーション連合) 、およびWHOによって共同で設立されたCOVAXは、Covid-19ワクチン候補に関し、広範な研究・開発・製造を支援し、またその価格を交渉するプラットフォームとして機能することが期待されている。全ての参加国は、その財政レベルに関わらず、ワクチンが開発されたならば、それらのワクチンに公平に確保することができる。当初の目標としては、2021年末までに20億本分(dose, 接種量)を確保する。それはハイリスクで身体の弱い人達や、前線にいる医療関係者に供与するには十分な数量である。
    • 低所得の国々は、他の手段ではワクチンが入手困難であり、一方、財政が十分で、購入の資金もある国々でメーカーと直接契約していない場合は、COVAXは文字通り生命線として、それらの国々の国民が、Covid-19ワクチンを入手する唯一の解決策となる。最も豊かで財政余力のある国々は、ワクチンメーカーと直接交渉することが可能だが、それらの国々の国民を、直接間接的に護る上で、COVAXは貴重な保険の役割となるであろう。一方では、ワクチン数量を確保する機会を増やすことで直接のメリットとなる。同時に、COVAXを通じてCovid-19ワクチンを確保することによって、豊かな国々は、世界の他地域でもワクチン接種量を確保することによって感染が復活するリスクを減少させることができ、結果的に自国民を保護することに通じる。

  • なぜCOVAXが必要か:
    • COVAXは必要である。なぜなら世界の多数の人々はコロナウイルスに対し無防備であり、そのことがウイルスが引き続き衰えることにならないからである。COVAXは、この危機の終結に必要な数量のCovid-19ワクチンの開発成功と製造の機会を最大化することで、ワクチンを確保することの障害を取り除くことができるという目的で設立された。
    • まず我々は、確実とまでは言えないまでも、安全かつ効力のあるCovid-19ワクチンを必要としている。現在開発中のワクチンは170以上も候補があるが、この内の多くはうまく行かないかも知れない。今迄のワクチン開発の状況で言えば、臨床前の試験レベルでの成功確率は7%であり、臨床試験レベルでは20%の成功確率である。この成功率を上げるために、COVAXは、これらワクチンも関する最大で詳細な一覧表を作成した。その内9つの候補のワクチンがすでに開発済であり、さらに他の9つが現在評価中である。

  • COVAXは、Covid-19ワクチン開発の成功で、危機終結に必要な数量の製造を行う確率を最大化する仕組みを策定した。
    • COVAXに参加することで、資金調達を自律できる国々も、資金供与を得て調達する国々も共にワクチンの安全性と効果が保証された段階で、ワクチンを確保することが可能となる。自主財政で、自国民の一定割合に供給する数量を確保できるかどうかは、実際にどれだけの数量を購入できるか次第である。資金供与を受けてワクチンを購入するする場合は、(その資金供与にも依るが)長期的には、人口の20%のワクチン接種量を購入することになる。当初の段階で、需要が供給を上回る場合には、ワクチンが入手可能となった段階で、入手量の増加に応じて調達数量に基づき各国に配布することになる。
    • これら全てを実現するために、Gaviは、自主財政の国々と資金供与を受ける国々の参加を通じてCOVAX Facility (機関)を設立し、それを通じて、財政的に自律している経済と資金を受け入れている経済が共に参加できるようにする。この組織の中には完全に独立した資金供与の機能であるGavi COVAX Advance Market Comitment (AMC)があり、低所得国のためのCovid-19ワクチン確保を支援することになっている。これらを組合せて、支払能力に如何に関わらず全ての国々の参加を可能にしている。

  • COVAX Facilityとは何か:
    • COVAX Facility(機関)の主な役割は、参加国の人々がCovid-19ワクチンを迅速・公平・安全に入手できる機会を最大化することである。当機関に参加することで、参加国およびその経済は世界最大で最も多様な品揃えのCovid-19ワクチンを入手できるだけでなく、積極的にその品揃えを管理できる。当機関は、継続的にCovid-19ワクチンの状況をモニターしてどのワクチン候補が、科学的な優位性や供給量で最適であるかを特定し、またメーカーに対して、当局の承認前に生産能力の拡張について働きかける。
    • 通常、メーカーはワクチン生産設備の建設や拡張に必要な投資を実施するリスクをワクチンの承認を得るまでは取りたがらないものである。しかしパンデミックの現状を見ると、毎月世界経済に3,750億米ドルもの損害を与えており、このことによってワクチンが承認されたとしても生産の深刻な遅延や初期の数量不足が生じることは明らかである。これを防ぐために、当機関は、メーカーと協力して承認がおりたらすぐ必要な数量の生産ができるような投資およびインセンティブを提供しようとしている。当機関は、多くの国々の需要をまとめることで購買力を行使して、メーカーから参加国へ届くまで、極めて競争力のある価格を交渉することができる。

