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The Rise & Fall of the Great Powers

Economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000

Category: HIS
Pub: 1987

Paul Kennedy



The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers


Economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000 1500 - 2000年の経済変化と軍事衝突
Paul Kennedy ポール・ケネディ


  1. Prologue:
  2. Strategy & economics in the preindustrial world:
  3. Chinese balancing act:
  4. The Japanese Dilemma:
  5. EEC - Potential and problems:
  1. プロローグ:
  2. 産業革命前の戦略と経済:
  3. 中国の綱渡り:
  4. 日本のジレンマ:
  5. EECその可能性と課題 :
  • When I stayed in 1990 at HBS (PMD), this book was one of the most popular book in the can (=students' same group), and frequently discussed this theme; particularly ris of Japan and fall of US.
  • Historical book has the value of sure eye and unique observation rather than correctness of statistics.
  • The real change of the world during the last two decades are beyond our imagination. Fact is stranger than fiction and histrical book.
  • Harvard Business School (PMDコース)にいた1990には、CAN (学生の同じグループ) で最も人気のあった本の一つで、よくこの本のテーマを討論した。特に、日本の興隆と米国の衰退について。
  • 歴史本は、統計数字の正確性より確かな観察眼に値がある。
  • 過去20年の世界の変化は、遙かに想像を超えるものだった。事実は小説や歴史書よりも奇なり。

>Top 0. Prologue:

  • This is a book about national and international powers in the "modern" - post-Renaissance period.
    • The "military conflict" referred to is always examined in the context of "economic change." How a Great Power's position steadily alters in peacetime is as important as how it fights in wartime.
  • 1660 -1815: It was in this complicated period that while certain former Great Powers like Spain and the Netherlands were falling into the second rank, there steadily emerged five major state (France, Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia) which came to dominate the diplomacy and warfare of 18C Europe.
  • Post-1815 decades: domestic instability in Russia and US. This relatively stable international scene allowed the British empire to rise to its zenith as a global power, in naval and colonial and commercial terms.
  • Pre-1914 period: traditional European Great Powers like France and Austria-Hungary, and a recently united one like Italy were falling out of the race. By contrast, the enormous, continent-wide states of US and Russia were moving to the forefront. Only Germany had the muscle to force its way into the select league of the future world Powers. Japan was intent upon being dominant in East Asia.
  • Post-1919: American withdrawal from foreign engagement, and the parallel Russian isolations. Despite spectacular early victories, the Axis nations could not in the end succeed against an imbalance of productive resources.

0. プロローグ:

  • 本書は「近代」即ちルネサンス以降の国家および国際的な力について記載している。
    • 「軍事衝突」とは常に「経済的変化」の文脈で検証する。大国の地位がいかに平時に変化したのかは、戦時の戦いと同じく重要である。
  • 1660-1815年:この時期はそれまでの西や蘭のような大国が二流となり、代わって5つの大国が登場してくる。仏・英・露・墺・プロシアが18世紀欧州の外交と戦争を支配するようになった。
  • 1815年以降数十年:仏、オーストリアハンガリーのような伝統的な欧州の大国と、近年統一されたイタリーのような国は競争から脱落しつつあった。対照的に大陸にまたがる巨大な国家である米国とロシアが前線に躍り出た。ドイツだけが将来の世界パワーの仲間入りを果たす力を持っていた。日本もまた東アジアの支配権を持とうとしていた。
  • 1919年以降:米国は孤立主義によって外国との関わりから手を引き、同時にロシアも孤立した。初期のすさましい勝利にも関わらず、同盟国は生産力の不均衡に対抗したが成功を収められなかった。
  • >Top The cold War: reinforced by the arrival of nuclear weapons and long-distance delivery systems.
  • The great Power is likely to spend much more on defense that it did two generations earlier, and yet still discover that the world is a less secure environment - simply because other Powers have grown faster, and are becoming stronger.
  • Both wealth and power are always relative: whether a nation be today mighty and rich or not depends not on the abundance or security of its power and riches, but principally on whether its neighbors possess more or less of it.
  • Over the last five centuries, it is not arguing that economics determines every event. Other things: geography, military organization, national morale, the alliance system, and may other factors can all affect the relative power of the members of the states system.
  • 冷戦:核兵器と長距離運搬システムの登場により強化された。
  • 大国は2世代前にくらべて防衛支出は凌駕しているにも関わらず、世界の安全な環境は確保できていない。それは他の大国がより迅速に力をつけてきているからである。
  • 富と力とは常に相対的である。今日の国家は強いか豊かであるかはその力や富の豊富さは安全には依存しない。むしろその隣国の力や富がそれ以上かそれ以下かに依存するからである。
  • 過去5世紀に亘って、経済がすべてであったとは主張していない。他の要素、即ち、地勢、軍事組織、国家倫理、連合システムなどの要素が国家システムのメンバー間の相対的な力関係に影響を及ぼすからである。

