| Bottom | Home | Article | Bookshelf | Keyword | Author | Oxymoron |


Balance Sheet Recession in Japanese economy

Cat: ECO
Pub: 2001
#: 0117b

Richard C. Koo


Balance Sheet Recession in Japanese economy



Richard C. Koo



Oct. 2001


  • Among many economists debating controversial issues how to recover Japanese economy, Mr. Richard C. Koo of Nomura Research Institute seems one of the leaders with most persuasive opinions.
  • The keyword of this book is "Fallacy of Composition.": Everyone is doing the right thing trying to repair their balance sheets in the face of massive decline in asset prices. It is impossible to tell people not to clean up their balance sheets. It it the function of the government who can only offset demand lost in such process.
  • 日本経済復活のための論争している多くの経済学者の中で、野村総研リチャード・クーは最も説得力のある意見をもつリーダの一人である。
  • この本のキーワードは「合成の誤謬」である。誰もが大幅な資産価値の下落に対しバランスシートを回復しようと正しい行動にでる。人々のバランスシートの改善をするなと言うことはできない。このプロセスを通じて失われた需要の穴を埋められるのは唯一政府の機能である。


(Note: The exchange rate is simplely converted as $1=\100)

1. Balance Sheet Recession:

  • Two large wheels have carried Japanese economy since postwar through 1980s.:
    • Higher saving rate of Japanese household
    • Higher investment rate of Japanese corporations
  • However, bubble economy collapsed in Japan, and the value of asset has slumped since 1990.
    • Stock price: about 20% of the peak
    • land price: about 83% down in urban areas
    • golf membership: about 90% down
  • Action of corporate sector:
    • shift from maximization of profit to minimization of debt
    • the sole concern is to repair their balance sheets (=contracted equilibrium)

<Fund supply and demand - Nominal Ratio of GDP> Source: Bank of Japan

  • Note:
  • Corporate sector (except financial circles) (red line):
    • Corporations borrowed money total $100B, 10% of GDP every year and promoted development of new products, investment of facilities, and investment for land.
    • Today in 1999 after a decade, corporations are repaying $200B, to the tune of 4% of GDP.
    • Demand for funds has fallen: 14% of GDP over 10 years period
  • Household (blue line):
    • The trend of saving rate of household is almost unchanged; 7-8% of GDP.
    • It is misunderstood that peoples increase money savings and curb consumption because of feeling of future uncertainty.
  • Present Japan resembles the Great Depression in US in 1929-33, both suffered similar balance sheet depression.
    • Then President Hoover adopted contracted equilibrium policy, causing US economy to shrink to half in GDP, stock prices 10%, and unemployment rate 22%.

注)為替はYen 100/$1にて表現


  • 日本経済を動かしてきた2つの車輪が、戦後から1980年代まではうまくかみ合ってきた。
    • 日本人の高い貯蓄率:
    • 企業の高い投資率:
  • ところが、1990年からバブルが崩壊し、資産価格の暴落がはじまった。
    • 株価:ピーク時の数分の一
    • 土地:大都市で83%減
    • ゴルフ会員権:90%減
  • 企業行動:
    • 利益最大化から債務の最小化へ
    • ひたすらバランスシート修復という縮小均衡へ注力


  • 法人企業(非金融)(赤線):
    • 十年前はGDPの10%、毎年10兆円を借入れ、新商品開発、設備投資、不動産投資を実施。
    • 10年後の今日、1999年にはGDPの4%、20兆円を返済
    • 資金需要減:合計GDPの14%(10年間)
  • 家計(青線):
    • 個人の貯蓄もGDP比7-8%でほとんど変化なし
    • 一般消費者が、将来に不安を感じ貯蓄を殖やし、消費を抑制しているから不景気であるという議論は誤り
  • 今の日本は、1929-33年の米国の大恐慌のときのバランスシート不況と同じ
    • 当事のフーバー大統領がこの縮小均衡策を採った結果、米国のGDPは半分に、株価は10%に、失業率は22%