  • 当機関は、継続してCovid-19ワクチンの状況をモニターし、科学的な効果と供給量に基づき、最適なワクチン候補を特定する。
    • 自主財政の国々は当機関に参加することで、それらの国々の人口の10-15%に対してワクチン接種に十分の数量を要求することができる。彼らが当機関に支払う金額は、注文したワクチン数量に基づく。これらの国々にとっては、当機関は保険サービスの役割であり、たとえ二国間での交渉が失敗した場合でも、ワクチン確保する機会を確実に増加させることができる。また機関はさまざまな資源をプールすることで、参加国は、世界がCovid-19ワクチンを可及的速やかかつ必要数量を調達できるよう支援することになる。
    • Covid-19ワクチン候補が最後に成功するかどうかの保証はない段階で、このように当機関によるグローバルなやり方とリスク共有によって、世界中でその成果を発揮することで、このウイルスの打ち克つ最善の手段を提供することになる。
    • これを書いている段階で、78カ国の高所得国が、COVAX機関への参加の意志を示しており、他の国々もそれに続くことになろう。これはこのCOVAX機関が、我々が期待した通り、ビジネスに対しオープンであることと世界中の関心を集めていることに他ならない。9月18日までの参加を表明した国は、契約上も参加が確定し、10月9日までに当機関に対して費用の前払いをすることとなる。
  • 確定購入対購入オプション:
    • COVAX機関に参加する自主財政国は、確定購入手続きと購入オプション手続きの2つの参加方法がある。
    • それは、これらの名称が示すように、自主財政国は、確定購入の手続きについては、当機関を通じて必要する数量の調達に対して購入保証をする必要がある。この確定購入の対価として、1本分(接種量)当たり1.60米ドル、またはワクチン1本分価格の15%のいずれが低い金額を前払いする必要がある。このタイプの契約で、参加国はワクチンの必要量の購入を契約することで、ワクチンが入手可能となれば、参加国の間で公平に分配されることになる。ワクチンの価格が想定していた価格の2倍以上となる場合には、購入をキャンセルできる。
    • 購入オプションの手続きについては、参加国はどのワクチンでも受取りをキャンセルできる。この場合、他のワクチン候補の必要数量を受取る権利は、供給が可能である場合に限り、失わない。このタイプの契約は、すでに直接契約でメーカーと契約している参加国にとってはより魅力的となる。それは彼らはすでに特定ワクチンの必要数量を確保したことになるからである。
    • これらの参加国にとってはトレードオフがあり、それは大きな選択となるが、彼らは1本当たりの全コストのより高額な前払いが必要となることである。即ち、1本当たり3.10米ドル、および当機関に対して、1本当たり0.40米ドルのリスク共有保証料を支払うことで、当機関がメーカーとの契約締結以降は、、特定のワクチンの購入をキャンセルすることで生じる損害を補填することができる。また配分されたワクチンのキャンセルによって、別のワクチンが入手可能となったときに順番待ちすることとなり、これらの国は必然的にワクチンの契約全量の受け取りが遅れることとなる。結局、ワクチンの全コストは、この2つのオプションでは同じこととなる。当機関を通じることで、参加国は当機関が交渉した数量の金額を支払うこととなり、同時に、当機関の運営費のための少額の負担をすることになる。一部のメーカーはワクチンを一定の価格で提供するが、その他のメーカーは購入国の所得レベルに基づく階層的料金を採用している。
  • GAVI COVAX AMCとは何か: (AMC=Advance Market Commitment)
    • Gavi COVAX AMCの主目的は、Covid-19ワクチンの支払いができない92の中低所得国に対して、高所得国と同時期にCovid-19ワクチンを平等に入手できるようにするための機関である。Gavi COVAX AMCに対する基金は、COVAX Facilityとは全く分離しており、自主財政参加国からの資金によって相互補填することはあり得ない。AMCは主としてODAや民間企業や慈善団体を通じて資金供給を受ける。
    • 今迄にAMCは7億米ドルの初期資金を得ており、2020年末までに必要な目標資本は20億米ドルである。従って当機関(Facility)への参加決定と合わせ、主権国家の資金供与国はODA予算を。必要な時期までにどの程度まで振り向けるかについても決定する必要がでてくる。全ての人が安全になるまで誰も安全ではないので、Gavi COVAX AMCは、全ての国々が平等・公平にCovid-19ワクチンを入手できるようにする唯一の方法である。

  • ワクチンはどのように配分されるか:
    • どのCovid-19ワクチンでも臨床実験が成功し、ワクチンの安全性と有効性が証明され、当局の承認が認可された暁には、入手可能な数量が全ての参加国に各々の人口比率に応じて配分される。全体量の約5% は、緊急事態に備えて備蓄され、また人道的な組織に対して、例えば、他の手段では入手不可能なワクチン避難民に提供される。
    • 財政自律できる国であっても、それらの人口の10-50%の間でのワクチン接種量を要求することができる。但し、いかなる国も資金提供した全ての国に人口の20%以上のワクチンの確保ができないうちは、この20%の数量を超えて受領することはできない。唯一の例外は20%未満の受領を選択した国が出た場合である。

  • 現状はどうか:
    • 国際社会が、パンデミックに対する国際的な普遍的かつ効果的な解決策を、これほどまでに迅速に構築できたことは画期的なことである。今やこの仕組を実行する時で、これはCOVAX Facilityに対する緊急投資を行うかにかかっている。
    • 多くの自主財政の国々がCOVAX Facilityへの参加を決めたことが画期的な進歩であり、それによって我々はワクチンメーカーや開発者に対し、ワクチン調達の正式の契約を進めることができるようになった。このことは、COVAXがCovid-19ワクチン開発の機会増大のみならず、我々が必要とするワクチンを必要となる時点に相当する数量の生産能力を保証することになる
    • さらに、Covid-19ワクチンの研究開発に対する資金不足が生じていることに対して、我々は緊急に資金供与を行う国々を必要としている。CEPI ( Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, 感染症流行対策イノベーション連合) はCovid-19ワクチンの研究開発をリードしており、現在9つのワクチン候補を支援しており、その内の8つはすでに臨床試験の段階である。各国政府はすでにこの努力に対し、14億米ドルの資金供与を約束したが、この計画を前進させるにはまで10億米ドルの追加が必要となる。
    • さらにGavi COVAX AMC組織は2020年末までに20億米ドルの基金を必要としており、引き続きAMC資金供与可能国とどのような参加形態となるのか詳細詰めている段階である。これはCovid-19ワクチン確保の障害とならないような支払能力を確保することを意味すると共に、世界の多数の国々は無防備な状態のままにしてパンデミックが必要以上に長引くような事態にさせないためにも必要なことである。
    • 【注:】
    • Bill & Melinda Gates Foundationは156百万米ドルを寄付した。
    • ワクチン価格(1本分)は、現状では、米国Modernaは、37米ドル、英国Astrazenecaは2-4米ドルで、非営利を基本と表明。他製薬会社はこのような表明はなし。
    • COVAXによる発注は7億回分 (2020/11時点)
    • COVAXによる低所得国人口20%へのワクチン配布は2024になるとの予測。高所得国による"Vacctinationalism"を指摘している。CanadaとUKはすでに全人口以上のワクチンを買う保。米国はCOVAX非加盟で、すでに人口の230%, 実質18億回分を確保。また低所得国の場合、ワクチン輸送・冷凍保存・注射器等の準備に不安を危惧。(Duke大学; Global Health Institute 11/9)

Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Direcotr-General of WHO, Sep. 22, 2020

    • The fastest way to end the #COVID19 pandemic & accelerate the economic recovery is to ensure some people are vaccinated in all countries, not all people in some countries. The COVAX Facility helps us achieve that & ensures the race for vaccines is a collaboration, not a contest.