>Top 1. Strategy & economics in the preindustrial world:

  • >Top 1500:the divide between modern and premodern times.
    Europe's relative weaknesses were more apparent than its strength. It was neither the most fertile nor the most populous area in the world.
    • Over much of the western world there still hung the shock of the fall of Constantinople in 1453. The popes were coming to fear the Rome's fate would soon match that of Constantinople.
    • Unlike the Ottoman and Chinese empires, unlike the Moguls, there never was a united Europe. Some more powerful monarchies were arising in the west notably Spain, France, and England, but none was to be free of internal tensions and all regarded the others as rivals, rather than allies in the struggle against Islam.
    • A considerable part of the European cultural and scientific heritage was borrowed from Islam, just as Muslim societies had borrowed for centuries from China through the media of mutual trade, conquest, and settlement.

1. 産業革命前の戦略と経済:

  • 1500年:近代と前近代の分水嶺
    • 欧州は相対的にその強さより弱さが目立った。それは世界で最も肥沃な土地でもなく、最も人口の大きな場所でもなかった。
    • ほとんどの西欧世界は、1453年のコンスタンチノープルの陥落の衝撃をいまだに抱えている。ローマ教皇たちはローマがいずれコンスタンチノープルと同じ運命をたどることを恐れるようになっていた。
    • オスマントルコ、中国の帝国、ムガール帝国と異なり欧州には統一国家が存在しなかった。西・仏・英のような強力な王国が興ったが、いずれの王国も内部抗争と相互に敵対関係にあり、イスラム世界に対して統一的に対抗するには至らなかった。
    • 欧州の文化や科学上の遺産のかなりの部分がイスラムからの借用であった。イスラム社会もまたそれらを何世紀も前から中国から貿易、征服、移住を通じて借用してきたのである。
  • >Top Ming China:
    • In 15C: China's population 100-130 million compared with Europe's 50-50 million. United, hierarchic administration run by a well educated Confucian bureaucracy had given a coherence and sophistication to Chinese society. China had a habit of change its conquerors (Kublai Khan) much more than it was changed by them.
    • By later 11C, there existed an enormous iron industry in north China, producing around 125,000 tons per annum; far larger than the British iron output in early stages of the Industrial Revolution, seven centuries later! China was the first to invent true gunpowder and cannons were used by the Ming to overthrow their Mongol rulers in the late 14C.
    • The magnetic compass was another Chinese invention, some of their junks were as large as later Spanish galleons. In 1420, the Ming navy was recorded as possessing 1350 combat vessels. The most famous the overseas expeditions were undertaken by the admiral Cheng Ho between 1405 and 1433. But three years later an imperial edict banned the construction of seagoing ships.
    • Conservatism in the Ming period; concerned to preserve and recapture the past, not to create a brighter future.
    • 15Cの中国の人口は100-130百万、欧州は50-55百万。統一的、階層的な管理体制が儒教教育を受けた官僚組織が統一的で洗練された中国社会をもたらした。中国は侵略者によって変化を受ける以上に侵略者たち (フビライ汗) を変化させる傾向がある。
    • 11世紀末期までに中国北部での鉄の生産は年間約12万トンもあり、7世紀後の産業革命後の初期の英国の生産量を超えていたのだ。中国は最初に火薬と大砲を最初に発明し、明はモンゴルの支配者を14世紀末に駆逐した。
    • 羅針盤もまた中国の発明であった。中国のジャンク (平底帆船)は後のスペインのがレオン船と同程度の大きさだった。1420年の明の海岸は戦闘船を1350艘保有していたと記録にある。最も有名な航海は鄭和によって1404-1433の間に実施された。しかし3年後には勅命によって海洋船の建造が禁止された。
    • 明の時期の保守主義:過去を維持し再現することに腐心し、明るい未来を創造しようとはしなかった。
  • >Top The Muslim World:
    • The most rapidly expanding forces in world affairs during 16C; not only were the Ottoman Turks pushing westward, but the Safavid dynasty in Persia was also enjoying a resurgence of power, prosperity, and high culture. Ismail I (1500-1524) and Abbas I (1587-1629) controlled the ancient Silk Road via Kashgar and Turfan to China. The king of Kabul, Babur established the Mogal Empire in 1526.
    • Suleiman I (1520-1566) besieging Vienna. Sultan Mehmet blockaded with large galleys and hundreds of smaller craft to assault Constantinople in 1453. The Ottoman system of recruiting future janissaries from Christian youth in the Balkans.
    • Ottoman supervised 14 million subjects; this at a time when Spain had 5 million and England a mere 2.5 million inhabitants. Constantinople was bigger than any european city of 500,000 inhabitants in 1600.
    • Ottoman imperialism, unlike that of the Spanish, dutch, and English later, did not bring much in the way of economic benefit.
    • The system, like that of Ming China, increasingly suffered from some of the defects of being centralized, despotic, and severely orthodox in its attitude toward initiative, dissent, and commerce.
    • Suffering from the newer weaponry of European forces, the janissaries were slow to modernize themselves. Their bulky cannons were not replaced by the lighter cast-iron guns. After the defeat at Lepanto (1571), they did not build the larger European type of vessels.
  • イスラム世界
    • 16世紀に世界も最も急速に拡張:西側へ押し出したオスマントルコのみならす、ペルシャのサファーヴィ朝も復活し権勢と繁栄と高い文化を誇っていた。特にイスマイリ1世 (1500-24) およびアッバス1世 (1527-1629) は昔のカシュガルやトルファン経由で中国までのシルクロードを支配した。カブールの王バーバルは1526年にムガール帝国を樹立。
    • スレイマン1世 (1520-66) ウィーンを攻撃。ムハメット2世はガレー船や数百の小舟でコンスタンチノープルを封鎖 (1453) 。オスマントルコは、バルカン半島のキリスト教徒の若者をイェンチェリとして 兵士に採用。
    • オスマントルコは14百万を支配した。当時スペインは5百万、イングランドは2.5百万の人口だった。コンスタンチノープルは1600年では欧州最大の都市で人口50万人だった。
    • その体制は明王朝と同様に、創意工夫、異論、商活動に対する姿勢についても中央専制主権、伝統重視の欠点がますます明らかになった。
    • 欧州のより新たな武器の被害を受けてもイェニチェリ部隊は自身の近代化には鈍かった。トルコの分厚い大砲はより軽い鋳鉄の銃に変更されることはなかった。レパントの海戦の敗北の後、より大きな欧州型の船を建造することはなかった。
  • >Top Mogul empire:
    • The above remarks about conservatism could be made with equal or even greater force about the Mogul empire. A conquering Muslim elite lay on top of a vast mass of poverty-stricken peasants chiefly adhering to Hinduism.
    • The sheer rigidity of Hindu religions taboos militated against modernization: rodents and insects could not be killed, so vast amounts of foodstuffs were lost; the cast system throttled initiative, instilled ritual, and restricted the market.(obscurantism)
    • Tax collectors, required to provide fixed sums for their masters, preyed mercilessly upon peasant and merchant alike.
  • ムガール帝国
    • 保守主義に関する上記の指摘はムガール帝国でも同等かそれ以上であった。イスラムの支配層が圧倒的多数の貧困のあえぐ、主にヒンズー教徒農民の上に君臨していた。
    • ヒンズー教の厳格な宗教的タブーが近代化を阻害していた。膨大な食料が失われているのにネズミや昆虫を殺さなかったのである。カースト制度は創造力を窒息させ、習慣を強要し市場を制限した(反啓蒙主義)。
    • 収税吏は、上部への一定額を納入するばよかったので、農民や商人に対しては無慈悲な徴税略奪を行った。

