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Negotiation as a Game

Caty: ECO
Pub: 1994
#: 9401b

Koichi Kusano


Negotiation as a game


Koichi Kusano 草野耕一
1994 1994
  1. Accommodative Negotiation:
  2. 2. Strategical Negotiation:
  3. 3. The Strong Winning Negotiation:
  4. 4. Blackmail Type Negotiation:
  5. 5. Chicken Game Type Negotiation:
  • It is said that negotiation resembles a war. But concurrently it gives us an aspect of collaboration how to pursue the common profit.
  • Also negotiation gives us a kind of pleasure, in particular when we feel a tense and concentration how to control ourselves during the process of the negotiation.
  • 交渉は戦争に似ていると言われる。同時に、共通する利益を追求するための共同作業の側面 もある。
  • また交渉は我々にある種の喜びを与えてくれる。交渉中は、いかに感情を抑制して緊張感や集中力を発揮する場合など特にそうである。


  1. To confer with another in order to come to reach an agreement.
  2. To succeed in accomplishing or managing.
  3. To sell or discount assets or securities.
  4. [Latin]: negotiotus < to transact business<not+leisure


  1. 交渉する、協議する、商議する
  2. 迂回する、切り抜ける、処理する、さばく
  3. 流通させる、譲渡する、換金する
  4. [ラテン語]:negotiotus <商いをする<暇でない
Purchase Order

>Top 1. Accommodative Negotiation:

  • (1) Agreement in any case:
    Both parties share the maximum profit of 'bringing to a successful conclusion.'
  • Positive-sum Game:
    Positive-sum game is always applicable as long as each party has an option to say "no"; as both party have the common profit of attaining to a successful conclusion, they collaborate as well as oppose each other for that purpose.
  • To achieve the purpose, both parties should maintain the negotiation to be "amicable", "effective", and "optimal."
  • (2) Amicable Negotiation (Common Profit):
    • Synergy effect of hostility:
      If hostility increases, collaboration will be difficult. So, both parties should forget hostility, and even if it cannot be removed, they should not reveal it.
    • Negotiation with an amateur:
      Machiavellian theory says; it is a harsh fact that hostile attitude can be effective to negotiate with an amateur who is likely to avoid confrontational human relationship. But, such negotiation style cannot obtain with professional negotiators representing nation or corporation.
    • "The last straw":
      If the other party accepts your too much requests, the situation may approach to the last straw which breaks sudden collapse of the almost successful negotiation.
    • Tragedy of international faction:
      English-talented persons are usually active in arranging alliance with foreign partner, while English-untalented persons show 'xenophobic." The problem is that English-talented persons are minor in number, and do not represent the mainstream.
      Excessive requests may cause anger of domestic faction, and may decrease passion of international faction, which may change the balance of internal power politics of the other party. In this case, it is exceptionally useful for the negotiator of the international faction to reveal the existence of hostility of the domestic faction to the other party.
    • Realistic approach:
      It is not the personality with which you negotiate, but the theme of the negotiation. A hysteric negotiator should remind this to heart.
    • Trap of "Amicable Negotiation":
      Amicable attitude can promote collaborative relationship during the negotiation. But negotiation has factors of confrontation and conflict, and there exist 'the limit of collaboration.'
      • A negotiation agent always keep in mind "fiduciary relation" or "fiduciary duty" to the principal.' (One must draw the line somewhere.)
      • 'Working Relationship" is essential for a bona fide negotiator. Easy personal contact ('nominication') may lead to 'at best dubious' situation.
  • (3) Effective Negotiation:
    • Cost consciousness:
      Negotiation requires cost per performance; trying to minimize 'agency cost' by the way of effective negotiation.
    • "Battle is not enough" Saigo Takamori said Meiji Restoration period: This means there is such case as;
      • tough and elongated negotiation and several risks of rupture become indispensable before arriving at the realistic mood of negotiation.
    • Negotiator needs to have double characters;
      • respect each process of negotiation (responding cool and logically at each phase, and also
      • have perspective view of the negotiation
    • "Sunk Cost":
      • all costs spent for the negotiation till then begins to change into into 'sunk cost' from that moment.
  • (4) Optimal Negotiation:
    • aims to maximize 'allocative efficiency.'
      • respects more 'interest' than each 'position' of the other party.
    • Surmise the other party's interest.
      • Eg: a case of governing law;
        requiring 'Legal opinion' in return for accepting governing law in NY state.
      • Eg: a case of Joint Venture;
        making the utility from acquired portion of control bigger than that from resigned one.
    • 'Substantive law' vs. 'Adjective law':
      Fare adjective law is a touchstone of whether the substantive law is effective.
      • 'Trump card':
        Eg: a case of stock price by the third party umpire;
        deciding the selling price by the average of the middle price and nearer price to it (neglecting the farthest price).
    • Why tends to avoid 'Definitive Negotiation?
      • Because, detailed 'contingencies' is not necessarily common interest of both parties.
      • Eg: a case of loan agreement;
        the detailed conditions are usually requested by the obligee side.
    • Enforceability:
      • Concurrent performance of the mutual agreement;
        right to refuse to perform an obligation until the concurrent performance by the other party.