Dr. Tedros, WHO事務局長 (2020/9/22)

  • Covid-19パンデミックを終結させ、経済を再生させる最も速い方法は、一部の国の全員ではなく、全ての国の一部の人にワクチンを接種することである。COVAX Facilityは、ワクチン獲得競争を競争ではなく、協同することで達成しようとするものである。

>Top The Diplomat, article by Hemant Adlakha as of Oct 23, 2020:

  • Did China join COVAX to counter or promote vaccine nationalism?
    China hs finanlly announced its memebership in the WHO's Covid-19 vaccine distribution alliance. What too so long?
    • On October 9, China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying announced that China has formally joined COVAX. “We are taking this concrete step to ensure equitable distribution of vaccines, especially to developing countries, and hope more capable countries will also join and support COVAX,” she said. Hua made a point of adding that China is leading the world in developing several COVID-19 vaccines.
    • Seth Berkley, the CEO of Gavi – the public-private partnership that co-leads COVAX with the WHO – welcomed China’s participation in the initiative. “I am delighted to welcome China into the #COVAX facility. This announcement gives even more momentum to our mission to ensure future #COVID vaccines are distributed equitably because no one is safe until everyone is safe,” Berkley tweeted a day after the Chinese Foreign Ministry announcement.
    • Interestingly, though China has finally joined COVAX, it is yet to explain its earlier reluctance to stay out of the WHO-led collective vaccine distribution regime. It is true that in May this year, President Xi Jinping said in his video message to the WHO Health Assembly that “China would share with the world the COVID vaccines it is developing.” Despite the commitment, however, until early October China had been refusing to join COVAX.
    • There is some speculation that Beijing might have changed its mind after a recent poll conducted by the American Pew Research Center revealed that “the negative views of the people in several countries towards China deepened during the pandemic.” The survey was conducted between June 10 to August 3 this year, and over 13,000 people from 13 countries, excluding China and the U.S., took part in it.
    • COVAX is the $18 billion WHO-supported effort to provide a coronavirus vaccine to developing countries. The initiative, backed by over 180 member countries, is being hailed as unique, especially given its focus on equitable access to a COVID-19 vaccine. As Christopher Brauchli recently observed, “The critical word in the (COVAX) description is ‘equitable.’ The WHO project is important for all the participants, but it is especially important for the small nations that are unable to develop or acquire a developed vaccine on their own.”
    • COVAX – a joint public-private partnership initiative by WHO, Gavi (the Vaccine Alliance), and the Coalition of Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) – is designed to give governments an opportunity to hedge the risk of backing unsuccessful vaccine candidates and give less developed countries access to shots that would be otherwise unaffordable. It currently has nine vaccines under development – including two from China – and nine under evaluation in its portfolio.
    • Earlier last month, as the September 18 deadline for joining COVAX was approaching, Beijing continued its ambivalent stance on whether to join the WHO vaccine program, which had already been snubbed by U.S. President Donald Trump. However, based on Xi’s earlier commitment to the WHO that China would “share” COVID-19 vaccines and Beijing’s statement just before the September deadline that it “supports” COVAX; many expected the Asian economic giant would end up joining the initiative.
    • Health experts and strategic affairs analysts in China, and globally, see Beijing’s decision to join the global vaccine distribution and manufacturing initiative as driven by three main factors:  “soft power” diplomacy, the ugly deterioration in relations between China and the U.S., and China’s attempt at an “image makeover” – both at home and in the world.
  • A Good PR Move:
    • Notably, prior to committing itself to joining COVAX, China had been offering other assistance. Beijing has been promising loans under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) banner to countries lacking the resources to be able to secure millions of vaccine doses needed for their populations. Various countries, including Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Morocco, have signed formal agreements with Chinese vaccine manufacturers. This enabled the Chinese government to positively counteract the immense loss of face in the global arena due to factors such as negligence and suppression of information in Wuhan in the early phase of the epidemic; Xi Jinping’s more aggressive foreign policy; and threats to Taiwan and human rights abuse in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. “In many ways [joining COVAX] is a soft power win for China, coming amidst a slew of negative reports in other fields in recent weeks,” Nicholas Thomas, an associate professor in health security at the City University of Hong Kong, told Bloomberg.
  • US Exits, China Enters:
    • Second, ever since the BRI became China’s “national strategy,” Beijing has been consistent in moving in to fill gaps wherever the U.S. moves out of global leadership roles. By doing so, China hopes to both win friends abroad and strengthen its sphere of influence in relation to the existing U.S. dominance in different parts of the world. After the unexplained hesitation and considerable delay, China’s decision to finally back the WHO project is indicative of this strategy to quickly fill in any void left over by the United States. As the Chinese language Mingpao, based in North America, tries to explain: “China’s participation in COVAX fills up the gap left by U.S. President Trump’s neglect of the plan in the global health public leadership system.”
    • China will have to move fast to take advantage, as the gap may be temporary. Unsurprisingly, rival presidential candidate Joe Biden has promised to reverse Trump’s decision to quit the WHO. “Americans are safer when America is engaged in strengthening global health. On my first day as President, I will rejoin the WHO and restore our leadership on the world stage,” Biden tweeted on July 8, after Trump officially moved to withdraw the United States from the WHO.
  • Building Trust:
    • Third, experts say Beijing may have revised its earlier decision to stay out of COVAX based on overriding concerns regarding a lack of trust in the distribution of Chinese-produced vaccines globally. Remember, China claims that the first round of COVID-19 vaccines could be available to the public as early as by the end of the year. China is ready to conduct the final phase III human trials in foreign countries for four of its nine vaccines under development. According to a recent Bloomberg report, almost 100 countries have established vaccine links with China so far. Key features of such vaccine agreements include Chinese loans for buying vaccines; official vaccine testing and manufacturing; and the priority supply of Chinese vaccine to these countries.
    • Interestingly, China does not have much experience in manufacturing and distributing a vaccine for global consumption. Yet COVAX as well as other international vaccine research institutions have welcomed China’s proactive approach to the equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines globally. “The potential role for Chinese vaccines manufacturers to play in the global rollout under COVAX will not only boost the domestic industry, but also help add much-needed credibility to Chinese-developed vaccines,” said Xiaoqing Lu Boynton, a consultant at Albright Stonebridge Group who focuses on health care and life sciences.
    • Furthermore, joining a popular initiative like COVAX would certainly help shift the perception that China is a bad actor. Calling the move to join COVAX a “shot in the arm” for Beijing, Malaysia’s popular news website The Star commented: “For China, joining COVAX gives it a chance to demonstrate the responsibilities of a superpower and promote health diplomacy and international exchanges.”
    • Finally, Beijing’s calculated move to join COVAX is being described as a boost to the global scheme to ensure fair access to COVID-19 vaccines for poorer countries. Both financially and politically, China joining COVAX is also seen by many as an effective counter to the “vaccine nationalism” of rich and developed nations, notably the United States.
      • Beate Kampmann, director of the London-based Vaccine Center, told China’s English language TV channel, CGTN that she welcomed China’s significant role in boosting COVAX to beat the U.S.-led trend “vaccine nationalism” in the race to first manufacture and make a vaccine available to the public.
      • Zha Daojing, a researcher at Peking University, told The Star that it was quite normal and a fact of life that governments may base their decisions about vaccine distribution on factors such as nationality or geopolitics. “It is kind of vaccine nationalism,” Zha quipped – and even China is not immune.
      • Hemant Adlakha is professor of Chinese, Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and Honorary Fellow with the Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi.