>Top 2. Chinese balancing act:

  • History and Speculation:
    • Even if there always were many methodological difficulties in dealing with "historical facts," past events did indeed occur. Nothing one can say about the future has that certainty. Unforeseen happenings, sheer accidents, the halting of a trend, can ruin the most plausible of forecasts; if they do not, then the forecaster is mere lucky.
    • Many a final chapter in works dealing with contemporary affairs has to be changed, in the wisdom of hindsight, only a few years later; it will be surprising if this present chapter survives unscathed.
    • The speed of this global economic change has not been a uniform one, simply because the pace of technological innovation and economic growth is itself irregular, conditioned by the circumstance of the individual inventor and entrepreneur as well as by climate, disease, wars, geography, the social framework, and so on.
    • The intellectual breakthroughs from the time of the Renaissance onward, during the Enlightenment and industrial Revolution, simply meant that the dynamics of change would be increasingly more powerful and self-sustaining than before.

2. 中国の綱渡り:

  • 歴史と推測:
    • 歴史的事実の扱いについては、多くの方法論上の困難があるにせよ、過去の出来事は事実起こったことである。未来についてはそのように確定的なことは言えない。予期せぬ出来事、単なる事故、動向の停止などが多くの予想を裏切ることになる。そうでないとしても、予想屋の運が良かったに過ぎない。
    • 現在を扱うこの最終章の多くは、後智恵によって変更されるになろう。もし本章が無傷で残るとすれば驚きである。
    • 世界の経済変動の速度は一定ではなかった。それは技術革新や経済成長自身が、個々の発明者や企業家の環境、また気候、病気、戦争、地理的状況、社会構造などによって条件によって異なったことによる。
    • ルネサンス以降、啓蒙時代や産業革命時代を通じて、知的な急進展は変化の力学が、それ以前に比べて一層強力かつ自立的になったことである。
  • >Top The second major argument has been that this uneven pace of economic growth has had crucial long-term impacts upon the relative military power and strategic position.
    • The rising and falling of the various empires and states has been confirmed by the outcomes of the major Great power wars, where victory has always gone to the side with the greatest material resources.
    • The very structures of international production and trade are changing faster than ever before; with agricultural and raw-materials products losing their relative value, with knowledge-intensive goods becoming dominant, and with world capital flows becoming increasingly detached from trade patterns.
    • The rise of the Pacific region is likely to continue, simply because that development is so broad-based. Economic growth in this vast area has been stimulated by a happy combination of factors; a spectacular rise in industrial productivity by export-oriented societies, in turn leading to great increases in foreign trade,
    • In 1960, the combined GDP of the Asian-pacific countries (excluding US) was a mere 7.8% of world GDP; by 1982, it had more than double, to 16.4%. It is very likely to contain over 20% of world GDP by 2000 - the equal of Europe, or US.
    • The center of world economic gravity is shifting rapidly towards Asia and the Pacific,
  • Spiraling cost of the arms race:
    • Bombers cost 200 times as much as they did in World War II. fighters cost 100 times or more. Aircraft carriers are 20 times as expensive. Battle tanks are 15 times as expensive. Gato class submarine cost $5,500 per ton in World War II, compared with $1.6M per ton for the Trident.
    • World arms imports of a colossal $35B had exceeded the world trade in grain ($33B).
    • World military expenditures had reached a total of about $940B (1985), rather more than the entire income of the poorer half of this planet's population. That expenditure on weapons wa rising faster than the global economy.