1. 協調的交渉:

  • (1) ともかく成立:
  • 正和ゲーム(positive-sum game):
  • そのためには、交渉を「友好的」「効率的」「賢明なもの」にすべきである。
  • (2) 友好的交渉(共通の利益)
    • 敵意の相乗効果:
    • 素人相手の交渉:
    • 最後の藁(The last straw)
    • 国際派の悲劇:
    • 即物的アプローチ:
    • 友好的交渉の陥穽:
      • 代理交渉の場においては、「本人」に対する忠実義務(fiduciary duty)という規範意識が必要。(「和を以て貴し」ではない)
      • 良き交渉家としての相互信頼関係(Working Relationship) が重要。安易な"Nominication" は談合的になりがち(at best dubious)
  • (3) 効果的交渉:
    • コスト意識:
      交渉における費用対効果、すなわち効果的交渉を通じてAgency costを最小化することが重要。
    • 西郷隆盛:まだ戦が足りもうさん
      • 激しい議論の応酬、交渉決裂の危機を通じて、当事者双方が疲弊して、ようやく現実的交渉が始まる場合
    • 二重人格者としての交渉家:
      • 交渉プロセスの重視(論理的かつ冷静な展開)および
      • 交渉の大局観
    • サンク・コスト (Sunk Cost):
      • 交渉に費やされるコストは刻々とサンクコストになる
  • (4) 賢明な交渉:
    • 「配分的効率」の極大化を目指す
      • 各々の立場よりも利益を重視する
    • 相手の利益を推測する
      • 例:準拠法の場合
        NY法準拠を受ける場合でも、契約の各条の法的有効性を確認させる 'Legal opinion'を要求
      • 例:合弁契約の場合
    • 実体法と手続法:
      • 伝家の宝刀:
    • なぜ明確な交渉を避けるのか?
      • 偶発事象を明確に交渉しておくことは、当事者共通の利益と言えない
      • 例:金銭貸付契約の場合、詳細な契約を規定したいのは貸主側
    • 約束の実効性:
      • 互いの約束を同時に実行する:

>Top 2. Strategical Negotiation:

  • Principle of BATNA (Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement): Opportunity cost of the negotiation
    • BATNA should be objective and economic bottom line, not subjective and mental bottom line.
  • Negotiation Matrix: Here, "Strong' means the party's position is obstinate or inflexible, and 'Weak' means not.
    The Matrix (in a case of secondhand car sales negotiation) has the following premises:
    • The secondhand car can be sold anytime to a dealer at 50
    • The new car is available at 100.
    • Seller-A wants to sell his car at 80, but Buyer-B wants to buy it at 60.
  •     A
        Weak Strong
    B Weak ? +30
    ? +20
    Strong +10 0
    +40 0
    • 1) If A and B are strong , both stick to their BATNA, and gain nothing (no deal).
    • 2) If A is strong, and B is weak, the price will be 80 as insisted by A. Where A gains 30, while B also gains 20 compared to the price of a new car.
    • 3) If A is weak, and B is strong, the price will be 60 as insisted by B. Where A gains 10, while B gains 40.
    • 4) If A and B are weak, both will gain in-between of the above 2) and 3), but the price is uncertain.
  • Structure of persuasion:
    There are three types of persuasion: 1) Emotional, 2) Utilitarian, and 3) Logical:
    • 1) Emotional persuasion:
      Effective in negotiating with emotional person, or persuasion amid tears, or typically Marcus Antonius's oration at Julius Caesar's funeral of Shakespeare, or Adolf Hitler's agitation.
      • May bring adverse effect, or "Overcompensation" by the other party.
    • 2) Utilitarian persuasion:
      A Warning board in metro in Boston, saying "Don't pickpocket, otherwise one-month jail"
    • 3) Logical persuasion:
      depending common sense of value and integrity as
      "Even bad law is a law." by Socrates logic.
    • The most effect method is 'Utilitarian persuasion,' but in actual negotiation, 'Logical persuasion' surprisingly often appears, because 'Logical persuasion';
      • is sonorous, does not hurt the other party's pride and honor.
      • is applicable in almost cases.
    • Negotiator is said a kind of modern sophist.
      Protagorus, sophist says; "human is a universal measure."
    • Dichotomy:
      'Logical persuasion' is principle, while 'Utilitarian persuasion' is real intention.
    • Expected Value:
      Probability theory is useful in planing a strategy.
      • Risk Averse:
        Too much risk cannot offset the expected value, probably because of theory of marginal utility or philosophy of uniqueness of life.

2. 戦略的交渉:

  • BATNAの原則:交渉の機会費用
    • 客観的・経済的なボトムラインであって、主観的・精神的なボトムラインではない
  • 交渉マトリックス:(左図)
    • 車はいつでもディーラーに50で販売可能とし、また新車の価格は100とする。
    • 売り主Aはこの車を80で売却希望、一方買い主Bは60で購入希望あり。
    • 1) もしA,Bいずれも強気の場合、両者ともBATNAにこだわり、売買は不成立
    • 2) もしAが強気で、Bが弱気の場合、価格はAの主張する80で決まる。Aの利得は30(80-50)となり、Bの利得は新車購入と比較して20となる。(100-80)
    • 3) もしAが弱気で、Bが強気の場合、価格はBの主張する60で決まる。Aの利得は10 (60-50)となり、Bの利得は40となる(100-60)
    • 4) もしA,Bいずれも弱気の場合、上記2)と3)の中間で売買成立するが、価格は確定できない。
  • 説得の構造:
    • 1) 感情的説得
      • 逆効果あり得る:「過剰補償」
    • 2) 功利的説得
    • 3) 論理的説得
    • 最も有効な説得方法は、功利的説得であるが、現実の交渉では意外にも論理的説得が頻繁に行われる
      • 論理的説得は、格調が高く、相手の自尊心や体面を傷つけない
      • 論理的説得は、いかなる状況でも可能
    • 交渉家は現代のソフィスト
    • 対表現:論理的説得はタテマエ、功利的説得はホンネの交渉を司る
    • 期待値:
      • リスク・アバース:

>Top 3. The Strong Wins Pattern Negotiation:

  • 1942 Singapore: Yamashita - Percival Negotiation;
    pushing 'Yes or No' answer. The matrix between the strong Japanese army vs. the weak British colonial army is as follows:
  •     Japan
        Weak Strong
    UK Weak ? +100
    ? -30
    Strong -30 -10
    +10 -100
  • The strong side considers that their BATNA is more preferable than to accept the weak's proposal. So, there is no other choices than the equilibrium point of the strong Japan and the weak UK.
  • Bargaining Power:
    Eg: Case of Coalition Government:
    Minor party is the strong negotiator, while majority party is the weak, because majority party gain more preferable profit than breakoff of the negotiation. One who is anxious for the negotiation can gain more profit from the conclusion of it; playing as the weak negotiator.
  • Gain Time:
    It is possible to escape from this strong-seak negotiation pattern during the elapsed time.
  • Standstill Agreement:
    Eg: Cease-fire agreement, as a kind of battle of time.