The Diplomat誌 Hemant Adlakha記事 (2020/10/23)

  • 中国のCOVAXへの参加はワクチンナショナリズムへの対抗か推進か:
    中国はついにWHO Covid-19ワクチン配布連合への参加を公表した。それまで時間がかかったのはなぜか。
    • 10/9に、中国外務省スポークスウーマンの华春莹(Huà chūnyíng)は、中国が公式にVOVAXへの参加したことを発表した。""我々は特にワクチンを途上国へ公平に配布する具体策を取り、またさらに能力のある国々はCOVAXを支援することを期待する"と語った。彼女はまたCovid-19ワクチン開発でも世界をリードしているとも語った。
    • WHOを共同でCOVAXを主導している官民協力団体であるGaviのSeth Berkley CEOは、中国の参加を歓迎し、"中国の参加によって今後Covidワクチンが確実に配布することを更に後押しすることとなる。なぜなら全ての人々が安全になるまで誰も安全ではないからである"とBerkley の中国の参加発表の翌日語った。
    • 中国は結局はCOVAXに参加することになったが、当初はWHO主導のワクチン配布計画参加を躊躇していた経緯がある。今年5月に、習近平主席はWHO総会へのビデオメッセージで、"現在開発中のCovid-19ワクチンを世界と共有する"と言っていたが、この10月までCOVAXへの参加を拒否していたことがある。
    • American Pew Research Centerが行った世論調査で"このコロナパンデミックの間、数カ国で中国に対する否定的な意見が出てきた"ことの発表の後、北京は方針を変えたのではないかという憶測がある。その調査は今年6/10から8/3に(米中を除く)13カ国の13,000人以上を対象に行われた。
    • COVAXは、WHOが180億米ドルを支援して途上国にコロナワクチンを配布することを、特に公平に配布することを強調した計画として呼びかけたものである。Christopher Brauchli(記者)が言うには、"COVAX (Covid-19 Vaccine Global Access Facility)のキーワードは公平性である。WHOのプロジェクトは全ての参加国にとって重要だが、自国でのワクチン開発や購入ができない途上国にとっては特にそれは重要である。"
    • WHO主導で官民で設立されたCOVAXとGavi (the Vaccine Alliance)、およびCEPIは、各政府にワクチン候補が成功しない場合のリスクヘッジにない、先進国以外の国々にとってはそれ以外では得られないメリットがある。現在9つのワクチンが開発中で評価段階にあり、その内の2つは中国製である。
    • COVAXへの参加期限は9月18日だったが、先月9月始めの段階では、北京は、米国トランプ大統領が拒否していたWHOのワクチン計画への参加に対しても曖昧な姿勢続けていた。しかし習主席はCovid-19ワクチン計画に参加することを表明していたこともあり、北京は、締切期限直前にCOVAXへの参画を表明したことで、多くの人の期待通り、アジアの経済大国がこの計画に参加することになった。
    • 健康医療の専門家および中国の戦略分析者は、グローバルなワクチン配布製造計画に参加を決定した要因としては、1)外交におけるソフトパワー、2) 米中間の険悪な関係悪化、3) 中国の内外でのイメージ回復があるという。
  • 良いPR効果:
    • COVAXへの参加表明に先立ち、中国は別の支援も表明している。中国は自国民分のワクチン数量を確保できない国々に対し、一帯一路構想に基づく融資を約束している。これらの国々には、パキスタン、インドネシア、バングラデシュ、モロッコがあり、すでの中国のワクチンメーカーと正式契約している。これは、当初武漢での感染初期に、情報を無視したり抑制したことでの国際社会での面子の回復になると思われてきた。また習近平にとっては、より深刻な外交課題である台湾を巡る緊張や新疆・香港での人権問題があり、"これら批判的な報告が多々ある中で、中国にとってソフトパワーが必要となった"ということであろうと香港市立大学の健康医療准教授はBloombergに語った。
  • 米国は脱退し中国は加入する:
    • 二番目に、一帯一路計画 (BRI, Belt & Road Initiative)が中国の国家戦略になって以来、北京は米国がグローバルリーダーから脱退したギャップを埋めることを一貫して行ってきた。そうすることが、中国にとっては、世界の様々な場所での既存の米国優性の地域での友好国を獲得し、影響力を強めることを期待してきた。かなり決定が遅れたとは言え、中国が最終的にはWHOのプロジェクトに復帰する決定をしたことで米国によって生じた空白を早急に埋める戦略としての意味があったと思われる。中国語の (北米ベースの) 明報誌によれば、"中国のCOVAXへの参加は、米国トランプ大統領がグローバルな健康医療での主導権の計画を無視してきたギャップを埋める結果となった"と解説している。
    • 中国はこの機会に迅速に行動しそうである、というのはそのギャップは一時的だからである。対抗するJoe Biden大統領候補は、トランプによるWHO脱退の決定を覆そうとしているからである。"米国が世界の健康医療を強化することが、米国にとってより安全になる。大統領としての初日に私はWHOに復帰し、世界舞台での主導権を取り戻す"と、Bidenは7月8日に、トランプが公式にWHOからの脱退に動いた後、ツイートして語った。
  • 信頼の回復:
    • 三番目に、専門家によれば、中国製ワクチンの世界への配布について信頼性が不足していることの最優先課題として、当初のCOVAX見送り方針を修正した可能性があるとのことである。中国は当初Covid-19ワクチンが今年末までに入手可能になるだろうと主張していたことを想起して欲しい。中国は、その9つのワクチンの内の4つを外国で最終3段階の臨床実験を行う予定である。最近のBloomberg報告によれば、中国はすでに100カ国でのワクチン供与を確立している。これらのワクチン契約には、ワクチン購入のための中国からの融資、正式のワクチン試験と製造、これらの国々への中国製ワクチンの優先的供給が含まれている。
    • 中国は世界でのワクチン利用のための製造や配布について、それほど経験豊富という訳ではない。にも関わらずCOVAXやその他国際的なワクチン研究機関は、中国によるCovid-19 ワクチンの世界への公平な配布に関与することを歓迎している。"中国のワクチンメーカーによってはCOVAXの下でグローバル展開するこは、国内産業への影響力のみならず、中国製ワクチンへの信頼性を急増させることに通じる可能性がある"とXiaoqing Lu Boynton (アジア投資会社Albriht Stonebride Group (ASG)のVP)ヘルスケア・生命科学コンサルタントは言う。
    • さらに、COVAXにような信頼性のある計画に参加することで、中国の悪いイメージを変えることになるだろうとしている。COVAXへの参加は、北京にとってはカンフル剤となるだろうと、マレーシアのThe Starはウェブサイトで評価している。"中国にとってCOVAX加入は、超大国としての責任を示し、健康医療外交や国際交流を推進するチャンスとなろう"と。
    • 最後に、より貧しい国々にとってCovid19ワクチンを公平に入手できる国際的に取り組みを加速することを北京は計算済みである。財政的にも政治的にも、中国がCOVAXに参加することで、先進国による"ワクチン・ナショナリズム"への効果的な対抗策となるものと見られている。
      • Beat Kampmann (在ロンドンのVaccine Centerのdirector) は中国の英語TV報奨CGTNで、米国主導のワクチンナショナリズムへの有効な対抗策として歓迎すると発言。
      • Zha Daojingは、北京大学の研究者は、The Starに語るには、各国にとってワクチンの配布には、国籍や地政学が関係するのはむしろ当然であり、それはワクチンナショナリズムの一種といえるし、中国もその例外ではない、と。
      • Hemant AdlakhaはニューデリーのJawaharlal Nehrudaigakuの中国語の教授で、デリーでの中国研究機関の名誉フェロー。
    • <参考> COVAXの仕組み:
      • 高中所得国は、拠出金をCOVAXに支払い、開発や設備に使用
      • 購入Option方式: 購入権を担保するが購入義務は追わない。ワクチンを選択可能。拠出金は$3.1/dose
      • ドナー国からの拠出金で途上国へワクチン供給を行う