    • It seems increasingly difficult to argue against the proposition that excessive arms spending will hurt economic growth.
  • 第二の論点としては、経済成長の不均衡は長期的には相対的な軍事力や戦略的位置関係に決定的な影響をもたらしたことにある。
    • さまざまな帝国の興亡は主な大国間の戦争の結果であり、その結果はいつも多物量資源のある側の勝利であった。
    • 国際的な生産と貿易は以前より急速に変化している。農業は原料生産の価値が減少すると共に、知識ベースの製品が主要になり、世界の金融も貿易のパターンとは急速にかけ離れたきた。
    • 太平洋地域の興隆は、発展が広範囲に及んでいるのでおそらく継続する。広い範囲での経済成長は輸出指向の工業生産が、さらに貿易の増加をもたらすという組合せによって経済成長が実現される。
    • 1960年には、米国を覗く太平洋地域のGDPは7.8%に過ぎなかったが、1982年には16.4%に倍増し、おそらく2000年までには、欧米と同じく、世界のGDPの20%を超えよう。
    • 世界の経済の中心は急速にアジア太平洋地域にシフトしつつある。
  • 軍事費の加速的な増加:
    • 第二次大戦時と比べて、爆撃機は200倍、戦闘機は100倍以上、空母は20倍、戦車は15倍、ガトー型潜水艦は、当時$5,500/トンだったが、現在のトライデント型は$1.6M/トン。
    • 世界の武器輸入は、$35Bで、世界穀物取引 ($33B)よりも大きい。
    • 世界の軍事費(1985) は、合計$940Bで、これはこの地球上の貧しい方の半数の全収入より大きい。しかもその支出は世界経済より急速に増加中。
    • 過剰な軍事支出は経済成長を阻害するという主張に反論するのはますます困難。
  • >Top Merchant states:
    • Japan, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Sweden, and Austria: which have taken advantage of the great growth in world production an din commercial interdependence since 1945, and whose external policy emphasizes peaceful, trading relations with other societies.
    • They all sought to keep defense spending as low as is compatible with the preservation of nation sovereignty, thereby freeing resources for high domestic consumption and capital investment.
  • Warrior states:
    • On the other hand, there are various militarized economies - Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Israel, USSR - all of which allocate more than 10% of their GNP to defense expenditures each year.
  • Threefold one:
    • simultaneously to provide military security for its national interests, and to satisfy the socioeconomic needs of its citizenry, and to ensure sustained growth.
    • A country whose productivity growth lags 1% behind other countries over one century can turn, as England did, from the world's indisputed industrial leader into the mediocre economy.
    • Basic argument remains: without a rough balance between these competing demands of defense, consumption, and investment, a Great Power is unlikely to preserve its status for long.
  • 通商国家:
    • 日本、香港、スイス、スウェーデン、オーストリアは、1945年以降世界の生産と通商の相互依存の中で経済成長を謳歌。
    • それらの国々は軍事費を独立維持の必要な最低限に留めて、国内消費と資本投資のための資源を優先。
  • 軍事国家:
    • ベトナム、イラン、イラク、イスラエル、ソ連はそれぞれGNPの10%上を毎年軍事費に支出。
  • 三重目標:
    • 国益を保持する為の軍事費、国民の社会経済的なニーズの充足、および持続的な成長
    • 他国に比べて1%低い成長率を1世紀続けると、世界リーダーから二流経済へ転落 (英国の例)
    • 基本的な論点:国防、消費、投資の大凡のバランスを保てなければ、大国は長くはその地位を保持できない。
  • >Top China's Balancing Act:
    • Weaknesses in China's combat effectiveness, due to the Maoist attacks upon professionalism in the army and the preference for peasant militias.
    • Economically China appears still further behind; its official per capita GNP; can hardly be more than a mere $500, compared with well over $13,000 form many of the advance capitalist states, and $5,000+ for USSR.
      • Re: Nominal GDP per capita 2009 statistics:
        US $46K, Japan $40K , UK $35K, Taiwan $16K, Russia $9K, China $ 3,735
    • Difficulties of governing such a populous state, of reconciling the various factions (party, army, bureaucrats, farmers), and of achieving growth without social and ideological turbulence.
    • China's internal history of the past century doe not offer encouraging precedents for long-term strategies of development.
    • Deng Xioping's leaders hip may one day be seen in the way that historians view Colbert's France, or the early stage of Frederick the Great's reign, or Japan in the post Meiji Restoration decades; as a country straining to develop its power by every pragmatic means.