2. Fiscal spending is indispensable:

  • Zero growth economy has been sustained by government financial support:
    • Depreciation of asset during the last decade amounts $13,000B (equivalent to 2.5 times of GDP)
    • During this period, Japanese government stimulated economy spending $1,400B to defend deflationary spiral, where $500B was spent from government budget.
    • This became one of the most success stories of Japanese economy; only $500B budget dike defended flood of deflation of $13,000B.
    • During this period, corporations succeeded to contract debt amount; the balance of debt of corporations decreased $1,020B in 2000 from its peak in 1995.
    • Japan should continue financial deficit at least until 2003 to sustain its economy. It may delay in recovery because of additional decline of stock price of $1,000B since the start of Koizumi cabinet.
  • Vicious cycle of Hashimoto cabinet in 1997-8:
    • Financial spending: $150B decreased (increase of consumption tax, repeal of special allowances of corporation tax, increase of social security, suspension of large supplementary budget)
    • Thereafter, Japanese economy registered five consecutive terms of negative growth. ("Near meltdown situation")
    • Financial deficit upsurged from $220B in 1996 to $370B in 1999.
  • President F. D. Roosevelt after Helvert Hoover's mistake:
    • Recovering economy by stimulative finance from 1933, such as New Deal Policy.
    • In 1937, shifting to financial reforms, US economy collapsed again; becoming half of stock price, 70% of mineral and industrial production, and upsurge of unemployment.
  • Koizumi cabinet (Takenaka Minister of Financial Policy)
    "No economic recovery without structural reforms."
    • Similar policy as President Hoover (Andrew Mellon, Secretary of the Treasury)
      "Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate real estate... It will purge the rottenness out of the system... Values will be adjusted, and enterprising people will pick up the wrecks..."
    • The release of Depost Pay-Off suspension aimed to select banks may bring the situation worse.
  • Author's opinion:
    The main cause of the recession is deficiency of demand caused by >Top fallacy of composition.
    • "Neutral thesis of finance" will be formed:
      People's behavior of continuous saving will not relate to financial position whether it is surplus or deficit. Thus, decrease of financial deficit will not necessarily decrease savings and increase consumption.
    • The real anxiety of people is not the financial deficit but the discharge caused by restructure of the company.
    • Especially, after Sept. 11, 2002, supplementary budget (including government expenses of $50-100B) will be necessary to cover the fall of export to US.
  • Active financial policy of Obuchi cabinet (1998.10-2000.4)
    • Aggregate market value of stocks: $2,130B increase
    • The financial institutions share 14.5% = $310B capital gain.
    • The financial institutions have $437B of government bond. As the yield raised to 1.775% from 0.845%, capital loss arose about $30B. Considering these factors, the capital gain became $280B.
  • Six months after Koizumi cabinet (2001.3 - 2001. 9):
    • Aggregate market value of stocks: $1,000 decrease
    • The financial institutions share 10.3% = $100 capital loss.
    • >Top→so-called "Sadomasochistic economy"


  • 財政の下支えがゼロ成長を維持:
    • 過去十年間の資産価値の下落は1300兆円(2.5年分のGDPに匹敵)
    • この間の景気対策は140兆円によってデフレスパイラルを防いだ。この内、真水は50兆円弱
    • わずか50兆円の堤防が1300兆円の洪水 (デフレ圧力) を防ぐという、有史以来の成功した経済政策のひとつ。
    • この間、企業は所得を維持して債務の圧縮に成功した。 (企業の有利子負債残高は、1995年のピークから2000年には102兆円減少)
    • 財政赤字は、大体2003年頃まで必要。
  • 1997-8年の橋本政権の悪循環:
    • 財政支出15兆円減少 (消費税増、特別減税廃止、社会保障負担増、大型補正予算見送り)
    • その後の日本経済は5期連続マイナス成長(メルトダウン状態)
    • 1996年の財政赤字22兆円は、99年には37兆円に急増
  • フーバー失政後のルーズベルト大統領:
    • 1933年より積極財政により経済の建て直し(ニューディール政策)
    • 1937年には、財政再建が始まると、米国経済は崩壊し、株価は再び半分、鉱工業生産は70%に、失業率は急増。
  • 小泉政権(竹中大臣):
    • フーバー大統領(Andrew Mellon財務長官) と同じ構造改革論.
    • さらに、銀行淘汰を目的としてペイオフ解禁の強行も問題。
  • 著者の意見:
    • 「財政の中立命題」成立せず:
    • 人々の将来不安は、財政赤字ではなく、会社のリストラによる不安。
    • 特に、9.11以降のUSへの輸出減を補完する意味で、補正予算(真水5-10兆円)必要。
  • 小渕政権の積極財政(1998.10-2000.4):
    • 株価時価総額を213兆円増加
    • 金融機関保有分は14.5%ゆえ、31兆円のキャピタルゲイン。
    • 1998.10の金融機関の国債保有高43.7兆円。国債利回りは0.845%→1.775%へ上昇。キャピタルロスは約3兆円。前述と合わせ、28兆円のキャピタルゲイン
  • 小泉政権誕生後(2001.3-2001.9):
    • 株価暴落による時価総額減:100兆円
    • 金融機関保有分は10.3%ゆえ、10兆円のキャピタルロス
    • →いわゆる「サド・マゾ経済