>Top 20 What is the R number and how is it calculated? by James Gallgher, 20 Dec. 2020:

  • What is the R?
    • The R number is a way of rating coronavirus or any disease's ability to spread. R is the number of people that one infected person will pass on a virus to, on average. Measles has an R number of 15 in populations without immunity. That means, on average, one person will spread measles to 15 others. Coronavirus - known officially as Sars-CoV-2 - would have a reproduction number of about 3 if no action was taken to stop it spreading.
  • Coronavirus in the UK:
    • R numbert range: 1.1 - 1.2
  • How is R calculated?
    • You can't capture the moment people are infected. Instead, scientists work backwards. Data - such as the number of people dying, admitted to hospital or testing positive for the virus over time - is used to estimate how easily the virus is spreading.
    • If the R value is higher than one, then the number of cases increases exponentially - it snowballs like debt on an unpaid credit card.Why is a number above one dangerous? But if the R number is lower the disease will eventually stop spreading, because not enough new people are being infected to sustain the outbreak. Governments everywhere want to force the R number down from about three (the R number if we took no action) to below one.
  • What is the R number in the UK?
    • The R number is not fixed. Instead, it changes as our behaviour changes or as immunity develops. Mathematical modellers at Imperial College London attempted to track how the number changed as isolation, social distancing and the full lockdown were introduced in the spring. Before any measures came in, the R number was well above one and the conditions were ripe for a large outbreak. Successive restrictions brought it down, but it was not until full lockdown that it was driven below one.
  • How the lockdown cut the rate of infecction in the UK
    • Although the R number across the UK is now between 1.1 and 1.2, there are regional differences. Scotland's estimated R number is between 0.9 and 1.1. In Wales the number is thought to be between 0.9 and 1.2 - while in Northern Ireland it is about 1.15. In England, the highest estimated R rate is in the East, where it is between 1.2 and 1.4.
  • Is it the most important number?
    • The R number is one of the big three. Another is severity - some people have a very mild disease that does not cause many problems. But coronavirus and the disease it causes, Covid-19, can be severe and deadly. The last is the number of cases, which is important for deciding when to act. If you have a high number, but ease restrictions so the reproduction number is about one, then you will continue to have a high number of cases.

20. The Diplomat, article by Hemant Adlakha as of Oct 23, 2020:

  • R数とは何か
    • R数は、コロンウイルスの拡散率を示す。それは一人の感染者が、平均的に感染させる人数である。麻疹の場合、免疫がない人へのR数は15である。これは一人の患者が15人に麻疹を感染させる。コロナウイルスの場合は何も行動を取らない場合は、R数は3である。
  • 英国でのR数は、1.1 -1.2である。
  • Rはどのように計算するか:
    • 人々が感染させられた瞬間はわからない。その代わり、死亡者周、入院者数、陽性者数のような数字を利用してウイルスがどのように感染するかを推定する。
    • もしR数が1より大きい場合、感染者数は未払いの借金のように指数関数的に増大する。1より大がなぜ危険かについては、もしR数が小さければ、新たに感染する人がなくなるので、その病気は感染が止まる。政府は、何も対策しない場合のR数3から1以下にしようとしている。
  • R number:
    if it is abo e one the then number of cumulative cases takes off:
  • 英国におけるR数の状況:
    • R数は一定ではない。それは我々の行動や免疫の拡大によって変化する。Imperial College Londonによる数式モデルで、この数字が、この春実施した外出禁止、社会的距離、完全封鎖による効果を測定した。何も対策を取らない場合は、R数は1よりかなり大きくなり大規模感染が発生する条件となる。継続的な行動制限によってその数は減少するが、1以下にするにはロックダウンが必要となる。
  • 英国におけるロックダウンによる感染率低下:
    • 英国でのR数は、地域差はあるが、現在1.1 - 1.2である。スコットランドは0.9 - 1.1。ウェールズは0.9 - 1.2、北アイルランドは1.15。イングランドは(東部が一番高いが)1.2 - 1.4である。
  • それは最重要の数字か:
    • R数は重要な3指標の一つ。他の指標としては、深刻度、即ち軽症か重症かであり、コロナウイルスが原因で重篤化したり死亡する比率である。また感染者数があり、それは行動基準の決定を左右する。この感染者数が大きくなると、R数が1程度であっても、感染者数の高止まりが継続することになる。