    • Planned reduction of PLA (People's Liberation Army) from 4.2 to 3M personnel, since far too many of them were merely support troops, used for railway-building and civic duties.
    • The navy, in 1980 an 18 vessel task force undertook an 8,000 nautical mile mission in the South Pacific. The first significant demonstration of Chinese sea power since Cheng Ho's cruises of the early 15C. As early as 1980, China was testing ICBMs with a range of 7,000 nautical miles.
    • Chinese defense spending of the proportion of GNP: perhaps 17.4% in 1971 to 7.5% in 1985.
    • Defense has to remain the fourth of China's "four modernizations" behind agriculture, industry, and science.
      • Peace is central to Deng's economic strategy; war, even of a regional sort, would divert resources into the armed services and alter the order of priority among China's four modernizations.
    • >Top East Asian methods of wet-rice cultivation are inordinately productive in yields, but are also extremely labor-intensitive Agriculture forms over 30% of China's GDP and employs 70% of the population. Already China is attempting to feed a billion people on only 250M acres of arable land (compared with US's 400M ares for its 230M population). Deng's encouragement of market-oriented reforms, together with large increases in agricultural purchase prices, have led to tremendous rises in food production over the past half-decade. (Green revolution) 800M Chinese in rural areas increased their incomes by about 70%.
      • Even the reduced growth rate are 7.5% annually, which would double in less than 10 years. (10% rate would do the same in a mere 7 years.)
    • Only now is China beginning to shake off the consequences of the Cultural Revolution; it would take some time to catch up on the scientific and technological progress made elsewhere.
    • The sheer size of the domestic market of a continent-wide Power such as China, and of its population and raw-materials base, make it highly unlikely that it would become as dependent upon overseas commerce.
    • Beijing is clearly determined not to become dependent upon foreign capital, manufactures, or markets, or upon any one country or supplier in particular.
    • The ideal position is to be equidistant between the two (US and USSR), and to have them both wooing the Middle Kingdom.
  • 中国の綱渡り:
    • 中国の戦闘能力の弱点:毛沢東主義で軍事専門家を攻撃し、農民による民兵を優遇した。
    • 経済的には中国はまだ後進国で一人当たりGDPはまだ$500程度。多くの先進資本主義国が$13,000で、ソ連でさえ$5000超。
      • Re: 名目一人当たりGDP 2009:
        米国 $46K, 日本 $40K ,英国$35K, 台湾 $16K, ロシア $9K、中国 $ 3,735
    • 人口の多い国は各派 (党・軍・官僚・農民)の合意を得て、社会、思想的混乱なく経済成長達成することは難しい。
    • 過去の中国は発展の長期戦略の先例がない。
    • 但し、邓小平のリーダーシップによって、コルベールの仏、初期のフレデリック大王時代、明治維新後の日本のように現実路線での力の増大に集中したと見なせる。
    • 人民解放軍を4.2Mから3Mに計画的に減員した。実際には圧倒的多くが支援部隊で鉄道建設や民間の仕事に携わっている。
    • 1980年には、海軍は18隻の機動部隊で南太平洋の8,000海里での活動開始。これは15Cの鄭和 (Zhèng Hé)以来の海軍力の誇示となった。1980年代初めには7,000海里のICBMの実験を実施。
    • 中国のGNP比の国防費:おそらく17.4% (1971)から7.5% (1985)程度
    • 国防は中国の4つの近代化、即ち、農業、工業、科学に次いで4番目。
      • 平和は、邓小平の経済戦略の中心課題。戦争は、地域紛争であっても中国の4つの近代化の優先度の変更を迫ることになる。
    • 東アジアの米作は単位面積当たりの生産量が多いが、同時に極端に労働集約的である。中国の農業は、GDPの30%だが、人口の70%が従事している。現在、中国は耕作面積250M acre(1acre = 0.4ha)で10億人を養っている。(米国は400M acreで2.3億人) 邓小平は、農業には購入価格引き上げと合わせた市場価格への改革実施。 その結果、食料増産(緑の革命)し、8億人の地方の収入を70%増加させた。
      • 年率7.5%成長であっても10年間で倍増。10%成長であれば、7年で倍増達成。
    • 現在、中国は文化大革命の欠点を克服しつつあり、科学技術進歩に追いつくには若干の時間を要する。
    • 中国のような大陸国家で、その大きな国内市場や人口、天然資源ゆえに、海外貿易に依存する国とはならない。
    • 北京は明らかに害し、製造、市場などと他の特定の供給国に依存しない決意を固めた。
    • 米ソ二強の間での等距離を維持し、どちらからも秋波を送られる王国を目指す。