3. "Liquidity Trap":

  • Corporations have no idea of borrowing fund at a balance sheet recession. Demand for funds has fallen far faster than supply of funds.
  • It is impractical to induce banks to lend more money, which may cause more non-performing loans.
    • >Top'Inflation targeting' policy may cause banks' malfeasance.
    • Easy-money policy by BOJ may not cause the private sector to become rich.
    • BOJ can only buy government bond, debenture, commercial paper, etc.
  • "The Great Contraction" 1929-33:
    Many banks in US reduced: 40% decrease of money supply.
  • Only once in several decades, bubble economy collapses, and corporations tend to minimize their debt and funds demands situation changed. → Market will not respond to up or down of interest rate. → Government remains the only borrower → Both Money supply and GDP depend on government fiscal policy.
    • >Top "Crowding Out":
      Action of fiscal policy in usual situation may scramble for the limited fund between the private sector and the government.
    • "Liquidity Trap":
      Even inducement of lower interest rate and increase of money supply can not pick up the market.
    • Demand for funds by private sector and level of interest rate indicate us the real situation.
  • Greenspan of US FRB (Oct. 2001):
    Advised fiscal boosting measures corresponding to 1% of US GDP.
    • Rate of Operation of US industry: down to the level of July 1983.
  • Sakakibara, MOF financier (June 1999):
    • Exchange operation of $30B without prior consensus with Larry Summers, US Treasury Secretary, aiming cheaper yen¥120 from¥117 per US$1.
    • But actually, yen arose further because of Japan-US disharmonious relation.
    • In 1930s at the time of global balance sheet depression, every country rushed to depreciate each currency, becoming about protectionism, and chilling global trade, and causing world economic crisis.


  • 企業もバランスシート不況下では、借金の発想なし
  • 銀行の貸し出し伸張には、貸出基準の緩和が必要だが、不良債権になるような借り手への貸付は無理
    • インフレ・ターゲット達成には、銀行の「背任行為」が必要
    • 日銀の量的緩和で、民間はリッチにならない
    • 日銀が買えるのは国債、社債、CPなど金融資産のみ
  • "The Great Contraction" 1929-33:
  • 何十年かに一回、バブルが発生して崩壊すると、企業は債務の最小化や資金需要の激変→金利の上下に景気反応せず→唯一の借り手は政府→マネーサプライもGDPも財政政策に依存
    • クラウディング・アウト
    • 流動性の罠」:
    • 上記のいずれかは、民間資金需要と金利が教えてくれる
  • グリーンスパン 2001.10:
    • 米国製造業の稼働率は1983.7の水準に下落
  • 榊原財務官 1999.6:
    • 円ドルレートを\117→\120の円安目標に
    • 日米間不調和は、市場は円高に着目
    • 1930年代のバランスシート世界不況の時も、各国は通貨切り下げ競争→保護主義→世界貿易激変→世界大恐慌となった。