>Top 21. Mutant coronavirus in UK, by Kai Kupferschmidt, Science, 20 Decl, 2020

  • Mutant coronavirsu in the United Kingdom sets off alarms, but its imporntace remains unclear:
    • On 8 December, during a regular Tuesday meeting about the spread of the pandemic coronavirus in the United Kingdom, scientists and public health experts saw a diagram that made them sit up straight. Kent, in southeastern England, was experiencing a surge in cases, and a phylogenetic tree showing viral sequences from the county looked very strange, says Nick Loman, a microbial genomicist at the University of Birmingham. Not only were half the cases caused by one specific variant of SARS-CoV-2, but that variant was sitting on a branch of the tree that literally stuck out from the rest of the data. “I’ve not seen a part of the tree that looks like this before,” Loman says.
    • Less than 2 weeks later, that variant is causing mayhem in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe. Yesterday, U.K. Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced stricter lockdown measures, saying the strain, which goes by the name B.1.1.7, appears to be better at spreading between people. The news led many Londoners to leave the city today, before the new rules take effect, causing overcrowded railway stations. The Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy announced they were temporarily halting passenger flights from the United Kingdom. The Eurostar train between Brussels and London will stop running tonight at midnight, for at least 24 hours.
    • Scientists, meanwhile, are hard at work trying to figure out whether B.1.1.7 is really more adept at human-to-human transmission—not everyone is convinced yet—and if so, why. They’re also wondering how it evolved so fast. B.1.1.7 has acquired 17 mutations all at once, a feat never seen before. “There’s now a frantic push to try and characterize some of these mutations in the lab,” says Andrew Rambaut, a molecular evolutionary biologist at the University of Edinburgh.
  • Too many unknowns:
    • Researchers have watched SARS-CoV-2 evolve in real time more closely than any other virus in history. So far, it has accumulated mutations at a rate of about one to two changes per month. That means many of the genomes sequenced today differ at about 20 points from the earliest genomes sequenced in China in January, but many variants with fewer changes are also circulating. “Because we have very dense surveillance of genomes, you can almost see every step,” Loman says.
    • But scientists have never seen the virus acquire more than a dozen mutations seemingly at once. They think it happened during a long infection of a single patient that allowed SARS-CoV-2 to go through an extended period of fast evolution, with multiple variants competing for advantage.
    • One reason to be concerned, Rambaut says, is that among the 17 mutations are eight in the gene that encodes the spike protein on the viral surface, two of which are particularly worrisome. One, called N501Y, has previously been shown to increase how tightly the protein binds to the angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 receptor, its entry point into human cells. The other, named 69-70del, leads to the loss of two amino acids in the spike protein and has been found in viruses that eluded the immune response in some immunocompromised patients.
    • A fortunate coincidence helped show that B.1.1.7 (also called VUI-202012/01, for the first “variant under investigation” in December 2020), appears to be spreading faster than other variants in the United Kingdom. One of the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests used widely in the country, called TaqPath, normally detects pieces of three genes. But viruses with 69-70del lead to a negative signal for the gene encoding the spike gene; instead only two genes show up. That means PCR tests, which the United Kingdom conducts by the hundreds of thousands daily and which are far quicker and cheaper than sequencing the entire virus, can help keep track of B.1.1.7.
    • In a press conference on Saturday, Chief Science Adviser Patrick Vallance said B.1.1.7, which first appeared in a virus isolated on 20 September, accounted for about 26% of cases in mid-November. “By the week commencing the ninth of December, these figures were much higher,” he said. “So, in London, over 60% of all the cases were the new variant.” Johnson added that the slew of mutations may have increased the virus’ transmissibility by 70%.
    • Christian Drosten, a virologist at Charité University Hospital in Berlin, says that was premature. “There are too many unknowns to say something like that,” he says. For one thing, the rapid spread of B.1.1.7 might be down to chance. Scientists previously worried that a variant that spread rapidly from Spain to the rest of Europe—confusingly called B.1.177—might be more transmissible, but today they think it is not; it just happened to be carried all over Europe by travelers who spent their holidays in Spain. Something similar might be happening with B.1.1.7, says Angela Rasmussen, a virologist at Georgetown University. Drosten notes that the new mutant also carries a deletion in another viral gene, ORF8, that previous studies suggest might reduce the virus’ ability to spread.
    • But further reason for concern comes from South Africa, where scientists have sequenced genomes in three provinces where cases are soaring: Eastern Cape, Western Cape, and KwaZulu Natal. They identified a lineage separate from the U.K. variant that also has a N501Y mutation in the spike gene. “We found that this lineage seems to be spreading much faster,” says Tulio de Oliveira, a virologist at the University of KwaZulu-Natal whose work first alerted U.K. scientists to the importance of N501Y. (A preprint of their results on the strain, which they are calling 501Y.V2, will be released on Monday, de Oliveira says.)
    • Another worry is B.1.1.7 could cause more severe disease. There is anecdotal evidence that the South African variant may be doing that in young people and those who are otherwise healthy, says John Nkengasong, director of the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention. “It’s concerning, but we really need more data to be sure.” The African Task Force for Coronavirus will convene an emergency meeting to discuss the issue on Monday, Nkengasong says
    • Still, B.1.177, the strain from Spain, offers a cautionary lesson, says virologist Emma Hodcroft of the University of Basel. U.K. scientists initially thought it had a 50% higher mortality rate, but that turned out to be “purely messy, biased data in the early days,” she says. “I think that is a very strong reminder that we always have to be really careful with early data.” In the case of N501Y, more young people may be getting sick because many more are getting infected; Oliveira says some recent postexam celebrations in South Africa have turned into superspreading events. Studies in cell culture and animal experiments will have to show how a virus with several or all of the mutations carried by the new variant compares with previous variants, Drosten says.
    • Getting definitive answers could take months. But Ravindra Gupta, a virologist at the University of Cambridge, has made a start. The 69-70del mutation appeared together with another mutation named D796H in the virus of a patient who was infected for several months and was given convalescent plasma to treat the disease. (The patient eventually died.) In the lab, Gupta’s group found that virus carrying the two mutations was less susceptible to convalescent plasma from several donors than the wild-type virus. That suggests it can evade antibodies targeting the wild-type virus, Gupta wrote in a preprint published this month. He also engineered a lentivirus to express mutated versions of the spike protein and found that the deletion alone made that virus twice as infectious. He is now conducting similar experiments with viruses that carry both the deletion and the N501Y mutation. The first results should appear just after Christmas, Gupta says.
  • Does is occur elsewhere?
    • The ban on flights from the United Kingdom that other countries are imposing “is pretty extreme,” Hodcroft says. But it does give countries time to think about putting any additional measures in place to deal with passengers from the United Kingdom, she says: “I would hope that most countries in Europe are thinking about this.”
    • But scientists say B.1.1.7 may already be much more widespread. Researchers in the Netherlands have found it in a sample from one patient taken in early December, Dutch health minister Hugo de Jonge wrote in a letter to Parliament today. They will try to find out how the patient became infected and whether there are related cases. Other countries may have the variant as well, says epidemiologist William Hanage of the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health; the United Kingdom may have just picked it up first because it has the most sophisticated SARS-CoV-2 genomic monitoring in the world. Many countries have little or no sequencing.
    • The evolutionary process that led to B.1.1.7 may also occur elsewhere. With vaccines being rolled out, the selective pressure on the virus is going to change, meaning variants that help the virus thrive could be selected for, says Kristian Andersen, an infectious disease researcher at Scripps Research. The important thing in the coming months will be picking up such events, Andersen says. “Whatever enabled the B.1.1.7 lineage to emerge is likely going on in other parts of the world,” he says. “Will we be able to actually detect it and then follow up on it? That, to me is one of the critical things.”