3. 強者必勝型交渉:

  • 1942年シンガポール:
    • 強者側は、弱者側の提案を呑むより自らのBATNAを追求する方が有利となる。かくて、この交渉パターンは強者の日本が強気、弱者の英国が弱気という均衡点が生じる。
  • バーゲニング・パワー:
  • 時を稼ぐ:
  • スタンドスティル契約:

>Top 4. Blackmail Type Negotiation:

        Weak Strong
    Ching Weak ? +200
    ? -150
    Strong +50 0
    -20 -1000
  • Shimonoseki Peace Treaty (1985):
    Munemitsu Mutsu, then foreign minister's strong stance against Li Hung-chang, Ching's plenipotentiary required:
    • Independence of Korea (under the influence of Japan)
    • Cession of Liaotung peninsula, Taiwan & other islands
    • Reparation of ¥450M
      • Japanese war cost was ¥150-200M
      • Japanese revenue: ¥80M
    • Best favored nation
  • Japan was the strong side having bigger allowance, while Chinese Ching was the weak side being distressed.
  • Strategy of the strong:
    clarify that there no way but to accept the strong's requirement, taking mean advantage of the weak.
    • Pretend 'the strong wins pattern'
    • even the weak is ready to accept the strong's request to persuade its principal.
  • Strategy of the weak:
    • Flat refusal, but if it is 'the strong wins pattern,' the negotiation will be broken up.
    • Never cut off the retreat
      Don't say 'won't pay' but 'can't pay.'
    • assign to the principal's final decision.
  • Response of the weak:
    • conclude at the minimum cost
    • try to reverse the strong's mind by logical or emotional persuasion.
    • Gain time
    • change the game's pattern
  • A case of purchase of cola in a desert:
    A wanderer want to buy a bottle of cola in a desert a ¥10,000, but an Arabian merchant countered to sell it at ¥1 million by check.

4. ブラックメール型交渉:

  • 下関講和会議(1895):
    • 朝鮮の完全独立(宗主国の放棄)
    • 遼東半島、台湾、ボウ湖諸島割譲
    • 賠償金3億両(¥450M)
      • 日清戦争の戦費(¥150M-200M)
      • 当時の日本の歳入¥80M
    • 最恵国待遇(沙市、重慶の開港)
  • 交渉決裂の被害が相対的に小さい方の当事者(余裕者)は日本で、大きい方の当事者(困窮者)は清国
  • 余裕者の戦略:
    • 外見上強者必勝型の交渉パターンを演出する
    • 困窮者側も、相手の要求を全面的に受け入れることを「本人」説得したい
  • 困窮者の戦略:
    • 相手の強気の要求を断固はねつける選択 。但し、実際には強者必勝型のパターンであれば、交渉の破綻を招く
    • 退路を絶たない
    • 判断を「本人」に委ねる
  • 困窮者が強気の戦略をとらない場合:
    • コストの少ない交渉を実現する
    • 論理的説得や感情的説得により相手の翻心を促す
    • 時を稼ぐ
    • ゲームのパターンを変える
  • 砂漠でのコーラの場合:

>Top 5. Chicken Game Type Negotiation:

    Weak Strong
Russia Weak ? +200
? -100
Strong +100 -1000
-50 -1000
  • Eg: Portsmouth Peace Treaty (1905):
    Jutaro Komura, Japanese plenipotentiary negotiated with Sergey Witte, Russian plenipotentiary at Portsmouth mediated by US president Theodore Roosevelt.
    • Japanese requirement:
      • Korea as Japanese protectorate
      • Withdrawal of both armies from Manchuria
      • Lease of Liaotung peninsula
    • (Necessary)
      • Reparation (max ¥1,500M)
      • Delivery of detained battle ships
      • Cession of Sakhalin
      • Piscary of Maritime Province of Siberia
    • Conclusion:
      • Cession of southern half of Sakhalin
      • No reparation
  • Strategy of 'Chicken Game Type Negotiation':
    • Start from the strong position
    • If the other party shows the strong position, then stalemate continues.
  • Three Scenarios:
  • (1) Hannibal Type Negotiation:
  •     Hannibal (50K)
        Weak Strong
    Weak - +150
    - -20
    Strong -80 -200
    +100 -100
    • Hannibal with 50K cohort occupied a city of Rome, while Roman army countered with 100K to regain the city.
    • Hannibal cut off the retreat breaking the bridge by themselves, and showed no choice of the weak response.
    • Roman general was compelled to choose the weak response.
    • 'Self-commitment" policy: to narrow the options to negotiate, ie, gaining bargaining power by decreasing own bargaining allowance.
    • One-time victory sacrificing future negotiations.
    • To send ultimatus, while to ignore it.
  • (2) Gambler Type Negotiation:
    • 'Bargaining over bananas'
    • There is no rule of bargaining.
    • New proposal should be conspicuous and stable.
    • Fiction of 'principle of equal partners'
  • (3) Socrates Type Negotiation:
    • 'Dialectics';
      • listen to reason.
      • Each partner want to be persuaded
    • Merit of this type:
      • no lingering dissatisfaction
      • smaller risk of rupture of negotiation
      • saving of negotiation cost
      • easing later negotiations
    • negotiate rule of the negotiation
    • unilaterally accept a part of the other party's proposal.
      • Speak for the other party's logic.
    • Raise the damage of rupture of the negotiation
      • postpone the difficult items
      • negotiate item by item
        • or 'package deal'
      • increase the numbers of negotiators
      • have pride of negotiator, anticipating judgment of the principal
  • Eg: Negotiation between Kaishu Katsu, representative Tokugawa Shogunate vs. Takamori Saigo, representative of Imperial Army regarding dispossession of Edo Castle (Mar. 1968):
    • Opposition and accommodation
      • Dango (by mutual consent)
    • Negotiation on behalf of each principal

5. チキンゲーム型交渉:

  • 例:ポーツマス講和会議(1905):
    • 日本側要求:
      • 朝鮮の保護国化
      • 満州からの両軍の撤退
      • 遼東半島租借権
    • 必要条件:
      • 賠償金(最大15億円)
      • 抑留された軍艦引き渡し
      • 樺太の割譲
      • 沿海州の沿岸漁業権
    • 結論:
      • 南樺太の割譲
      • 賠償金な
  • チキンゲーム型交渉戦略:
    • まず強気の姿勢から開始
    • もし他方も強気の場合、膠着状態になる
  • 3つのシナリオ:
  • (1) ハンニバル型交渉:
    • 50万の歩兵からなるハンニバルはローマの年を占領し、一方ローマ軍は100万の歩兵で奪還を目指す
    • ハンニバルは退路の橋を自ら絶ち、弱気の選択肢を放棄し、それを相手側に示した。
    • ローマの将軍は弱きの選択肢を取らざるを得なくなった
    • 「セルフコミットメント」
    • 将来の交渉を犠牲にすることで一度の勝利を得る方法
    • 最後通牒を送り、一方はそれを無視する
  • (2) ギャンブラー型交渉:
    • バナナのたたき売り方式
    • バーゲニングの規則はない
    • 新た提案は顕著で安定的であるべき
    • 当事者対等の原則という仮説
  • (3) ソクラテス型交渉:
    • 「対話法」:
      • 理性に従う
      • 各当事者は相手から説得されることを求めている
    • この型のメリット
      • 当事者に不満が残らない
      • 交渉決裂のリスクが小さい
      • 交渉コストの節約
      • その後の交渉を容易にする
    • 交渉のルールを交渉する
    • 初期段階は相手の提案の一部を一方的に受諾する
      • 相手の提案の論議的説得を代弁する
    • 交渉決裂のダメージを引き上げる
      • 難しい問題は後回し
      • 個別項目毎に交渉
        • パッケージディール
      • 交渉参加者を増やす
      • 「本人」の判断を先取りした交渉家の誇り
  • 例:幕府代表勝海舟・官軍代表西郷隆盛江戸城明け渡し交渉(1868. 3):
    • 対立しながらも協調しあって
      • 談合
    • 代理人としての交渉


  1. To confer with another in order to come to reach an agreement.
  2. To succeed in accomplishing or managing.
  3. To sell or discount assets or securities.
  4. [Latin]: negotiotus < to transact business<not+leisure


  1. 交渉する、協議する、商議する
  2. 迂回する、切り抜ける、処理する、さばく
  3. 流通させる、譲渡する、換金する
  4. [ラテン語]:negotiotus <商いをする<暇でない

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