4. Don't haste to clean up bad loans:

  • It is not the bottleneck that supply of funds, but demand for funds.
    • But the case of 1997 was the cause of supply of funds. Then yen depreciation and low stock price were concurrently occurred due to 'sale of Japan'; caused lowering of capital ratio of banks, thus brought 'credit crunch.'
  • Banks in Japan and in US never lend fund to ventures.
    • Only 1/8 ventures succeed.
  • The case of 'S&L' (Savings & Loan Association) in 1989:
    • Financial restriction commission like 'RTC' was established and sold out the asset of S&L.
    • The amount of sold asset of S&L was about 5% of US total asset. (About $160B)
    • Koizumi cabinet referred this case as solution of bad loans. But Japanese total loss of asset is $13,000B.
    • In Japan 95% caused problem, but only 5% seems sound, which is reverse of the case of US S&L. (5% problem and 95% sound) The similar measures can not be used in Japan.
  • Debt Crisis in Latin America in 1982:
    • Major US banks lent money to South America totaling $38B. The crisis there may have caused financially>Top systemic risk.
    • As background, corporations tend to depend on CP market for fund raising.
    • Paul Volcker, FRB chairman proclaimed to prevent making bad loans.
      • Neglect micro justice
      • Abandon policy of bad loans (Bredi bond)
      • Spending a decade to clear up the situation without burden on tax payers.
  • Financial Systemic Risk:
    • More sellers of asset, but fewer buyers of it.
    • If haste to clean up bad loan of $100B, which may cause further deterioration of market and depreciation of asset value. Thus new bad loan of $300B will rise out of questionable total asset of $1500b.
    • Recession is the cause of generating bad (=non-performing) loans.
  • Government's capital injectionin 1998:
    $600B, and $100B in the following year were injected to prevent credit crunch of banks.
    • Equity ratio of bank is 8% (BIS guidelines): Therefore, $10B capital injection will produce $1250B additional lending funds to banks.
    • Superfluous requirement of Financial Service Agency:
      required to submit restructuring program including cleaning of bad loans. Banks' credit crunch to improve ROE is correct action from microscopic viewpoint. →'Fallacy of Composition'
    • It is contradictory to request more easy-credit and also improvement of management.
  • Cleaning of bad loans (non-performing loans):
    • may fester the market, causing chain-reaction of bankruptcy.
    • Abandonment or Debt Equity Swap:
      Loss arises in bank side.
    • Even excess capacity makers sustain the market.

4. 不良債権処理は急ぐな:

  • ボトルネックは資金需要であり資金供給ではない。
    • 1997年の貸し渋りは供給要因だった。日本売りによる円安と株安の同時進行→銀行の自己資本比率の低下→貸し渋り
  • 日も米も銀行はベンチャーに貸出せず
    • ベンチャーで成功するのは1/8
  • 米国貯蓄貸付組合(S&L)の破綻処理(1989):
    • RTCという公的金融機関を設立し、S&Lの資産を売却処理。
    • 米国の全資産の5%に過ぎない。解決には$160Bの負担
    • 小泉内閣の不良債権処理の雛型。但し、日本の資産価格の下落は1300兆円(=$13,000B)
    • 95%に問題があり、5%が健全の時に、5%が問題で95%が健全な時と同じ手法は使えない。
  • 中南米債務危機(1982年)に匹敵:
    • 米国の大手銀行による中南米諸国への貸出($38B)→システミックリスク
    • 背景:企業の運転資金としてのCP市場の発展
    • ボルカーFRB議長による不良債権化阻止方針
  • 金融システムリスク
    • 資産の売り手は沢山、買い手はほとんどなし状態
    • 例えば、不良債権10兆円を早急に処理すると、それに伴う景気の悪化と資産価格の下落で、問題債権150兆円の内、30兆円が新たに不良債権化しまうような危険性
    • →景気が悪いから不良債権が発生
  • 1998年の公的資金注入
    • 銀行の自己資本比率は8%ゆえ、10兆円の資本投入すれば、125兆円の貸し渋りを回避可能
    • 金融監督庁の余計なこと:
    • 貸し渋り解消要請と経営改善要求とは矛盾
  • 不良債権処理:
    • 清算方式:景気・連鎖倒産の恐れ
    • 債権放棄/Debt Equity Swap:
    • 供給過剰の企業でも景気下支え要因


