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エネルギー
シフトの戦略

A Strategy for Green Shift

Not Nuclar Not Fossil Enrgy


Cat: ENE
Pub: 2011
#: 1418b

Testsunari Iida (飯田哲也)

UP 14909
Titile

A Strategy for Green Shift

エネルギーシフトの戦略

 
  1. Things left behind of in 20C:
  2. Ecological modernization:
  3. New reality of Nuclear Power Plants:
  4. Long-term forecast of energy source:
  5. Poor Japanese Sustainable Energy Policy:
  6. Start from Fringe:
  1. 日本の20世紀の忘れ物:
  2. エコロジー的近代化:
  3. 原発の新しい現実:
  4. 中長期のエネルギー源:
  5. 日本の貧弱な再生可能エネルギー政策:
  6. 周縁からの開始:
Tag
Galapagosization of Knowledge; Nicholas Stern Review; Correlation of CO2 reduction and GDP Growth; Risk Society; Deep Ecology; Lifetime of Nuclear Plants; 21C type Fourth Revolution; Supply Push & Demand Pull; Lifetime of Nuclear Plants; Japanese RPS; Local bottom-up decision;
Why
  • The author's original title is literally 'A Strategy for Energy Shift', but here I would traslate it as 'Green Shift'; which is an association of 'Blueshift', because stars which blueshift are approaching to us. It also reminds us 'Blue Ocean Strategy'. Of course Green is the term of Ecology.
  • Green Light also means 'Go Ahead', though it is expressed 'Blue Light in Japan.
  • 著者の元のタイトルは"エネルギーシフトの戦略"とあっている。ここではそれを"グリーンシフト戦略"と訳した。それはブルーシフト (青方偏移) からの連想である。青方偏移する星々は我々に近づいてきている。それはまたブルーオシャン戦略を想起される。グリーンとはもちろんエコロジーの意味もある。
  • グリーンライトとは前に進めの意味だが、日本では青信号と表現するが。
Résumé
Remarks

>Top
1
. Things left behind of Japan in 20C:

  • 'Galapagosization of Knowledge', Galápagos sysndrome of knowlege:
    • Such knowlege is separated from European & American ones; such separated knowledge only applicable in Japan (like the format of mobil phone, etc.) is called Galapagosization.
    • 'Separated pluralism' is acceralating; the term is mentioned by Masahiko Aoki. Each ministry of Japan acts as an indempendent state. The ministr of Japan should be called 'Honorary Mininster for the Day', as expressed form Yoshihiro Katayam, former minster of internal affairs & communications.
    • Japanese monopolised electric system by 10 utility companiese is a typical structural problem, which was born after serious debate between public utilities or monopolized utilities just after WWII; which is composed of 'Regional monopoly' and 'Vertical monopoly, or functional monopoly from power generation, transmission, distribution and sales of electricity. Though very limited deregulations were induced during 1990s, the basic structure of monopoly is unchanged, which is quite unique in advanced countries.
  • 3.11 disaster could be an opportunity to change monopoly structure:
    • Massive earthquate (M9.0) and Tsunami disaster in 2011/3/11 could be an opportunity to reconsider the basic environment & energy policy in Japan, particularly to deregulate monopolized market of electric power industry.
  • 21C type of Social Revolution:
    • Energy revolution is occurring as the fourth revolution; after Agriculture, Indstrialization, Information Technology.
    • Wind energy power generation is expanding 30-40% growth per annum, attained 36 GW capacity.
    • Solar energy is expanding 60% growth per annum, increased 15 GW capacity in 2010.
    • The investment in these sustainable energy is growing 60% per annum, even after the Lehman Shock, attained Yen 20T ($230B) in 2010, 30% increase year on year. But most of the market is outside Japan; Japanese makers could not gained such emerging market.
    • Japanese Solar PV (photovoltaic) makers had been a top runner in the world market, but they are far behind nwo.
    • In the wind power generation market, Japan is 18th in the world, and even MHI, the top make of Japanese wind power makers, cannot enter withing the top ten.
    • Japan obviously lacks in sustainalble energy policy; which is deriving Japanese competitiveness in the industry.
  • Aso - Hatoyama Energy policies:
    • Aso administration (2008/9 - 2009/9) and the next Hatoyama administration (2009/9 - 2010/6) had studied basic energy policy based on energy ecoometrics, particularly considering global warning issue.; The problem of this study was based on the narrrow national burden rate (increase of ¥360K each HH).
    • There was no long-term strategic viewpoint as an advanced country such as ocial expenses, shift of burden to the nexe generation, and GNP.
    • >Top The 'Nicholas Stern Review' (The Economics of Climate Change, 2006) pointed the burden of the present generation is necessary to prevent long-term environmental distruction.
  • Relationship of Economics and Enegy:
    • Energy issue is a part of economics, and is mostly affected by the economics.
    • Econometrics viewpoint tends to pursue decreasing deman of energy by decreasine economic actiiteis; but the balance of these is more important.
    • For example, regulationof exhaust gas of vehcles make decrease of GDP; it is caluclated based on expolatration of the present industrial and social structure.
    • 'Michael Porter Hypothesis' insisted in 1991 the emission contron can cause technical innovation and contribute economic growth.
    • Energy innovation can be expected much in user side such as energy saving domestic elctric appliances, EV, Solar PV installed houses:

1. 日本の20世紀の忘れ物:

  • 知のガラパゴス
    • 仕切られた多元主義

 

 

 

  • 3.11は電力独占体制見直しの機会

 

 

 

  • 21世紀の社会革命

 

 

 

  • 麻生〜鳩山内閣のエネルギー政策
    • 長期視点の欠如
    • スターン報告, 2006

 

 

 

  • 経済とエネルギーとの関係

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

>Top
2. Ecological modernization:

  • Correlation of CO2 reduction and GDP Growth: 1990-2007 <fig.>
    • EU has shifted to Wind, Solar PV, and Natural gas since 2000.
      • EU attained CO2 reduction and GDP growth during the period.
      • While, US and Japan failed CO2 reduction;
      • in particular Japan did not succeed both in growig GDP and decreasing CO2.
    • EU energy policies:
      • RPS (Renewable Portfolio Standard); electric supply companies must produced a specified fraction of their electricity from renewable energy sources.
      • FIT (Feed In Tariff); the compensation rates is determined by means of scientific studied, based on the use of state-of-the-art technology. FIT offers a guaranteed purchased agreement for long period (15-25 years)
  • Economic growth and Ecological policies were not trade-off:
    • Since 1980s, ecology-centric policies have been promoted in EU; backed by the dsicussion or movement of such as Risk Society, Deep Ecology, Shallow Ecology.
      • Risk Society: environmental had become predominant product of industrial society. Modern societies are exposed to risks such as pollution, newly discovered illnesses, crime, that are the result of the modernization process.
      • Deep Ecology: (by Arne Naess) Nature is a subtle balance of complex inter-relationship of organisms within ecosystems. Living environment as a whole should be respected. (Biospheric egalitarianism, or Ecosophy, Gaia hypothesis)
  • Discussion of ecological modernization:
  Conventional Ecology-Economic Policy Ecological Modernization
Regulation method Control or order type; rigid Market mechanism; soft-landing
Policy style Dichotomy; Ideological Multi-stake holders; Realistic
Environmental restriction End of pipe (emission regulation) Preventive;
Polluters Pay Principle;
Environmental Impact Assessment
Economic policy Don't consider economic restriction Internalization of externalities
Ideology Industrialism Risk Society; Knowledge Society
Key word Economic Growth;
Market Fundamentalism;
Anthropocentrism
Sustainable Development; Egocentrism
    • During Thatcher's administration, environmental policies were weakened in UK.
    • While, in Scandinavian countries, more flexible policies combining market mechanism and environmental thought (Ecological Modernization)
    • Environmental or Ecological Tax
    • Demand Pull Policy: Industrial subsidy is a typical Supply Push Policy.
      • In the beginning of 1990s Finland and other Scandinavian countries adopted environmental (carbon) tax; Germany and UK adopted it in the latter 1990s, but France still could not adopt it.
  • >Top Comparison of Supply Push & Demand Pull:
Supply Push Policy Demand Pull Policy
Technical assessment Market assessment
Supply of facility Application, Add value, User-centric
Economic competitiveness Social viewpoint of necessity of policy, finance, system, & organization
Technical demonstration Business, financial, Institutional & Social model
Industrial subsidy Share of risk & cost to make preferable mar
Planning Experience, Result, & Lessons
Monetary based cost down Market competitiveness
    • Supply Push Policy focusses R&D&R (Research, Development and Demonstration)
    • Demand Pull Policy focusses actual market proliferation.
    • Japan has actually no policy considering ecological modernization; which mostly promotes short-sighted market mechanism.