21. 英国でのコロナウイルスの変異, Kai Kupferschmidtg (Science, 2020/12/20)

  • 英国でのコロナウイルスの変異が警鐘を鳴らしているが、その重要性についてはまだ不明:
    • 12/8に英国でのコロナウイルス感染拡大に関する通常の火曜日の会議で、科学者及び衛生当局の専門家は図表を見て立ち上がった。イングランド南東部Kentで感染爆発が発生し、英国でのウイルス系統樹から変種を示していたと、Birmingham大学の遺伝子学者Nick Lomanが語った。SARS-CoV-2ウイルスの変種が半分を占めているのみならず、その変種は系統樹のデータから飛び出していたからである。"このように系統樹から離れている部分は見たことがない。"と。
    • 2週間も経たない内に、その変種は英国や他の欧州で蔓延しつつある。昨日12/7にBoris Johnson首相は、より厳格なロックダウン政策とそのより感染力の強い変種をB.1.1.7を名付けた発表した。このニュースによって多くの市民は、新ルール施行前にロンドンを離れようとして鉄道駅に殺到した。オランダ、ベルギー、イタリーは英国からの航空便の運行を一時的に禁止した。ブラッセルとロンドン間のEurostar鉄道、その日深夜に少なくとも24時間は運行停止となる。
    • 一方、科学者は、B.1.1.7ウイルスが人から人への感染力が本当に強まったかどうか、またそれはなぜなのかを追求中だが、まだ確証は得られていない。またなぜこのように迅速に進化したのかについても疑問である。B.1.1.7には17箇所の変異が同時に起こっており、今迄そのようなことはなかった。"現在、研究機関でこの原因究明に大拍車で取り組んでいる"とAndrew Rambaut (Edinburgh大学の分子進化生物学者) は語った。
  • 多くの不明点:
    • 研究者によれば、SARS-CoV-2ウイルスは歴史上どのウイルスよりも短期間に進化しているという。今迄は、月間で1-2ヶ所の突然変異だった。これによれば、今日のウイルス遺伝子は、1月の中国での初期の遺伝子から20ヶ所で変異したことになるが、多くの変異は同じ箇所の変異を繰り返している。"我々は遺伝子の追跡を緻密に行っており、その詳細を知ることができる"とLomanは言う。
    • しかし、このウイルスが一度に12ヶ所もの突然変異を起こすことは今迄なかった。この原因としては、SARES-CoV-2に長期間感染した患者の体内で、速い進化を遂げ、多くの変異種の中で勝ち残った結果であろうと推測している。
    • Rambautが言うには、17の突然変異の内、8つの遺伝子はウイルス表面のスパイクの蛋白質をコードしている点に注目しており、その内の2つが特に憂慮すべきことである。その一つはN501Yと呼ばれ、Angiotensin変換酵素 (ACE, 生理活性酵素) とより強固に結合するように蛋白質を変質してきており、これは人の細胞への入口となる。その他に69-70delと呼ばれるものはスパイク蛋白質の2つのアミノ酸が欠損しており、免疫が低下した患者から免疫反応を免れたウイルス中に発見されている。
    • これらの変異の一致によって、B.1.1.7 (および2020/12に最初に調査中の変異種VUI-202012/01も含め)は、英国内で他の変異種がより迅速に感染拡大したものとされた。英国で広範に行われているPCR検査はTaqPathと言われ、主に3つの遺伝子の欠片を検出するものである。69-70del変種のウイルスはスパイク遺伝子のコード化する遺伝子に関しては陰性となるが、残り2ヶ所の遺伝子検査となる。これは英国で連日何十万件で実施されているPCR検査 (ウイルスの全遺伝子検査より迅速・安価に実施できる) によってB.1.1.7の追跡が可能であることを意味する。
    • 土曜日(12/5)の記者会見で、Patric Vallance (科学主任顧問) は、9/20に分析されたB.1.1.7は、11月中旬には感染した中で26%であった。"12/9からの週の時点ではもっと増加している。ロンドンでは60%以上がこの新種ウイルスであった"と語った。Johnson首相はこれに加えて、この突然変異によってウイルスの感染率は70%も高まったと語った。
    • Christian Drosten (ベルリンのCharité大学病院のウイルス学者が言うには、"まだ不明な点が多いので確信的に言うには早すぎる"としている。一つにはB.1.1.7の急激な感染率は下降する可能性もあるという。科学者達は以前スペインから他の欧州各国への急速に感染した変種、紛らわしい名称だがB.1.177の方がもっと感染力が強いとされてきたが、それはスペインである休暇を過ごした旅行者によって欧州中に感染を広げたことによるもので、今回の変種はそうではないとしている。Angela Rasmussen (Georgetown大学のウイルス学者)によれば、新たな突然変異は、もう一つのウイルス遺伝子ORF8を欠損しており、以前の研究ではそれはウイルスの感染力を弱めるものかもしれないということだった、と言う。
    • 南アフリカでの報告では、そこでの科学者は、感染が拡大している3州 (Eastern Cape, Wester Cape, およびKwaZulu Natal)で遺伝子配列分析を実施した。彼らは英国での変種とは別系統の種を同定し、同じくスパイク遺伝子でのN501Yの突然変異を見つけた。"この系統の変種は遥かに急速に感染拡大しているように思える"として最初に英国の科学者にN501Yの重要性を警告したTulio de Oliveira (KwaZulu-Natal大学のウイルス学者) は、これを501Y.V2変種と呼び、分析結果を月曜日12/10に発表すると語った。
    • B.1.1.7については、さらに深刻な病気をもたらす懸念がある。まだ不確実情報だが、"南アの変種は、既往症のない若者にも感染し得るとし、そうであれば重要なことであり、さらに調査が必要"と、John Nkenbgasong (アフリカ疾病防止センター長) は語った。アフリカコロナウイルス・タスクフォースは緊急対策会議を月曜日に開催するとのことである。