5. Can Koizumi accomplish reforms?:

  • Background of higher rating for Koizumi cabinet:
    • Support for other than his economic policy.
    • Poor understanding of his economic policy
    • Expectation for 'Leap in the dark'
  • Koizumi lacks explanation for reasons of long-term slowdown.
    • Usually it takes more than decade to recover from balance sheet recession.
  • Koizumi's 'Large-boned or Brawny Policy':
    • No diagnosis why the decade-long recession occurred.
    • Mood of self-imposed control to reveal dangers of his tricky logic.
    • Final clearance of bad loans within 2 years is too radical. (Lack of 'Sequencing')
      • The target of clearance seems only $127B (3rd/4th category of bad loans)
      • But total bad loans including questionable ones (2nd category) may amount to $1500b
      • If the target is limited, no need to rush the clearance.
    • Minister Takenaka resembles to 70 years ago Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon.
  • Supply side economy by Reagan/Thacher in the beginning of 1980s:
    • In US: short-term interest rate was 20%, and long-term rate was 14%
  • Selection of general construction companies:
    • may cause increase of unemployment, and oligopoly by the remained companies.
    • maintainingemployment and earnings is more important for total productivity of Japan.
  • Voices from the market:
    • Financial deficit:
      increased from $220B (1997) to $300B (2001)
    • Economic indicator: 2001 is less than average of 1996
    • Government bond interest: 1.4% (1997) and also around 1.4% (2001); historically low rate means historically expensive government bond, which expects more active fiscality.
    • Ultra anemia situation:
      Decrease of demand for funds of private sector; $350B (7.5% of GDP) is bigger than increase of fiscal deficit ($150B).
  • Function of finance:
    • to maintain people and corporations' earnings
    • to succeed to reduce balance of debt of corporations
    • to prevent flood of $13,000B by dike of $1400B
    • to enable digestion of government bond; subject to
      • low bond interest
      • balance of ordinary budget
      • yen base and bought by Japanese
  • Is the financial deficit the income transfer between generations?
    • If government tax income is 100 and private sector's income is 100
    • If government issues government bond 20, then
      • Present generation can spend 80 of private and 120 of government.
      • Next generation can receive 20 of bond, then can spend 120 of private and 80 of government, same total as the present generation.
      • In addition, next generation can inherit sound economy.
  • Clearance of bad loans and regeneration of finance are postwar treatment of bubble economy.
    • These two are not structural reform
    • If we try to treat these problems neglecting economic strength, bad loans and financial deficit tend to expand before those recovery.
      • In 1997 the effort of financial recovery increased rather financial deficit; from $220B to $370B (1999)
  • Lifting suspension of >Top 'Deposit Pay-Off':
    • This is a policy of stopping full amount of savings protection by the government since 1996 over the limit of $100K.
    • 'Deposit Pay-Off' policy is a far global standard.
    • About half of the total savings of $5,000B in Japan are more than $100K.
  • Rating of banks (by Moody's Investors Services Inc.)
    • Bank of America: A-
    • Citi Bank, Chaise: B+
    • Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank: D
    • Shinsei Bank: D-
    • Other major city banks: E+
    • Daiwa Bank and Yasuda Trust & Banking: E
    • "E" rate means "outside support needed"
    • It takes 5-6 years or a decade to return to the normal rating.
    • Japanese financial system might fail into crisis within one hour if big depositors are destabilized.
    • The case of Continental Illinois Bank: Crisis occurred within several hours, and nationalized 2 days later.
    • Moral hazards; should be controlled by strict inspection by the authority.