2. エコロジー的近代化:

  • GDPの伸びとCO2削減 (1990-2007)
    • 環境税(炭素税)の有無
    • CO2総量規制
    • 自然エネルギー促進法

cco2reduct_GDP

  • リスク社会
  • ディープ・エコロジー

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  • 供給プッシュと需要プル

>Top
3. New Reality of Nuclear Power Plants after 3.11:
 

  • Japan had emphasized 3E in energy policies: 1) Energy security, 2) Economy, and 3) Environment; but actually secured energy sources as much as possible depending on short-term market prices.
  • Reality of Nuclear Power Plants after 2011/3/11 are:
    • Operation rate drastically declined.
    • Plant facility obsolescence: Number of N-plants decrease half, unless new construction of N-plants.
    • Rise of prices of fossil fuels (oil, coal, natural gas, etc.); nuclear fuel also fluctuate according to the oil price.
  • Lifetime of Nuclear Plants: estimated by ISEP
  • decommission of N-plants
    • Nuclear Power Plants in Japan (54 units)
    • The above is estimated on the assumption that no new nuclear plants are constructed. Actually, it is getting much hard to construct them to obtain public acceptance after 3.11 disaster.
 

3. 原発の新しい現実

  • 日本の原発小史:
    • 1954:原子力予算 ¥235M
      (a parody of U235)
    • 1955: 原子力基本法:
      原子力3原則 (民主自主公開)
    • 1956/1/1: 原子力委員会 (初代委員長:正力松太郎)
    • 1956: 日本原子力研究所設立
    • 1957: 日本原子力発電(株)設立
    • 1963/10/26 東海村JPDR初発電
    • 1974: 電源三法; 電源開発促進法他
      • 原発交付金:829億円(2004)
      • 内、福島130、新潟121、復井113、青森89億円
    • 濃縮ウランは70%以上米国から
    • 現在:54基 (世界3位)
  • 原発の寿命40年:

>Top
4. Long-term forecast of Energy Source:

  • Long-term forecast of Energy Source Optimization <Fig.>:
    Source: by ISEP (Institute for Sustainable Energy Policies)
    • In a decade; Negawatt can be 30% and Sustainable energy 30%
    • And in 2050, Negawatt would be 50% and Sustainable energy 50%; no dependance on fossil energy.
    • Energy self sufficiency ratio would be 100% (from only 4% now)
  • Energy issue should converge on the following '21C type Paradigm Shift':
    • How to secure energy sources, considering environmental risk
    • How to promote Negawatt mindset
    • How to commit drastic increase of sustainable energy.
      • E.g..: Germany attained sustainable energy ratio from 65 to 17%, challenging to aim further 20% (from 17% to 35%).
    • How to promote local production & local consumption economics.
      • Sustainable energy is available in smaller size by distributed technology.
    • How to relate economic affluence and people's happiness.
  • Triple Decoupling Strategy:
    It is important to decouple or divide the two coupled issues, say, to gain energy resources usually causes adverse impact on surrounding environment, and so on.
    1. Decoupling of Environment and Energy resources;
    2. Decoupling of Energy resources and Economic development, and;
    3. Decoupling of Economic development and Happiness
  • 21C type Fourth Revolution is in process:
    • Worldwide investment for sustainable energy attained $230B (¥20T).
    • The investment is estimated to increase more than $2.2T (¥200T) in a decade.
    • The motivations are:
      • Short and sure return of investment
      • Contribution of local economy, including increase of new employment
      • Negawatt also contribute local economy and local employment.

4. 中長期のエネルギー源:

  • 中長期の電力エネルギーシフト:

energyresources

  • 3つの切り離し戦略

 

  • 21C型第4の革命

 

  • 発電容量:Generation capacity
  • 発電量:Power generation amount
  • 1GW x 24hr x 365 x 60% = 5.2TWh

>Top
5. Poor policy for Japanese sustainable energy:

  • Triple minorities in politicians:
    • Promoters of sustainable energies in Japan are regarded as minorities in triple meanings; ie., as 1) anti- Nuclear Power Plant faction, 2) pro-green energy faction, and 3) pro-leftist faction; further more the most zealous supporter was a woman politician, who is Ms. Mizuho Fukushima (coincidently same name of Fukushima Nuclear Plant), then the leader of Social Democratic Party of Japan.
    • 2000 was the decisive year in Japan and Germany:
      • Germany revised 1990 FIT law to Renewable Energy Act 2000 (EEG, Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz).
      • Japan prepared the similar Renewable Energy Act 2000 in Japan, which could not approved in the Diet. (called as the Imaginary Renewable Energy Act)
      • The mostly same act was authorised in the new cabinet (DPJ) in the morning of the destined day, 2011/3/11.
  • RPS (Renewable Portfolio Standard) vs. FIT (Feed In Tariff)
    • RPS supporting groups: UK, Netherlands; Electric companies
    • FIT supporting groups: Germany, Spain; Environmental NGO's, Sustainable energy industries
    • FIT system has been proved much successful than RPS in promoting sustainable energies.
  • Japanese RPS; "Devil is in the detail."
    • jpn_rps
    • Target ratio of sustainable energy from 0.3%/2002 to 1.35%/2010; this target ratio seem extraordinarily lower than UK (+10% in 1998) and Texas US (+15% in 19989
    • 0.3% increase in the first year 2003, then 1.3% in 2004: only 1% increase is set up, but actually this ratio will be the upper limit.
    • The target in the first year 2003 was 3.3 Two, but electric companies have already bought 4.1 TWh; The balance of actually bought quantity minus the target can be carried over the following year's target.; The target quantity will be easier and easier.
    • Thus, the target in 2007 will be fulfilled without actual buying of sustainable energy at all.

5. 日本の貧弱な再生可能エネルギー政策.

  • 再生可能エネルギーの推進者は
    3重の少数者

 

  • RPSとFITとの違い
    • 日本版RPSのまやかし
    • 悪魔は細部に潜む
    • 新エネルギー特別"阻止"法2003

>Top
6. Start from Fringe:

  • River of sustainable energy starts from local branch, then increase support of currency, and flows as a big river.
  • Start from National or from Local:
    • Nation top-down decision:
      • Sufficient human resources
      • Complicated and delayed decision process
      • Strong resistance from vested organizations
      • Distant from the field
      • Deviation from sense of common people
    • Local bottom-up decision:
      • Insufficient human resources:
      • Simple and quick decision process
      • Weak resistance from vested organizations
      • Near to the field
      • Closeness to sense of common people
  • start from sense of commpn people
  • Local Knowledge Core Center in Denmark:
    • DCE (Danish Centre for Environment and Energy):
      • functions as a think tank, making policy proposals on environment & energy, in collaboration with the Danish government & local communities, NGO/NPO, and venture capitals.
      • this centre was established after national argument on Nuclear energy in 1970s; Danish Electric Companies published their plan of establishing 15 nuclear power plants in Denmark.
      • Around 1984, Denmark finally canceled the plan of establishing nuclear plants.; 1979 TMI accident affected.
      • The centre was reformed to function as a think-tank of sustainable energy.
      • The world first offshore Wind power stations are owned by Copenhagen citizens.

6. 周縁からの開始

  • 周縁からのボトムアップ:
    • 乏しいリソース
    • 比較的単純な意思決定
    • 現場への近さ
    • 市民への近さ
      1. 小さな社会変革
      2. グリーン知識の移転
      3. 地域での変革
      4. 更なる改革
      5. 国の改革への応答
      6. 世界の反応
   
Comment
  • All sufferers, engineers and observers of the Fukushima Nuclear Power disaster could neither confirm the final convergence of the plants, nor what really happened at the nuclear plant site on 2011/3/11 while they are alive.
  • It would take several generations to complete the decommissioning of the crippled plants, as well as to regain the habitable land of the highly contaminated area to the original situation before the accident.
  • 'Decontamination' of the nuclear waist is even impossible; humans can only collect and control them separately only waiting its natural decaying, which usually takes ten times of half-life period to be intoxious, ie., Ce-137 requires 300 years.
  • 福島原発事故の全ての避難者、技術者、観察者は生存中に原発の最後の収束も、また2011/3/11に実際、原発現場で何が起こったのかを確認することもできないであろう。
  • プラントの廃炉が完了し、高汚染地域が事故前の元のように住めるようになるには何世代もかかるであろう。
  • 核廃棄物を"除染"することはそもそも不可能である。人間はそれ集めて分離保管し、自然崩壊を待つだけである。無毒化するまでの期間は通常は半減期の10倍、セシウム137なら300年かかる。

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