    • スペインからのB.1.177については、さらに教訓があるとEmma Hodcroft (Basel大学ウイルス学者) は言うには、英国の科学者は当初は致死率が50%以上だと言っていたが、これは初期段階での誤った認識で混乱を引き起こしたと彼女は語った。"これは非常に強い教訓で、我々は常に初期のデータには注意する必要がある"と言う。M501Yの場合、より大勢が感染した結果、多くの若者が感染したのだ。Oliveiraが言うには、一方で南アでの最近の追加試験の結果、急速に感染拡大していることが判明した。
    • 確定的な知見までにはまだ数ヶ月かかる見込みである。Ravindra Gupta (Cambridge大学のウイルス学者) も調査開始した。69-70del突然変異は、D796H と呼ばれる別の突然変異ウイルスと一緒に、数カ月間感染し回復期の血漿治療を受けていた患者から発見された。(この患者は結果的に死亡したが) Guptaのチームの研究室での知見では、2種類の突然変異を持つウイルスは、幾人かのドナーによる回復期血漿に対して、それ以外の野生型ウイルスに比べてより影響されないという。そのことは、その変種が、野生型ウイルスを対象にした抗体から逃れやすいことを意味する、とGuptaは今月発表の論文に記載した。彼がレンチウイルス(エイズなど免疫不全ウイルス)に対して行って実験では、スパイク蛋白質を変異させ、それを欠損した種では感染力が2倍になったとしている。彼は現在同様の実験をN501Y変異による欠損を持つウイルスについて実験中である。最初の結果は、クリスマス以降になる模様とGuptaは言う。
  • 他でも同様なことが起こるか:
    • 英国などからの飛行停止は、極めて異常事態である、とHodcroftは言う。しかし英国からの旅行者に対処するために追加の政策を考える余裕を与えることになり、欧州各国はこのことを考えて欲しいと、彼女は語った。
    • しかし科学者が指摘するには、B.1.1.7すでに広範に汚染拡大してしまったという。オランダの研究者によれば、12月始めの一人の患者の検体から、オランダ保健大臣のHugo de Jongeは議会への書簡の中で、その患者はどのように感染し、また同様のケースがあるかどうか調査中とのことである。他の国々でも同様の変種があり得る、とWiliam Hanage (Harvard T.H. Chan School公衆衛生の感染学者)は言い、英国が最初にこの変種を取り上げたのは、英がSARS-CoV-2の遺伝子解析では世界で先端を走っているからだとしている。多くの国ではその遺伝子変異の発見はまだ見つかっていない。
    • B.1.1.7へ至った進化については他地域でも可能性はある。ワクチンの普及とともに、ウイルスに対する選択的な圧力が変化しつつあり、それはウイルスが選択的にワクチンに対抗するように変異する可能性があることを示している、とKristian Andersen (Scripps研究所の感染病研究者)は言う。今後数ヶ月間で重要なことはこのような事象を発見することであるとAndersen は言う。"B.1.17系統種に起こったことは、世界の他地域でも起こる可能性がある。それを実際に検知可能か、そしてそれへの対策は可能かは、我々にとっても極めて重要なことである"と語った。
  • The expression by European and American media look more concrete and straighforward, or sometimes spicy and critical, but backed by statistical analysis or comments by sepecialists.
  • In contrast, Japanese media look so-called "sontaku" considerations, which literally meaning 1) think about how the top doesn't feel unpleasant, 2) read what the top implies, 3) compliment between the lines or backgrroud, not causing disadvantage in the future. This may cause Japan as an unique or different impression about the way of communication. Virus never do such sonataku as humans.
  • The rapid global consesus of establishment of COVAX is remarkable, though Trump administration neglect it. It is hoped that this will indicate returning trend of the normal of global collaboration.
  • 欧米メディアの表現は、もっと具体的で直截的で、ある場合は辛辣で批判的であるが、統計分析や専門家の指摘に裏付けられている。
  • 対照的に、日本のメディアはいわゆる忖度による配慮が目立つ。忖度とは1) トップが不快に感じないように、2)トップの示唆することを読む、3)行間や背景を補充し、将来不利にならないようにする。このことは日本のコミュニケーションの方法が異なると思わせる原因であろう。なお、ワクチンは人間のように忖度することはあり得ない。
  • ワクチン共同買付の国際的な機関が急速に設立されたことは画期的である (トランプ政権は無視しているが)。正常な国際協力への回帰になることを期待したい。

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