5. 小泉改革は実行できるか:

  • 小泉内閣の高い支持率の背景:
    • 経済政策以外
    • 経済政策への理解不足
    • ショック療法("Leap in the dark")期待
  • 長期低迷の説明不足:
    • バランスシート不況は治療に10年以上かかる
  • 小泉内閣「骨太方針」
    • なぜ10年間も停滞したのかの原因究明なし
    • 小泉政策の危険性への報道自主規制
    • 2年以内の不良債権最終処理は過激すぎる(政策の順序づけなし)
      • 主要行の不良債権(第三・第四分類)12.7兆円で、問題債権(第二分類)を含む不良債権の合計は150兆円ある。
      • 短期間でできることが限られているなら、最初から処理を急ぐ必要なし
    • 竹中大臣は70年前のAndrew Mellon財務長官
  • 1980年代初めのレーガン/サッチャーによるサプライサイド経済
    • 当事の米国は短期金利20%、長期金利14%
  • ゼネコ淘汰は完全雇用が前提
    • 失業増、残ったゼネコンの寡占化
    • 今は企業を極力つぶさず、雇用と所得を維持
  • 市場の声:
    • 財政赤字:
    • 経済指標:2001年でも96年度平均以下
    • 国債金利:1.4%(97)→1.4%台(01)
    • 超貧血状態:
  • 財政の役割:
    • 企業を含む人々の所得を維持すること
    • 企業の有利子負債残高は大幅に減少
    • 140兆円の堤防が1300兆円の洪水を止める
    • 国債の消化は可能か
      • 低金利である以上国債消化は可能
      • 日本が経常黒字国
      • 国債は円建てかつ自国民が消化
  • 財政赤字は世代間所得移転か?
    • 政府100の税収/民間100の所得の場合
    • 政府による20の国債発行は
      • 現世代は、民間80、政府120が使える
      • 将来世代は、国債20が償還され、民間120、政府80が使え、合計は同じ
      • さらに、後世には経済全体の健康も引き継ぐ
  • 不良債権処理と財政再建は戦後処理
    • これらは構造改革ではない
    • 2つのバブルの戦後処理を体力を無視しておこなうと、かえって不良債権も財政赤字も拡大
      • 97年の財政再建努力によって財政赤字は22兆円→37兆円(99)に拡大
  • ペイオフ解禁
    • 1996年から継続している預金全額保護を本来の1000万円の水準に落とす政策
    • ペイオフは国際標準から遠い位置にある
    • 日本の総預金500兆円の内、約半分が1000万円以上の大口預金
  • 銀行の格付け(ムーディーズ)
    • Bank of America: A-
    • Citi Bank, Chaise: B+
    • 東京三菱:D
    • 新生:D-
    • 他都銀:E+
    • 大和/安田信託:E
    • Eの意味は「外部の支援が必要」
    • まともな格付けには5-6年から10年かかる
    • 日本の金融システムは大口預金者の動揺により1時間で破綻の可能性
    • Continental Illinois銀行の場合、数時間で危機発生し、2日後には破綻し国有化された
    • モラルハザードは、検査当局の監視強化で


6. What Japan should challenge?:

  • Corporations should change present negativism of borrowing money as long as household continues high saving ratio. Deflation gap of Japan can not be improved without balance of savings and investment, and also continuation of financial deficit.
  • In 1939 US was also under such negativism syndrome.
    Long-term interest rate of 1920s could recover in 1959.
  • Japanese should change from intensive saving people to more spending people.
    • In US: "All savers" account policy; meaning tax exemption of the interest up to $2000.
  • Change of people's saving mind is very difficult.
  • "Saving is virtue" tradition countries: Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan
  • "Oshin Drama" world is a virtue microscopically, but a vice macroscopically.
  • "Exhortation" (Double consumption) campaign:
    "Consume more¥100 by the rich and¥1 by the poor."
    Different action is needed in the case of "fallacy of composition."
    • This campaign is more sound than zero-interest rate and financial deficit of $6,600B.
    • "Financial deficit is a future additional tax; which is better to consume now or to pay it later as a tax."
    • >Top "Reverse Consumption Tax": 1% refund to the people who spend more than 80% of their income.
    • Household consumption amounts 60% of GDP, and several percentage of this will cause same effect of double investment by corporations.
  • Double Leisure Program:
    Japanese people should change their life style.
    Luxury goods need more time to spend them.
    • Work more under excess production means 'fallacy of composition.'
    • Government should encourage 2-3 weeks long vacation.
  • Double Housing Space Program:
    High quality house is asset. The value of real estate should be equal to floor area of the house, and profit of the real estate should not depend on the land price.
  • Correction of High Cost Habit:
    Excessive inhabitant egoism is the cause of useless public works.
    • Early completion incentives to public works
    • Attraction to investment
    • Collision with vested interest
  • Free trade policy and appropriate measure to China/India
  • Incentives to long-term holding of stocks.
  • 'Exit' problem of a official buying out operation:
    Cross holding of stocks was originated from securities depression in 1960s.
  • "Market Price Accounting" is >Top pro-cyclical: expands business fluctuations.
    • Central bank and government should function toward "counter cyclical." (to curb business fluctuations.)
  • Japan is a minimum " >Top "Downside Risk" country; which can be prevented by appropriate policy.
  • Hashimoto cabinet ran after six hares, but it was problem that the faster one was fiscal reconstruction.
    • Similarly, Koizumi cabinet is running after faster hares of clearance of bad loans and fiscal reconstruction.