>Top 3. The Japanese Dilemma:

  • The very fact that Beijing is so purposeful about what is to happen in East Asia increases the pressures now bearing down upon Japan's "omnidirectional peaceful diplomacy."
  • The best thing that could happen from Tokyo's viewpoint would be for the continuation of those factors which caused "the Japanese miracle." But precisely because this is an anarchic world in which "dissatisfied" powers jostle alongside "satisfied" ones, and because the dynamic of technological and commercial change is driving so fast, the likelihood is that those favorable factors will diminish - or even disappear altogether.
  • For over 40 years the Japanese homeland has been protected by US nuclear and conventional forces. Thus enabled Japan to redirect its national energies from militaristic expansion and its resources from high defense spending, Japan has devoted itself to the pursuit of sustained economic growth, especially in export markets. This success could not have been achieved without entrepreneurship, quality control, and hard work, but it was also aided by : holding-down of the yen to an artificially low level for decade after decade; the restrictions upon the purchase of imported foreign manufactures.
  • Japanese very success is already provoking a "scissors effect" reaction against its export-led expansion.The one blade of those scissors is the emulation of Japan by other ambitious Asian NICs. All of these countries have far lower labor costs than Japan, and are challenging strongly in fields in which the Japanese no longer enjoy decisive advantages - textiles, toys, domestic goods, shipbuilding, even steel and automobiles.
  • Japan need to move "up-market" they are withdrawing from the bottom end of a production spectrum. MITI (renamed METI since 2001) is to plan the phasing out of industries which are no longer competitive, also to arrange for the transfer of resources and personnel into other, more competitive sectors of the international economy.
  • More worrying blade of the scissors has been the increasingly hostile reaction of Americans and Europeans to the seemingly inexorable penetration of their domestic markets by Japanese products. Year after year, Japan's trading surpluses with EEC and US have widened. Washington's demand for measures to reduce the imbalance - e.g., to encourage a rise in the exchange value of the yen, a substantial increase in American imports into Japan, and so on.
  • The swift rise in the value of the yen could mean the end of Japan's export-led boom, a decline in its payments surpluses, a slowing-down in its growth rate become more "mature" and its potential for spectacular expansion diminishes.
  • Japanese age structure of its population, by 2010 it will have the lowest ratio of working-age people (15-64 years old) among the leading industrial nations, which will require high social security outlays and could lead to a loss of dynamism.
  • As a country so incredibly dependent upon imported raw material, it benefits enormously from the changing terms of trade which have reduced the prices of so many ores, fuels, and foodstuffs; the drop in world oil prices after 1980-81, which saves Japan billions of dollars of foreign currency each year.
  • A rapid appreciation in the value of the yen is likely to cut some of the country's exports overseas, it also greatly reduces the cost of imports - and thus helps industry to stay competitive and inflation to remain low.

3. 日本のジレンマ:

  • 東アジアにおいては、北京が断固とした政策に対して、日本の全方位平和外交という構図
  • 東京にとっての最善なことは、"日本の奇跡"の要素が継続することである。しかしそれ故に、現状に不満の勢力は満足の勢力と衝突する。また特に、技術やビジネスの変化が急激なので有利な条件は減殺するか全くなくなることもある。
  • 40年間以上は、日本本土は米国の核や通常兵器に守られてきた。これによって国家のエネルギーを軍事的な拡張から経済成長特に輸出へ向けることが出来た。この成功はもちろん企業や品質管理、熱心が仕事もあり、また円の低い為替レートは輸入増加の抑制となってきた。
  • 日本は、輸出主導による拡大の成功では、すでにダブル反響を引き起こしている。一つはアジアNIC諸国が、日本よりも低賃金であることを活かして、繊維、玩具、家庭用品、造船、あるいは鉄橋や自動車まで競争に参入した。
  • 日本は生産をより高級品向け市場にシフトする必要に迫られた。通産省は競争力のない分野から撤退してより競争力のある分野に経営資源を投入するように計画した。
  • もう一つの反響は、対日赤字が毎年増加する毎に、欧米は、日本製品の流入に敵対するようになった。米国は円レートの上昇を要求することで、米国製品の日本市場への輸入を促した。
  • 円レートの急激な上昇は、日本の輸出競争力を奪い、日本の貿易黒字は縮小し、経済成長も鈍化し、急成長は止まって成熟経済となった。
  • 日本の人口構造も2010年までには生産性人口 (15-64歳まで)は先進国中最少比率となり、社会の活性化の低下を招いた。
  • 日本は多くの資源の海外依存度が異常に高く、鉱石、燃料、食料の価格下落によって貿易条件が極端に変動する。1980-81の石油価格の下落によって日本は何十億ドルも得をした。
  • 円レートの急激な上昇によって輸出力はそがれるものの、輸入価格が下がり、企業は競争力を維持し、インフレも低いレベルとなった。
  • >Top Japanese Strengths: "Oil Information Research Saves Market Work."
  • 0) The 1973 Oilcrisis:
    • stimulated the Japanese into searching for all sorts of energy economies, which contribute to the still great efficiency of its industry. In the past decade alone, Japan has reduced its dependence on oil by 25%.
    • More significant still is the continued surge of Japanese industry toward the most promising sectors of the economy; that is, high technology. It clearly intends to be a leading force in those scientifically advanced manufactures which have a much higher added value.
  • 1) Computer and its software: Information
    • Japan's determined move into two fresh fields. The first is the production of advanced computers ("fifth generation" supercomputers), which can work hundreds of times faster than the largest existing machines.
    • The same is also happening in the field of computer software, where again American firms and a few European firms were unchallenged until the early 1980s.
    • The most important will be the impressive lead which Japan has in the field of industrial robots and its development of entire factories virtually controlled by computers. lasers, and robots; the ultimate solution to the country's decreasing labor force. Japan continued to introduce about as many industrial robots as the rest of the world combines, several times the rate of introduction in US.
  • 2) R&D: Research
    • one of the most important of all in explaining the rise and fall of particular firms and industries is the large and increasing amount to money which is allocated to research and development in Japan. The proportion of GNP devoted to R&D will virtually double this decade, rising from 2% in 1980 to an 3.5% by 1990. (US has stabilized R&D expenses at about 2.7% of GNP) Even more interesting is the fact that a far high proportion of Japanese R&D is paid for and done by industry itself than in Europe and US where so much is done by governments or universities. "Pure" science is left to others, and tapped only when its commercial relevance becomes clear.
  • 3) Higher national saving:
    • The very high level of national savings in japan, which is especially marked compared with that in US. US have traditionally encouraged personal borrowing and consumer spending and in Japan encourage private savings. In Japan pension schemes are usually less generous
    • The share of GNP which is collected in Japan both as income tax and social security payments is much lower than in the other major captalist-cum-welfare state society.
  • 4) Guaranteed home market:
    • Japanese firms have a virtually guaranteed home market in all except prestige and specialized manufactures. While much of this was aided by in-built bureaucratic practices and regulations designed to favor Japanese producers in their home market; high quality and familiarity of Japanese products, a strong cultural pride, and the complex structure of domestic distribution ands sales will ensure that.
  • 5) High quality of Japanese work force:
    • The is the very high quality of the Japanese work force at least as measured by various mathematical and scientific aptitude tests. Even 15 year olds in Japan show a marked superiority in testable subjects (e.g., mathematics) over most of their western counterparts Japan has dearth of Nobel Prize scientists, but it produces many more engineers than any western country (about 50% more than US itself). It also has nearly 700K R&D workers, which is more than Britain, France and West Germany have combines.
  • 日本の強み:
  • 0) 1973年の石油ショック:
    • 省エネ経済への志向が高まり、産業の効率化に貢献した。過去十年間で、日本は石油依存度を25%節約。
    • 更に重要なことは、日本は経済の有望分野、特にハイテク分野に注力し、付加価値の大きい先進的な製造分野のリーダーを目指した。
  • 1) IT分野
    • 2つの分野での参入。最初は第5世代コンピュータによるスパコン分野の共同研究。
    • (注:1980年代にICOTへ570億円/10年間投資。喧伝した割には成果乏しい)
    • もう一つはコンピュータソフトウェアの分野。欧米では1980年代初期までは未挑戦分野だった。
    • 日本は産業用ロボットでは最先端。コンピュータとレーザーとロボットから成る無人工場もある。日本はロボットの導入で労働力不足を補えるかも。日本のロボット津入は、世界の半数に達する。
  • 2) 研究開発:
    • 企業や産業の興隆にはR&Dが最重要である。日本のR&DのGNP比は、1980年には2%、1990年には3.5%。米国はGNPの2.7%でほぼ横ばい。但し、日本のR&D投資はほとんどが民間企業で、欧米のように政府や大学の投資は少ない。従って純粋科学への投資は少なく製品化し易い分野への投資が多い。
  • 3) 貯蓄率:
    • 米国に比べて日本では国民の貯蓄率が高い。米国は伝統的に、借入や消費を優遇してきたが、日本は逆に貯蓄を優遇してきた。
    • 日本では、所得税および社会保険の費用が占めるGNP比率は、北欧諸国に比べて圧倒的に低い。
  • 4) 保証された国内市場:
    • 一部を除いて、日本の国内市場は日本企業にとっては保証された市場。官僚や法律の支援もあり、また日本製品の高品質は親和性、強い文化的要因など複雑な市場がそうさせている。
  • 5) 高品質な労働市場:
    • 日本の労働力は優秀である。15歳の数学などの脳力も他の西欧諸国に比べて高い。ノーベル賞受賞者以外にもエンジニアが多く70万人もいる。これは英仏独合計よりも多い。