6. 日本経済のチャレンジすべきこと:

  • 家計の高貯蓄に対する企業の借金拒絶症
  • 1939年代の米国でも借金拒絶症:
  • 人々を一生懸命貯蓄する世界からもっと消費させる世界へ
    • 米国では"All savers' account":上限$2000までは金利無税
    • 人々の貯蓄に関する考えを変えるのは至難
    • 日本、韓国、中国、台湾がみな「貯蓄は美徳」の伝統
  • おしんの世界ような貯蓄はミクロでは美徳だがマクロでは悪徳
  • Exhortation運動(消費倍増計画):
    • ゼロ金利、財政赤字660兆円に比べればまともな政策
    • 財政赤字は将来の税金であり、今使うか、将来税金で取られるかどちらか
    • 逆消費税」:所得の80%以上消費した人には1%の税金還付
    • 個人消費はGDPの60%もあるので、あと数%伸びるだけで、企業の設備投資倍増と同じ効果
  • 余暇倍増計画:
    日本人は ライフスタイルを変える必要
    • 供給過剰下で頑張って仕事することは合成の誤謬
    • 政府のリーダシップで2-3週間の休暇奨励
  • 住宅面積倍増計画:
  • 高コスト体質の是正:
    • 公共工事に早期完工インセンティブを
    • 投資対象としての魅力
    • 既得権益との衝突
  • 自由貿易体制と中国・インド対策
  • 株式の長期保有に関する優遇措置
  • 株の買取機関の出口問題:1960年代の証券不況時の買取が、企業の株持ち合いのルーツ
  • 時価会計はプロ・サイクリカル
    • 中央銀行や政府の役割は本来は"Counter-cyclical"(循環抑制的)
  • 日本はダウンサイド・リスクが最小
    • 政策を打てば止められるリスク
  • 橋本内閣は6匹の兎を追ったが、その中の財政再建という足の速い兎を追ったことが問題
    • 小泉内閣も不良債権処理、財政再建という足の速い兎を追っている。

>Top <Deflationary Spiral>

  1. A typical Japanese may spend ¥800 of ¥1000 income, and save the remaining ¥200 with a bank.
  2. During a balance sheet recession, corporations will not borrow the ¥200, which will become "leakage."
  3. The spent portion of¥800 becomes someone else's income.
  4. The second person may spend ¥640 and save ¥160.
  5. This process will continue until household spends all money to maintain their life style.
  6. At this level, say ¥500, there will be no leakage and an equilibrium is reached. (This is exactly happened during the Great Depression in US)


  1. 典型的な日本人が¥1000の収入の内¥800を消費し、残り¥200を銀行に預けるとする
  2. バランスシート不況下では、企業がこの¥200を借りないので、¥200は資金循環から漏れることになる
  3. 消費された¥800分は誰かの収入になる
  4. 次の人は¥640を消費し、¥160を預金する
  5. このプロセスは家計が生活を維持するためにすべての金を使うまで続く
  6. このレベルを¥500とすると、もはや資金循環の漏れはなくなり均衡に到達する(このことは実際に米国大不況の間発生した。)

| Top | Home | Article | Bookshelf | Keyword | Author | Oxymoron |