>Top 4. EEC - Potential and problems:

  • Europe - the only not a sovereign nation-state:
    • members of EEC, but not of the chief military alliance (NATO)
    • similar to the members of the German Federation (German Confederation, or Deutscher Bund) in mid-19C.
      • composed of Austrian Empire and Kingdom of prussia and other 32 states as well as 4 free cities, totaling 34 members.
    • If that enlarged economic community was able to turn into itself into a Power state it would be a major new actor in the international system. But so long as that transformation did not occur; so long as there were divisions among the members of the customs union about further economic integration and still more, about political and military integration.
    • The German question of 19C wa a microcosm of the European problem of the present.
    • With the adherence of Spain and Portugal, its 12 member population now totals around 320M.
    • The total GNP of EEC is about equal (1980, 1986) to that of USA, or about 2/3 as big (1983-84 ) , certainly far larger than Russia, Japan, or China.
    • In military terms, taking only the four largest countries into account, the spending upon military forces represents around 4% of GNP as a rough average. Were the entire EEC spending around 7% of total GNP on defense, as US is today, the sums allocated would be equal to hundreds of billion of dollars - roughly the same amount as the two military superpowers spend.
    • The armed forces, not only suffer from a multitude of languages, but are equipped with many different weapons and have very marked differences in quality and training.
    • Although the coordination of currencies is now more successful than it was, the occasional realignments which do take place are a reminder of the separate fiscal system of the members.
  • Growth in Real GNP, 1979-83: gnp1979_83
    • Europe is beginning to stagnate, and perhaps even to decline.
    • The oil crisis of 1979 caused general world depression in demand, output, and trade - seemed to hit the European harder than many of the other major economcs.
    • One of the chief concerns of EEC has been the effect of this slump upon employment levels.

4. EEC:その可能性と課題:

  • 欧州:唯一の主権国家でない地域
    • EECのメンバーとNATOメンバーとは異なる
    • 19C半ばのドイツ連邦 (ドイツ同盟)に似ている。
      • オーストリア帝国とプロイセンを含むドイツ連邦は32の国と4自由都市がゆるい同盟関係。
    • 拡大した経済同盟が一つのパワー国家に発展するには新たな大プレーヤが必要となる。関税同盟から始まり、更に経済統合から政治・軍事統合に至るまでには長い変化の道のりが必要。
    • 19Cのドイツ連邦は、現在の欧州問題の縮図である。
    • スペイン、ポルトガルを加えると12ヶ国合計の人口は320Mとなる。
    • EECのGNP合計は米国に匹敵するか (1980, 86)、またはその2/3程度 (1983-84)もあり、ロシアや中国よりも大きい。
    • 軍事分野ついては、4大国ではGNPの4%を支出しているが、現在の米国がGNPの7%程度まで増やすとすれば、2大超大国と同額レベルになる。
    • 軍事力については、多言語の困難に比べて、大きく異なるの武器体系&でいかに訓練するかが問題。
    • 通貨の調整はうまくいっているが、今後は、メンバー各国の別個の財政制度が繰り返し課題として喚起されている。
  • Long time has passed since I encountered this great book:
  • Not reading through this must book has weighed on my conscience.
  • In 1990, I imagined the rise of Japan, and fall of US, but in 2011, the fall of both seems not unrealistic.
  • この名著にであってからずいぶん長い時間が経過した。
  • この必読本を読み終えなかったことがずっと心の重荷になっていた。
  • 1990年には日本の興隆と米国の衰退を想像したが、2011年には両国の衰退も非現実的とは言えなくなってきた。

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